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PREFACE

It seems the
ions

least

I can do to mollify ruffled opin¬

is to offer a word of explanation as

to how a medical

student comes to write an essay in philosophy for his medical
school thesis.

Without disclosing the argument that is

follow in t.he text,

perhaps

to

I can nevertheless prepare the

way a bit by ashing the question,

"What should

cise as a thesis accomplish for the student?"
admittedly not the only possibility,

such an exer¬
My answer,

was as follows:

and

the the¬

sis should provide an opportunity to return to certain fun¬
damentals and explore a field at a depth which the student
may not again enjoy for some time.
mates and I were told,
clinical;

Again and again my class¬

"Do not rush so fast to master the

you have your whole lifetime to do that.

vantage of your studenthood and immerse yourself
You may never again get such a golden chanceS"
my advisors at their word,
books."

that
a

And so

I took

or even psychometrics.

statistics,

For it seemed to me

if we indeed were to "return to the basic sciences,"

thought!

1 analysis would reveal

specialty.
I offer

then

rhat philosophy was the

proper basic science of psychoanalysis,

tone ,

in thinking.

returning for nearly a year "to the

Only my books were not biochemistry,

neurophysiology,

Take ad¬

my chosen medical

My text will defend this point of view in detail;

it now without further comment by way of
I merely wish to put on record that

-

i

-

setting the

I see no radical

”

ii

discontinuity between the educational aims of my thesis and
a more traditionally conceived one.

This project has afforded

me the occasion to think deeply about things which I trust
will
a

influence the whole of my future professional career as

doctor,

and

avoiding the

I

regard that as neither irrelevant to,

issues of,

is probably one of
at Yale,

medical school.

nor

On the contrary,

it

the most valuable) things about the freedom

and for which I am greatly thankful.

I would

like to take this opportunity to express my

gratitude for the numerous friends and teachers who have
helped me over the past year.

To Dr.

much of my above-mentioned freedom,
a carte blanche with my time,
even if bemusedly sceptical of
Harries,

who

Theodore Lidz

I owe

as he saw fit to give me

trusting me to find my own way,
the outcome.

Professor Karsten

introduced me to philosophy eight years ago,

helped to guide me though the interstices of Being and Time
this year with his accustomed clarity and honesty.
especially Humphrey Morris,

Many friends,

Flip Kur.sberg and Donna Avedisian,

goaded me to clearer thinking in our frequent conversations.
And Adrienne Kols and my parents die' me the tremendous favor
of editing and proofing.
Professor Edward S.

Finally,

Casey,

my deepest debt is owed ta

whose encouragement and interest

were there from the very beginning,
and thoughtfulness were
sharpen my argument.

and whose broad reading

the perfect stone against which to

To them all

I

say a

thousand thanks,

knowing that whatever shortcomings that are to be found within
are not of their doing,

New I-Iaven
21 February,

1977

but are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of
C.

G.

lies eit the very heart of

Jung's system of Analytical Psychology.

understanding of
Gestalt of
from Freud,
atry.

symbol

the term as Jung uses

his work,

and contemporary medical psychi¬

For many academic psychiatrists,
remained all

throughs

in psychopharmacology,

clinical behaviorism,

In a period

interest

seemed esoteric,

in

remote,

Isolated from the mainstream of

the American psychiatric community as
is often regarded

the notion

revolutionary break¬

and a growing

symbolism has

and capriciously arbitrary.

however,

too obscure.

dominated by Freudian ego psychology,

symbol

it reveals the entire

and clarifies at once his divergence

Structuralism,

of Jung's symbol has

A fundamental

it has been,

the Jungian

suspiciously by psychiatrists as a

curious and confused aberration of Freud's earlier formally
defined and accepted concept,
syncracy,

and

idio-

lacking claim to an intellectual consensus.

The thesis of
the case.

unable to rise above mere

this essay is to prove that such is not

In the following pages we will demonstrate the ex¬

tensive similarity and correspondence with Jung's concept of
symbol that exists

in much of

philosophical thought.

19th and

20th century European

The first part of

our argument will

consist of m extensive hermeneutical analysis of all the
pertinent material which Jung wrote on the subject of

1

symbolism.

2

In this section we will attempt to bring together various
strands of Jung's thinking in such a way as
broader implications of

this one concept.

we shall endeavor to clarify some ol
conceptions which have hampered a

to reveal the

At the same time

the more persistent mis¬

properly dispassionate eval¬

uation of Jung's thought.
In the second part we shall turn our attention to the
intellectual antecedents of Jung's

ideas on symbolism.

within the German metaphysical tradition,

Staying

we will seek to trace

the concept's heritage from Kant through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche,
pausing to consider the contemporaneous work of Cassirer,

and

ending finally in the present-day thinking of Martin Heidegger.
If

it appears

that this heritage

degger than to Jung,

that

in this second half of

is as

leads more directly to Hei¬
it should be.

For our claim

the essay will be that Heidegger

is

unquestionably the philosophic counterpart of Jungian psycho¬
analysis,

Jung's and Binswanger's protestations to the contrary

notwithstanding.
As a disclaimer by way of anticipation,
to add what this paper
attempt to

Representing as

locate Jung's thought

dialectic of
his

is not.

this century,

it has

in the general
little

let me hasten
it does an
intellectual

interest

in defending

ideas by detailed comparisons with antithetical systems.

Rather,

I hope only to further ciar.fy them by revealing their

ancestry and searching out their kirdred.

Hence,

passingly touch on Freud and Structi.ral.ism,
alternatives.

As Thomas Kuhn points

lating between scientific systems

out,

I

shall only

to name but two

the task of

is thankless,

trans¬

and all

the

3

the more so for pre-scientific onesi
Each group uses its own paradigm to argue that paradigm's
defense. . . . The status of a circular argument is only
that of persuasion.
It cannot be made logically or even
probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step
into the circle.^
Moreover,

were I

respondences of

to attempt a

systematic analysis of

two competing theory systems,

the cor¬

I would probably

lose what Michael Polanyi calls the comprehensive meaning of
the system I was trying to elucidate.
of

the reader

is

that he approach this

of

the protagonists,

that he

all

that

is asked

topic through the eyes

indeed "step into their circle"

and try to apprehend their Gestalt of
reality in their terms.

Hence,

the world so as

Would that he be surprised?

to see

PART 15
A DISCOURSE ON SYMBOL

JUNG'S EARLY THOUGHTS ON SYMBOLS

At first glance,

it might seem somewhat arbitrary to

single out the notion of

symbol as being distinctive of Jung's

thought.

it not Freud who first showed us the

After all,

meaning that

was

lay hidden in dreams?

known for archetypes,
uation process?
held

And

is not Jung better

psychological typology,

Surely the question of

and the

individ¬

symbolism is what Ju.ig

in common with his psychoanalytical contemporaries.
And yet,

that

is only at first glance.

fact shared only the word's hollow shell,

and

For Jung

in

instead went on

to develop a meaning for symbol that rested on a unique epis¬
temological foundation.

This new meaning stemmed from his

profoundly different visioning of
prior,

and

instinctual

it was that
roots of

insight which led him to explore the
spiritual

elaborated as early as
a re-visioning.

the unconscious as ontologica

1912,

Although it

life.

His concept of symbol,

was the seminal expression of

is common to hear the Freud/Jung

break described as a disagreement over the libido theory,
shall show that what was fundamentally at
different conception of
were made possible.

symbol,

we

issue was Jung's

by which all of his later

Viewed in this way,

itself becomes symbolic of

such

the

ideas

libido controversy

the deeper debate over symbol.

Jung first appeared on the European psychoanalytical
scene

in 1907,

with the publication of

his Psychology of

'

.

>-

■

■

6

Dementia Praecox,
immediately,

for

This early work won the admiration of Freud
it marked oneof

the* first attempts to demon¬

strate intentionality and meaning in the symptoms and speech
of psychotics according to psychoanalytical principles.
was clearly under the sway of Freud*s
at this point,

Jung

intellectual tutelage

and the book argued for a direct application

to psychosis of concepts developed by Freud for hysteria and
neurosis.

As a

result,

in and for itself.

Jung paid little attention to symbolism

Quoting Pelletier,

as "a very inferior form of

thought"

the power of discrimination."
but was made of

"indistinct,

mforced by images."

due to a

it off

"deficiency in

A symbol stood for a thought,
subsidiary associations"

"obscure rather than clarify it."
conceived as "an intentional

he merely passed

In contrast,

which

allegory was

interpretation of a thought,

re-

1

Ordinary dream symbols were also postulated to be the
result of

such a deficiency.

called "sleep-suggestion,"

Sleep was

induced by a mechanism

which emptied the mind of

the crowds

of thoughts whose presence constitutes the state of being awake.
This was accomplished by withdrawing attention and,
sequence,

depriving the thoughts of

themselves remained,

hox^ever,

2

Since the thoughts

they were still expressed,

now without benefit of attention -vaguely.

clarity.

as a con¬

Kith this explanation,

hence symbolically and

Jung had come up with a

suitable alternative to Freud*s censor
pendence needing to be manifested,

(some youthful

after all

.

.

.),

still accepting an essentially impoverished notion of
symbol.

only

inde¬
while
the

-

7 -

To this youthful formulation the

later Jung might

well have levelled the criticism he so freely directed at
others,

namely of succumbing to the fallacy of ’'nothing but.”

As William James put

it

in Pragmatism:

What is higher is explained by vhat is lower and treated
forever as a case of 'nothing but' — nothing but something
else of a quite inferior sort.^
In Dementia Praecox Jung had failed to recognize that this
phenomenon,

the symbol,

lacked intelligibility precisely

because he,

the observer,

was not ecual to it.

By the next year Jung was moving to correct this error.
In "The Content of
his first
would

the Psychoses”

inklings of

(1908),

Jung began to show

just what the unconscious ultimately

imply to him about human existence.

He no

longer rested

content with the facile explanation of the symbol as the mere
withdrawal of attention.

There was something

special behind

symbols which claimed being in its own right:
We healthy people, who stand with both feet in reality,
see only the ruin of the patient in this world, but not
the richness of that side of the psyche which is turned
away from us.
Unfortunately only too often no further
knowledge reaches us of the things that are being played
out on the dark side of the soul, because all the bridges
have broken down which connect that side with this.^
Two crucial insights emerge from this passage.
now saw the unconscious as having ar

in terms of consciousness.

"that” world,

Jung

autonomous existence,

albeit of a still fairly personal nature.
defined it

First,

5

He no longer

The unconscious was

on equal footing with "this”

one.

It even took

on a certain "richness.”

Both consciousness and the unconscious

were subsumed under soul,

whose two sides they formed.

But if the unconscious ceased to be defined perjora-

8

-

tively as "not consciousness,"
be given for

-

some explanation still had to

its apparent obscurity.

And so Jung placed new

emphasis on the expression of unconscious contents
ness,

and the difficulties

inherent

in conscious¬

in such expression.

The

obscurity became a question of knowledge and communication.
There was an epistemological barrier,

an obstacle to our con¬

scious knowledge of "the things
the unconscious.
however,

that are being played out" in
to
The barrier seemed not/be insurmountable,

for there existed "bridges"

over

it.

These bridges

were made by meaningful symbols.
The plight of the psychotic patient thus
partly in the breakdown of a

symbol

lay at

system which would ade¬

quately bring unconscious material to consciousness.
patient,"

said Jung,

for the dim,
stood,

dismal

"can spare only a
realm of

reality?

"The

fev; mysterious symbols
they need not be under¬

for our understanding has long ceased to be necessary

for her."

But implicit

in this failure was the assumption that

symbols were supposed to be understood.

To be successful,

had not only to bridge the gap to the unconscious,
expressed
was

least

but to be

in imagery which transcended idiosyncraey,

intelligible

were rooted,

intersubjectively to others.

at the level of consciousness,

world which we all share and call reality.

they

and which

Hence symbols

in the phenomena I.
And the patient* 3

incapacity to generate such intelligible symbols represented
for Jung,

at this stage of his thinking,

mastery of this phenomenal

world,

For

a

loss of

the ego*s

it was the intact ego

that function of the psyche so well adapted to manipulating
the images of external reality,

which accommodated the indi-

9

-

vidual to the demands of collective,
ego assumed the task of

social existence.

insuring that the psyche*s communi¬

cations were expressed understandably.
significant

The

Therefore,

it was as

that others failed to understand a psychotic*s

productions,

as

from reality.
conducive to,

it was that her ego fragmented and withdrew
The former was both symptomatic of,

and further

the latter.

The next few years found Jung actively engrossed in
trying to elucidate the meaning of his psychotic patients*
stymbols.

In the course of

tion which led,
der Libido

this work,

with the publication of Wandlunqen und Symbole

(Symbols of Transformation),

Freud in 1912-1913.

the phenomenological

on account of

to his break with

Jung began to regard the unconscious as

ontologically prior to consciousness.
course,

he came to a realiza¬

He acknowledged,

immediacy of consciousness which,

its continual perceptual input,

appeared to be

the ground of human existence.

But Jung recognized this

mediacy for what it really was:

an illusion.

not the ground of existence,
grounded ir.

but was

the unconscious at that.

philosophical metaphor of

of

im¬

Consciousness was

itself grounded,

and

Jung expressed this

"groundedness" with a similar trope:

Individual consciousness is onl/ the flower and the fruit
of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the
earth; and it would find itself in better accord with the
truth if it took the existence of the rhizome into its
calculations.
For the root matter is the mother of all
things,^
But although Jung defended this concept of the ontological
priority of

the unconscious as empirical,

with innumerable clinical examples,

it was

and supported it
in fact a

philosophical

-

interpretation,

10

based on a particular metaphysical point of

view.
Novi metaphysics, Aristotle's ‘'first philosophy,"

is

O

the elucidation of

the being of being.

Heidegger expands

this compact definition for us by calling metaphysics
questioning beyond the things that are,
them as such and _in the whole,

in order to regain

for the purpose of comprehension."

The ultimate task of this "questioning beyond"
that branch of metaphysics called ontology,
the question,

"How does

this "beyond"

—• that

being,

found.

which addresses

and not

For Jung,

the very object of the onto¬

logical endeavor -- was the unconscious.
scious was the whole,

is allotted to

it stand with being?"1^

is,

"the

Only in the uncon¬

just the ephemeral part,

to be

It is for this reason that ve characterize the uncon¬

scious as ontologically prior.
Jung's eittitude toward the unconscious was further
enced by a second philosophical conclusion.

influ¬

For Jung's meta¬

physics precluded the possibility of ever attaining any know¬
ledge of

the unconscious,

our being.

Jung was a

this ontologically prior ground of

self-avowed Kantian -~

"I am old-fashioned

enough not to have got beyond Kant"11 — and strenuously objected
to any suggestion that the Ding an sich might be known:
It is a thoroughly outmoded standpoint, and has been so
ever si \ce the time of Immanuel Kant, to think that it
lies wi ,hin the power of man to assert a metaphysical
truth.,
The existence of a metaphysically conceived unconscious was
not in doubl
sphere,

here.

One had to assume a "nan-conscious psychic

even if only as a

’negative borderline concept,'

like

11

Kant’s Dina an sich,"
evidence alone.

just on the face of Freud’s overwhelming

But epistemologicajly,

one could "not pretend

to know or assert anything about the state of
m the unconscious."

psychic elements

13

The impact of these two metaphysical presuppositions
had a profound effect on Jung’s
data.

interpretation of clinical

It was Jung’s philosophy which denied even the possibility

of sexuality as constituting the primary content of the uncon¬
scious.

The unconscious was "mother of all things'*

its being embraced all "the fundamental facts of
.
14
being."

To explain human existence in terms of

(or the will to power,
error therefore.

for that matter)

Not only did

and as such

[one’s] own
sexuality

represented a

double

it single out as pre-eminent

a characteristic which was both variable and only one among
many,

but it aimed at a

level which was simply too superficial.

The ontological cannot be explained by the ontic.

It

is a

category mistake to call any phenomenal reality "fundamental."
It behooves us to define here what
mental.

is meant by funda¬

Heidegger again comes to our aid by reminding us

the fundamental is what

is broad and deep,

it takes in the whole of being and pursues
.
15
its ground.

Put

in this way,

which is to say,
it to its source,

we can pull forth the latent

implications of Jung’s thinking without,
violence to his ultimate intent.
him to transcend the ontic

that

we believe,

doing

Jung’s metaphysics forced

level of

sought the most originary structures

individual phenomena.
of being,

He

the a priori

n r~

determinants of human existence.

He tas much less concerned

at this stage with the way particular psyches actually con-

»■

_

12

stellated themselves at the tangible level of external reality:
some might express themselves through sexuality;
will to power;

yet others

bilities were manifold,
to any one trait.
secondary.

in the

The possi¬

and no man could be reduced exclusively

But these external characteristics were

What Jung pursued was that which lay behind these

phenomenal expressions,
tence,

in the creative drive.

others

determined the ground of their exis¬

and was common to all men.
Now Jung himself certainly did not see his thinking

process as covering this ontological territory.

When Freud

. .
.
. .
. .
accused him of hiding behind a "religious-libidmal cloud,"

L7

Jung retorted by underscoring the objective and empirical
methods by which he had arrived at his conclusions.
end of Symbols of Transformation,

a 450 page gloss on fifteen

pages of a schizophrenic's fantasy,
esoteric

(but not on that account

At the

he defended his

irrelevant)

incredibly

mythological

researches as follows:
I have tried to understand her situation to the best
of my ability and have set down the results of my efforts
as an example of the nature and extent of the problems
about which any doctor who wants to practise psychotherapy
should have scientific knowledge.
He needs a science of
the psyche, not a theory about it.
I do not regard the
pursuit of science as a bickering about who is right, but
as an endeavor to augment and deepen human knowledge.^
The key here lies with the words "nature and extent."
nature of *he problem
of

human existence.

it plunges to the question

The tale that

Miss Miller's fantasies
meaning of

is deep:

is told as Jung unravels

is the st.or]' of being itself,

her psychological existence.

problem is broad:

The

The extent of

the
the

it covers the whole realm of human experi-

■

-

ence,

13

as expressed by the most varied mythologies from all

times and all places.

The nature and extent of these problems

is indeed fundamental.
But

despite our interpretation,

it was as a scientist

and not a philosopher that Jung proposed to expand the scope
of his study so as to include the whole man.
Freud on this account,

"As you know,

from the outside to the

let

.
19
knowledge lie there neglected."

deals.

I always have to proceed

inside and from the whole to the part.

I would find it too upsetting to

phenomenal world,

He remarked to

large tracts of human

By the outside he meant the

the world of appearances with which science

But note also the emphasis on the whole.

nomena were to be

investigated,

not

All the phe¬

just those which scientists

were comfortable with or merely used to.

Hence,

any conclusions

he arrived at were surely based upon a broad panoply of objec¬
tive facts,
ceptions,

and did not derive from any philosophical precon¬

or so he

And yet,

insisted.

is this disclaimer entirely truthful?

Theory of Psychoanalysis

(1912),

to Symbols of Transformation,
Freud’s empirical acumen,

the theoretical counterpart

Jung reserved highest praise for

but distinguished between a subjec¬

tive and objective element.

Referring to Freud’s theory of

the sexually latent period in childhood,
exception,

In his

with which he took

Jung noted;

There his been
the hypothesis
Freud observed
The error lies

no error of observation.
On the contrary,
of the latency period proves how exactly
the apparent recommencement of sexuality.
in the conception.

So apparently the question of object.ive facts was not quite

14

so simple.

It

is one kind of fact to take note of a develop¬

mental pattern in children.

But this first kind of fact

is

transformed into another sort as we proceed to interpret it
and give it meaning.
"latency"

For to name this objective observation

is to imbue it with a

set of associations that

imme¬

diately places the fact within the subjective framework of
the observer.
appreciated,

It becomes someone* s conception,

and to be

requires adopting that someone's point of view.

Jung was adamant on this point,
anything but a theorist.

maintaining that "Freud was

He is an empiricist as anyone must

admit who is willing to go at all deeply into Freud's writings

.

and to try and see his cases as he sees them."

21

Thus Jung

expressly recognized the subjective quality of scientific
perception itself.

Even to observe the sequence of development

in children requires a certain point
misperception bear witness to.

of view,

as millenia of

But if Jung was acknowledging

the inherent presuppositions of any observing consciousness,
then this must apply to himself as well.
Jung argued that his psychology diverged from Freud
because of his more

inclusive data base,

to speak of the whole organism,

man.

which permitted him

But we see nox/ that he

himself admitted that truth is not merely a matter of breadth
and depth,

a question of

matter of whose facts,

fundamental,

and that

capacity to perceive a fact.

is a

facts.

It

function of

is equally a
insight,

the

Freud's genius was to recognize

in dreams and sexuality new facts which no one else had dis¬
cerned.

Tney were his facts.

ceptual level,

So too Jung,

cn this same per¬

perhaps even unknown to himself,

transcended

15

the bounds of classical psychoanalysis by acquiring his own
Gestalt and making a leap into a nevf world.

That leap was

not conditioned on amassing new data, however,
data might later support the theory.

Rather,

though such
those facts

themselves which Jung chose to recognize as evidence could only
have sprung into view after his insight into the ontological
priority of the unconscious, which framed his whole vision.
Thus we have seen how the first part of Jung's metaphysics
led to a new definition of the phenomena pertinent to the study
of the psyche, with the consequent downplaying of sexuality.
The second half carried with it even greater implications,
however,

since the epistemological inaccessibility of the

unconscious threatened to leave psychology high and dry,

rele¬

gated to puzzling out meaning from symptoms and the recollec¬
tion of repressed material.

Jung's broader conception of the

unconscious, which went beyond contents that were once known
but later repressed, wavered on becoming an empty hypothesis
unless a way existed to bridge the chasm which separated
totally unknown unconscious contents from consciousness.

This

bridge was the symbol.

★

*

*

Let us recall how this conception of symbol differs
from the bridge metaphor of 1908 cived earlier.

At that

point, Jung spoke of symbols as potentially clear channels of
communication that offered to bring unconscious contents to
consciousness.

Now, however,

he was

returning to a gloomier

notion of the symbol's intelligibility*

'
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We call these actions, vhose meaning and purpose are
not immediately evident, symbolic actions, or symbols.
On the basis of this reasoning we call a dream symbolic,
because it is a psychological product whose origin, mean¬
ing, and purpose are obscure, and is therefore one of the
purest products of unconscious constellation.22
But this differs from the exasperated description of
one crucial

respect,

namely the source of

It was no longer a matter of

in

this obscurity.

the symbol being somehow a

degenerate form of knowledge.

On the contrary,

was the clearest approximation of
was obscure.

1907

the symbol

something that

in itself

"Symbols are not allegories and not signs,"

Jung maintained.

"They are

images of contents which for the

most part transcend consciousness."^'
This distinction of
serves to clarify Jung*s

symbols

from allegories and signs

wider understanding of the uncon¬

scious as hinted at above.

Speaking in Symbols of Transfor¬

mation about phallic symbols

(Tom Thumbs,

Dactyls,

Cabiri),

Jung explained:
In [no]] case should they be taken literally, for they
are not to be understood semiotically, as signs for defi¬
nite things, but as symbols.
A symbol is an indefinite
expression with many meanings, pointing to something not
easily defined and therefore not fully known • • •24
The symbol

thus stands as mediator between two mutually

exclusive realms of being.
ground of being,
consciousness,

Just as the unconscious forms the

sufficient unto

so consciousness,

illuminates the phenomenal world,

itself and indifferent to
as

the

light of awareness,

heedless of

its own existential

foundations.
Since Jung evidently had aiieady formulated his defi¬
nition of symbols as opposed to signs in 1912,

it will not dis-

■
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tort the historical development of Jung's
from his more elaborate descriptions of
in Psychological Types
tinction.

25

expression.

Here,

(1921),

ideas

if we quote

these concepts found

in order to amplify this dis-

Jung posited three classes of metaphorical

Semiotic expression served as "an analogue or an

abbreviated designation for a

known thing.*'

Many of Freud4s

dream symbols would then be classified as semiotic.
ample,

the rising flood of water

For ex¬

in the nanny's dream repre¬

sents a

situation which can be more accurately and fully ex-

pressed

in other ways.

27

Allegoric expression was "an inten¬

tional paraphrase or transmogrification of a known thing."
too,

can be viewed as semiotic,

utility lies
it stands.

inasmuch as

It,

its functional

in the eventual cognizability of that for which
Allegories differ from simple signs,

however,

in

that they are meant to obscure rather than offer succinct
encapsulations.

But here it

is a question of audience:

allegories

permit things to be said that would otherwise be forbidden,
because only a

select audience knows the code.

are therefore only apparently obscure.
Travels or Freud's sexual symbols.

Allegories

One thinks of Gulliver* s

In the latter,

never any doubt as to establishing the meaning,
order to escape the repression of

the censor.

It

there

is

hidden in
is only a

question of breaking the code.
Filially,

there are Jung's

symbols.

unique place in his epistemology anc
signs

Symbols occupy a

cannot be likened to

A symbolic expression is "the best possible formulation

of a relati,ve 1 v unknown thing,

which

for that reason cannot
*■> O

be more clearly or characteristically represented*"c

Such

,

-

a statement

18

is senseless unless we postulate an unconscious

which contains more than

just repressed contents,

since the

repressed has at one time been only too well known.
this definition suggests that

Moreover,

there are unconscious contents

which in a certain sense are seeking to be known.
symbols as "the best possible formulation"

To envision

hardly paints the

picture of strife and antagonism which we have accustomed
ourselves to regarding as typical of
contrary,

the unconscious.

On the

they would appear to be a positively constructive

effort at communication.
Jung goes on to note that symbols may either be living
or dead.
extended

This distinction most assuredly resulted from his
investigations

into historical source material,

which brought to light quite

literally hundreds of examples

of genuine symbols which today are quite meaningless.
us be careful here.

An ancient Mithraic symbol is dead,

on account of our ignorance before its hidden secrets,
precisely because we know

too much about

are "pregnant with meaning":
Dead

it.

to see.

clearly articulate
death of a
sciousness.

As a result,
it

symbol thus

in the

not

but

Living symbols

it is now before

we know it and can more

lucidity of consciousness.

The

represents a further advance of con¬

Just as the creation of a

the arrival of a

let

.
.
29
it is contained within them.

symbols have brought forth their meaning:

us for all

But

living symbol signals

previously unknown content at a kind of

accommodation with consciousness,

so too its death culminates

the process of that content becoming totally incorporated into
consciousness.

Such a view implies a particularly historical

vision of psychology.

.

*■
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If left at this stage of development,
would have remained

incomplete.

After all,

in order to medi¬

ate between consciousness and the unconscious,
be something that was mediated.
of

one mode,
called

there had to

And recalling the

the title Symbols of Transformation,

also underwent a transformation,

the theory

last word

whatever was mediated

rendering what was proper to

appropriate now to the other.

That

something Jung

libido.
It suffices to say that libido was for Jung a

heuristic concept.

sheerly

He posited only as the most empty of words,

a kind of placeholder to denote the dynamic relationship

.

.

between consciousness and the unconscious.

31

It

m no way

was meant to explain why and how relationship was possible,
only that

it was possible.

It was for this reason that Jung

later moved on to the word [psychic] energy,
physics which also begs
energy actually is.

taking a cue from

ignorance before the question of what

32

First and foremost,

libido powers the ego.

This

idea

results from Jung*s extensive work with psychotic patients at
the BurghOlr.li.
of decathexis,

It fills a heuristic gap
i.e.

affective investment

in the explanation

the withdrawal of the psychotic ego's
in external reality.

binds consciousness together

As the energy which

into a unified experience,

its

absence causes fragmentation of consciousness and consequent
maladaptive behavior toward reality.
be "measured’'

quantitatively,

psychotic patient

In this sense libido can

as a function of how well the

is able to detach himself

reintegrate his consciousness around a

from fantasy and

self-consistent and

20

unified experience of reality.

No cittempt

is made here to

describe ego functioning qualitatively in terms of
Secondly,

libido potentiate.*; the instincts.

not be confused with the instincts per se,
actual"substance"

of

libido.
It should

which form the

the unconscious:

Experience shows that instinctual processes of whatever
kind are often intensified to an extraordinary degree
by an afflux of energy, no matter where it comes from .
One instinct can temporarily be depotentiated in favor
of another instinct, and this is true to psychic activ¬
ities in general.23
Libido,

although conserved,

ular site

.

waxes and wanes at any one partic¬

in the unconscious,

and brings

into play now this,

now that unconscious content.
Libido therefore ranges throughout both consciousness
and the unconscious,
things work.

and supplies whatever it

As a concept

needs than any reality.
also an unknown of

sorts,

is that makes

it expresses more our explanatory

And while

it

is

true that

this does not mean it should be

likened to the unconscious contents themselves.

It

to distinguish here between two kinds of unknown.
scious contents,

libido is

such as the instincts,

is crucial
The uncon¬

are unknown because

they are both incompatible with consciousness and hidden from
view.

Libido,

scribes a

on the other hand,

functional,

is unknown because it de¬

quantitative relationship which has no

substance.
This explication of Jung’s

libioo-energy theory is neces¬

sary to clarify the particular role symbols were
as playing in Symbols of Transformat ion.

envisioned

Let us recall that

the ego’s contents are solely composed of bits of perceived
reality.

To be sure,

the egc organizes.

judges,

relates,

anj

.
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distinguishes,

but that upon which these operations are per¬

formed comes via the senses.
This

The ego has no content itself.

is not an entirely sufficient description,

however,

because we know from the work in the psychology of perception
that what we perceive is no simple natter of mere '’objective**
reality,

impartially registered.

The meaning given by human

beings to their conscious experiences
way reality is perceived.

That

sent us with a uniform field of

is,

is biased ahead of

in the very

the ego does not

just pre¬

sensations from which we then

choose the things that matter to us;
are aware of

is reflected

rather the very field we

time by those choices the ego

makes regarding which perceptions to make consciously aware.
And what determines
ego*s choices

just which meanings will structure the

is the libido.

The libido may be said tc

emphasize particular perceptions by focusing a greater quantum
of energy upon them.

It directs the ego*s ever present

intentionality.3 4
But as there are an infinite variety of meanings
be found in the world,
seem implausible that
energy.

even fora single individual,
libido

is this

uniform,

That this is not so will be

remember that libido
can vary.

it might

indifferent

seen as soon as we

is relationship,

On the unconscious side,

to

and that which it relates

libido can intensify or

depotentiaue any one of a number of unconscious contents.
Depending on which instinctual nexus

is activated,

the libido

will correspondingly relate it to the appropriate subliminal
ego orientation.
particular

*r&y.

The ego is then said to be cathected in a

22

For

example,

a two year old
ment.

is

-

one would be hard pressed to deny that

instinctively moved to explore his environ¬

From the point of view of the ego,

his entire consciois

activity is geared to making instructive observations of,
manipulations upon,

the surrounding physical world.

perceives reality in the way which will best
certain basic relationships.
the grasp of a

Likewise,

powerful sexual

according to the

instinct,

The ego

facilitate

a neurotic,

and

learning

caught in

misperceives reality

logic of his ego's expression of

And though his behavior be called maladaptive,
priate ego counterpart to that particular

it

libido.
is the appro-

instinct's potenti¬

ation.
Ego functioning on this
this word carefully,

level is subliminal.

We choose

because we are trying to distinguish

between two levels of what is usually subsumed under the rubric
of ego consciousness.

Of course the ego operates as a

of conscious awareness --

that by definition alone.

field

And on

a certain level the child and the neurotic are both conscious,
or at

least aware,

of what they are doing.

level they are not.
to reality goes,
for them.
sciousness,
subliminal.

the choice has in a

sense already been made

and that screening process we characterize as
The specific nature of a subliminal screen at
(since it changes over time,

instincts)

instinct.

insofar as their particular orientation

Reality has been screened before it gets to con¬

any given moment
tiated

For

But at a deeper

as do the poten¬

is the ego analogue of a specific unconscious

They are related by libido.

The drawback of this subliminal
be obvious enough.

relationship should

Net only does it deprive us of a certain
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freedom which,

however illusory,

we deem our due,

but from

a practical point of view it also robs us of the fullest ad¬
vantages of consciousness.

After all,

the ego seems best de¬

signed to select optimal relationships and yet,
association with the unconscious goes,

as far as

its

it seems doomed to

relinquish any determining robe.
Here is precisely where symbols

intervene.

not forget the magnitude of the problem.
six with a two-foid dilemma.

Let us

We were faced on page

The unconscious seemed to con¬

sist of more than repressed material;

it was the source of all

meaning and the very ground for our being.

But along with this

realization came the additional discovery that the unconscious
contents were essentially barred to conscious experience.
then posited a mediating function,
what was mediated.
theory of

libido,

Perhaps now,

but were at

We

pains to describe

after this foray into the

we can specify mere accurately why libido

is a necessary hypothesis.

For if,

as Jung repeatedly insisted,

consciousness and the unconscious were mutually exclusive,

it

would not be possible to argue that an instinct per se was
somehow transformed

into awareness.

Consciousness and the

unconscious must remain autonomous zones.
enologically and are defined as such.
between the two must be possible,
been at a

And yet some relationship

otherwise Freud would have

loss to make his discoveries.

relationship metaphorically as

They are so phenom¬

libido,

Jung expressed this
or psychic energy.

Just

as electrical potential energy is described as the mathematical
function of charges separated

in

relationship of those charges),

32

space
sc

(i.e.

libido

as the spatial
is described as

24

a function of
scious
two.

the separation of consciousness from the uncon¬

In both cases no thing spans the gap between the
In both a field effect

electrical energy,

is apparent.

In the case of

this field has a determining effect on

the surrounding environment,

as when iron filings assume a

particular pattern when placed within range.
of

libido,

And in the case

the field structures our perceptual reality.

So

far the metaphor holds.
Jung also declared the psyche capable of an additional
property,

namely the transformation of

this energy.

If a

light bulb is attached to the two sides of an electrical
potential

(e.g.

a battery),

it will transform electrical

potential energy into light and heat.
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Similarly,

Jung pro¬

posed that symbols were "the psychological mechanisms that
transform energy."
vert

libido from a

37

These transformers functioned to "con-

* lower*

to a*higher*

form."

was deemed higher because it was conscious.
are still unaware of
gives expression,
energy in a

but

by the

To be sure,

like that light bulb,

form that we can perceive.

in the unconscious,

As a

in both camps.
but

its

formed by the dialectical

It

its own truth.

the

is "always

manifest forms are moulded

39

While con¬
antithetical

that energy can be trans¬

interaction of

ing transformation is dependent upor

symbol

transformer,

,nd the unconscious remain autonomous,

realms related by a field of energy,

we

it now manifests

ideas acguired by the conscious mind."

sciousness

This form

the ultimate reality to which the

symbol must stand with feet
grounded

38

the two.

both,

The result¬

and yet expresses

And while we cannot fully reconstruct the

25

the unconscious side,
it might be,

yet we now have at least a hint of what

since we have in the symbol a conscious exemplar

of something which it has helped to form.

It remains for us

to imagine what kind of unconscious meaning (antithesis) could
have combined with the visual imagery of consciousness (thesis)
to result in the symbol

(synthesis).

The final answer eludes

us, but in our imaginings we have at least now gotten underway.
Jung

fully

grasped the impact that this conception

of symbol would have on psychotherapy.

First of all,

one

would have to deal with the patient as he presented himself
to the therapist,

an individual for the most part unaware of

how the activation of basic instinctual dominants was express¬
ing itself intentionally but subliminally in complexes of the
ego.

As noted above, the libido would here still be of a

"lower" form.

It is not "converted into effective work,

instead] flows off unconsciously [i.e.
old channels,

. . .

that is,

tasy activities."
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[but

subliminally] along

into archaic sexual fantasies and fan-

The damaging effect of these fantasies

stems from their not being recognized as fantasies by the
patient.

He suffers from a kind of literalism.

for example,

A neurotic,

might attribute his difficulties with women to

external circumstances (including tha women themselves),

instead

of recognizing those externals as "symbolic" of unconscious
conflicts.

By concretizing unconscious fantasies in a way

that renders symbols into "an unsuitable form that offers

. .

.

libido too low a gradient,"
So the first

41

he fails to become conscious.

part of analysis takes

Its object is to lyse,

m a reductive quality.

to dissolve as it were,

these unconscious

2b

concretions turned into habit, and allow the libido to regress
back to the unconscious, v/here a new, more conscious rela¬
tionship between ego and instinct Ccin be constellated.

Here

Jung gives Freud full credit for the psychology he had thus
far developed.
With one exception,

that is.

For if we recall that

Jung viewed the unconscious as totally unknowable, as wholly
other,

then the extent of regression would have to be total.

Regression means a decathexis of the; ego*s object relations
via a withdrawal of libido.

For Freud,

regression was inti¬

mately associated with fixation, and implied the reestablish¬
ment of cathexis at a lower, more infantile and unconscious
level.

42

...

But Jung found this unacceptable,

insofar as it did

not radically alter the problem of literalism.

Where the

libido freed itself from finding concrete expression in symp¬
toms,

the fixation theory would bind it up again in another

phenomenal reality -- the patient*s actual parents.
This simply did not go far enough.

Again,

if we pos¬

tulate the priority of the unconscious and its fundamental in¬
accessibility,

then to call regression to the real parents

the end point would amount to falling prey to the same kind
of subliminal projection that characterized the full-blown

.

.

neurosis, albeit at a more primitive level.
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To take Jung*3

vision of uhe unconscious seriously would necessitate the final
withdrav/al of libido from all the eco's phenomenal cathexes.
The ego must see at last that its entire meaning structure is
dependent on the unconscious instincts, as mediated via libido.
Every single phenomena1 image to which we attribute value

'

27

derives that value from the unconscious.

It will not do to

attribute any objective component to phenomenal reality per se,
at least as far as its meaning is concerned.

This is not to

argue for some kind of 19th century German Romantic idealism,

.

.

which would literally make phantoms of us all.
reality is there, and operates lawfully.
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Of course

But what reality

means to us is wholly a function of the unconscious.

Jung

expressed this to Freud metaphorically in a letter v/hich dealt
with their disagreement over the incest taboo:
The incest taboo does not correspond with the specific
value of incest sensu strictiori any more than the
sacredness of the totem corresponds with its biological
value. ... In my opinion the incest barrier can no more
be explained by reduction to the possibility of real
incest than the animal cult can be explained by reduction
to real bestiality.
The animal cult is explained by an
infinitely long psychological development which is of
paramount importance and not by primitive bestial ten¬
dencies -- these are nothing but the quarry that provides
the material for building a temple.
But the temple and
its meaning have nothing whatever to do with the quality
of the building stones. . . . Like the stories of a temple,
the incest taboo is the symbol or vehicle of a far wider
and special meaning.^
Nothing in the phenomenal world,

including the actual parents,

has meaning by itself alone:
. . . Therapy must support the regression, and continue
to do so until the * pre-natal® stage is reached.
It must
be remembered that the ’mother® is really an imago, a
psychic image merely. . . . Hence regression leads back
only apparently to the mother; in reality she is the
gateway to the unconscious, intc the ’realm of the Mothers.
The message is clear.

Jung took Kant seriously and called

all psychological reality phenomenal.
meaning was ’’symbolic,” i.e.
cathected libido.

Hence everything with

acquired its meaning from the

It simply was inconsistent to symbolize

everything except the penis, vulva, breasts,

etc.

They,

too,

4fc

'
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were phenomena

like everything else:

Thus a phallic symbol does not denote the sexual organ,
but the libido, and however clearly it appears as such,
it does not mean itself, but is always a symbol of the
libido. . . . The tertium comparationis for all these
symbols is the libido, and the unity of meaning lies in
the fact that they all are analogies of the same thing.
In this realm the fixed meaning of things comes to an end.^
And finally,

even this very theory .itself

becomes symbolic:

We have formulated symbolical concepts in a manner
analogous to our formulation of conscious concepts,
and this terminology has proven its value in practice.
Thus Jung proclaimed a
to be found

radical relativism.

in the unconscious,

a

Objective truth was

realm forever closed to us.

If we were even to talk about the unconscious,
to be metaphorically.

And any

it would have

judgment of the validity of

our metaphors would have to be based on their empirical use¬
fulness.

Here

significance.

is where Jung’s "scientific" attitude took on
Only in the acid test of

evaluate the accuracy of

his metaphors.

a patient to understand himself,
Jung so often put
ist,

was wirkt."

it,

if successful,

then

"Wirklich aber

juncture.

The reductive

leaves us with an unstable situation.
libidinal cathexes have been with¬
libido

one might suppose that the ego would disin¬

this point.

is patently obvious.
increase in

For as

judging from what was said before about the

powering the ego,
tegrate at

then it v;as real.
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If all the old subliminal
drawn,

If a metaphor helps I

echoing William James,

We reach here a critical
analysis,

therapy could he

50

That

this does not happen in neurotics

But equally obvious

is the tremendous

fantasy production that occurs with regression.

As energy is withdrawn from phenomenal

literalisms,

it is brans-

*

»
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formed into

symbols with the active participation of a higher

level of eco consciousness.
from the eco
level whose
all)

in toto,
object

(if one may speak teleologically here at
Such symbols bring to consciousness,

is possible,

ego no longer

is therefore not withdrawn

but rechanneled into a more purposeful

is communication.

insofar as

Libido

the meanings of

labors under the

the unconscious.

illusion of freedom,

while determined by the unconscious.

The

all the

Now it collaborates with

the unconscious and seeks to aid the expression of the symbol
with its wealth of phenomenal

imagery.

We embark here on the

synthetic phase of analysis.
But let us pause to reflect on where this
reasoning has brought us.
attacks,

phobias,

Surely it is far from the hysterical

and repetition compulsions which first

attracted Freud*s attention.
a certain quickening,

And

in fact,

The mood has changed.

We sense

an infusion of energy which begins to

pervade consciousness,
before.

line of

finding meaning where there was none
as Freud implied in his comment about

the "religious-libidinal cloud," Jung recognized that "this
synthetic treatment of symbols brings [one]] to the religious
question."

5i

We ought therefore to consider this appearance

of religious imagery before plunging,
psychological

theories,

of synthetic symbols.

into Jung's

later meta-

which more fully developed the concept

■

THE KELIGIOUS QUESTION

In trying to puzzle out the peculiar twist
thinking which was to

lead him so far afield from Freud*s

carefully blazed trail,
of Transformation.

one returns again and again to Symbols

This

remarkable book stands as Jung's equi¬

valent to The Interpretation of Dreams,

and on the weight of

its evidence and arguments hinges the validity of
part of Jung’s early psychological
pretation of Dreams
piece of

in Jung's

it

insights.

the better

Like The Inter¬

is an awesomely erudite work,

a master¬

the scholarly historical humanism which flourished

in Germanic cultures at the fin de sifecle.
pretation of Dreams,
adventure.

it

Also

like The Inter¬

is an exciting and suspense filled

In both there

is an air of mystery that is marvel¬

ously counterbalanced by the persistent probings of
reason and knowledge.

Finally,

the book shares with The Inter¬

pretation of Dreams a kind of passion.
that these are men who have

the thinker’s

One senses

joined the hunt:

immediately

they are on to

something.
Verturing to risk a personal opinion,

however,

I have

found one crucial difference which distinguishes Symbols of
Transformation from The

Interpretation of Dreams.

qualitative difference,

really,

It

and one so intangible and

indefinable as to be better stated as a

matter of taste.

yet from this difference springs the subject matter of

30

is a

Ani

this

-

section,

the question of
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religion.

The Interpretation of Dreams,
and original
who is

insights,

with all

its

innovation

plays a curious trick on the reader,

literally being initiated into a whole new and unex¬

pected world.

He comes with questions and suspicions and

counterexamples,

but gradually the relentless

logic and count¬

less examples which Freud propounds dissolve his hesitations.
And then the reader,
Freud did.

too,

begins to see this new world as

But soon the pendulum of

the reader's enthusiasm

starts to swing the other way.
pour forth,

As the examples continue to
more
the explanations become^and more inclusive, the

exceptions fall one by one -begins to shrink,

until at

so -that the reader's world

last he is left all alone with

only a heavy book in his hands.
up.

That exciting vorld has closed

At some point Freud has managed to explain it all away.

Everything of
referenced.
present.
the past.

importance about

it

is now catalogued and cross-

The project was to make the unknown known in the

And yet having done so,

the known slips away into

For to know all about a world means to have lived

through it already.
us because it

Such a world will never again be open to

is over and done with.

Even the future now closes before us.

But this

is not all.

As Freud reminds us at

the close of the book;
By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are after
all leading us into the future.
But this future, which
the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded
by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of
the past.^
The

lights are turned on.

face the oii world,

It

reality.

is tizre to get up again and

'
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Symbols of Transformation takes us on a different
journey.

By way of archaic,

straightaway into the past,
world.

It,

too,

atavistic fantasies,
and here,

too,

we are led

we encounter a new

is a complex world whose meaning and relevance

we at first doubt.

But what convinces us here?

Is it the

force of Jung*s argument? This surely helps to guide us through
the myriad of unheard of mythologies and foreign imagery.
his

logic

is not what persuades us.

It

But

is the power emanating

from the very symbols themselves that takes hold of us and
draws us

into their realm.

We are held captive by the fasci-

nosum that permeates this world.
And why is that?
that

it

Paul Kicoeur would have us believe

is simply a matter of the interpretation which we

bring to the symbols.

For him it is a question of attitude:

For the philosophy of religion, symbols are the manifes¬
tation in the sensible -- in imagination, gestures, and
feelings -- of a further reality, the expression of a
depth which both shows and hides itself.
What psycho¬
analysis encounters primarily as the distortion of ele¬
mentary meanings connected with wishes or desires, the
phenomenology of religion encounters primarily as the
manifestation of a depth or, to use the word immediately
. . . the revelation of the sacred.^
And there
shall

is certainly some truth tc

see below,

attitude.

this opinion.

As we

Jung was acutely alive to the problem of

The subjective element should never be minimized

in our analysis.
Nevertheless,
insofar as
symbols.

Hicoeur's account is insufficient

it fails to address the specific nature of religious

At

least as

important as the subjective element

the objective difference in religious symbols.
thing about

is

There is some¬

them that resists reductive analysis and flaunts
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their impenetrability.
cannot

We are never through with them;

we

leave them in the smug self-satisfaction of having

explained them away.

They attract us

like a magnet,

and we

are forever struggling for the secret of their meaning.
But if
present,

they are always with us,

and cannot fade into the past.

struggle to penetrate the symbol,
future.

This world of

past,

then they are in the
And moreover,

we are in turn led

ancient

in this

into the

images continues to open

up as men try with each new generation to bring fresh insights
of

interpretation.

The end of

Symbols of Transformation is

a beginning.
In order to substantiate our claim that religious
symbols are somehow objectively unique,

we must recall the

different sort of unconscious material with which Jung worked
as compared

to Freud.

This

is not to restate the tired clich£

about the Freud/Jung variance mirroring the distinction between
psychosis and neurosis.
fantasy there

is

After all,

what little psychotic

in Symbols of Transformation is hidden away

in an appendix at the rear.

Rather,

we are speaking of

unconscious material of myth and religious
makes up the myriad historical examples

.

.

.

.

patients merely set him m the right

.

imagery,

in the text.

.

direction.

3

the

which
Jung's

His real

accomplishment was to thoroughly trace out the similarities
between the

infinitely less well articulated psychotic fanta¬

sies and the profoundly complex religious symbols of antiquity.
Jung was fascinated not

so much by the schizophrenic*s symbols,

which may w2ll have lent themselves to a reductive interpre¬
tation.

These were only signposts on the way toward another.

'
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very different kind of
and

symbol,

which was able to move people

influence entire cultures.
Nevertheless,

Jung found himself

identity of many psychotic and religious
all,

struck by the odd
symbols.

Why,

after

should the study of patients whose libido had regressed

all the way back to the

infantile mother lead him to the

highest cultural achievements of

the ancient world?

There

must surely be some connection between the psychotic ego's
decathexis,
tents,

with its

subseguent

and the formation of

invasion by unconscious con-

these great collective symbols.

4

Jung postulated that these symbols accomplished in an orderly,
articulated,

intentional,

was chaotic,

vague,

mation of excess

.

and successful way what

compelled, and

.

failed,

5

in psychosis

namely the transfor-

libido which had regressed

into the unconscious:

The concrete reality of religious figures assists the
canalization of libido into the equivalent symbols, pro¬
vided tnat the worship of them does not get stuck in the
outward object.^
Implicit

in this conception

ical progress and teleology.
nomenon in general,

lies a deep-rooted sense of histor¬
Symbols,

provide the most

and the religious phe¬

influential cultural

im¬

petus toward raising consciousness:
Here religion is of a great help, because, by the bridge
of the symbol, it leads his [everyman*sj libido away fron
the infantile objects (parents) towards the symbolic
representatives of the past, i.o. the gods , . . ^
It thus functions to

lyse the literal,

concretized quality of the

ego's relationship with the unconscious that was described

in

the first section.
To

this extent,

therefore,

be relatively more adaptive.

religion frees the ego to

And this

is true even if

the

-A
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religious symbols themselves are
For when the
ure,

in turn hardened

libido gets stuck in a

the "outward object"

into

idols.

literalized religious fig¬

as it were,

it at least remains bound to the? representative human
figure and loses its original primitive form, even
though it does not attain the desired symbolic form.0
o

One need only think here of

the difference between the Judeo-

Christian and the "primitive"
neutral field,

by and

large,

have been withdrawn and

worlds.

The former

is a

fairly

from which all the projections

spiritualized,

leaving a fair sem¬

blance of objective reality which the ego can manipulate unhindered and mould

into culture.

9

Even if,

as has been the case,

the symbols of our tradition have long since frozen into solid
form,

the freeing effect remains.

The primitive,

on the

other hand,

condemned to contend not only with the obstacles

of reality,

but with the fears and obligations which he projects

onto reality,

can truly be regarded as operating at a

level of adaptation.

This

lover

is why Jung proposes that symbols

are "purposeful":
It is these inherent possibilities of 'spiritual* or
'symbolic* life and of progress which form the ultimate,
though unconscious, goal of regression.
By serving as a
means of expression, as bridges and pointers, symbols
help to prevent the libido from getting stuck in the
material corporeality of the mother. q
It

is only one short step from recognizing this purposeful

quality in religious symbols,
psychotherapy.

to translating it

For within the analytic situation,

is cautiousLy allowed or encouraged

to regress,

to form a genuine symbol around the figure of
This

into modern

is the transference.

the patient

and as a result

the analyst.

But the ley to this method*s effect-

'
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iveness

lies

in then demonstrating to the patient the

symbolic nature of

this projection,

symbol to full awareness and
in it.

Oddly enough,

it

that

said Jung,

in bringing the

letting him participate consciously

is through this symbolic fantasy

that the patient gets back to reality.
the analyst,"

is,

"The transference to

"builds a bridge across which the

patient can get away from his family into reality."11 The
transference,

however,

is not a demythologizing.

It

is the

first opportunity to consciously and effectively remythologize.
And

from this

insight derives the second,

synthetic phase

of analysis.
Jung was not the only psychoanalyst of this period to
admit the need for a constructive analysis.

James Putnam,

the eminent Harvard neurologist who was so instrumental
introducing Freud and psychoanalysis to this country,
wondered about the "second half."
too,

Originally,

shared the prevailing view that

analysis to deconstruct and

in

also

of course he,

it sufficed for psycho¬

lyse complexes,

but that

it was not our business to instruct the patient, to
supply the positive side of the re-education which
he needed to undergo, but only to place him in a better
position to obtain his education elsewhere.^
However,
of

over the course of time,

the ultimate implications

psycnoanalysis became clear to him.

tify delving into the very depths o*
to then back out and say to him,
what

it all means."

Instead,

One could hardly

a patient’s mind,

"I am sorry,

jus-

only

but no one knows

Putnam insisted that to explore

the unconscious meant a commitment to searching out that meaning:
The logical end of a psychoanalytic treatment, is the
recovery of a full sense of one’s highest destiny and
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origin and of the bearings and meanings of one's life.^
For this it was appropriate and even necessary that analysis
continue beyond the reductive phase.
Putnam differed from Jung in one crucial area, however,
and this led to radically dissimilar conceptions of this second
half of analysis.

Immersed as he was in the "moral philosophy"

that was then in vogue in the United States,

Putnam found it

reprehensible to allow a patient to escape the benefit of his,
Putnam's,
was

own personal moral vision.

Whereas psychoanalysis

adequate to the task of disentangling "the numerous

partial motives" of the unconscious, Putnam saw the ethical
issues raised by reconstruction as "only thoroughly studied

.

by philosophy."

.

14

So it was that Putnam argued for imposing

.

.

.

his externally derived meanings and values on the patient.

15

In the end the patient would not tell, but be told, his story.
And however much it might aid the patient on a superficial
level,

perhaps even easing his way through life,

the story

would no longer belong to him.
We need only think of today's infinitely more refined
way of modifying behavior to suit society's whims in order to
cringe at the potential for abuse with which this attitude
was fraught.

One can only admire the polite but cautious stance

adopted by 7reud toward such suggestions.

As he tactfully

put it,
it seemed more prudent to wait, and to discover whether
a particular attitude towards life might be forced upon
us with all the weight of necessity by the analytical
investigation itself.,.lb

But this was precisely Jung's discovery, and it is
what distinguishes him from Putnam.

Jung did not leave the
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bounds of the analytical setting to bring in extraneous
values.

He did not need to:

they were all there before him

in the patient's dreams and fantasies.
They were the patient's own values.

And not only that.

Out of his unconscious

came the authentic judgments about life:
Escape from the state of reduction lies in evolving a
religion of an individual character.
One's true indi¬
viduality then emerges from behind the veil of the
collective personality. . . . To do this he must first
return to the fundamental facts of his own being,
irrespective of all authority and tradition, and allow
himself to become conscious of his distinctiveness.^
Freud was right to criticize Putnam so long as he insisted
upon any one "particular attitude."
wisdom Jung never aspired.

And to that degree of

But Jung did claim to be able to

help each individual get on the track of meaning in his own
life.

Where it would lead,

and whether the patient would

follow -- that he could not say.
tivism,

True to his radical rela¬

he left that for the patient to find out for himself.
This attitude toward the patient's future offers

yet another explanation of Jung's turn to religious issues
in Symbols of Transformation.

For indeed,

if we are truly

to seek the fundamental facts of our own being,

then surely

we must address ourselves to that which has traditionally and
preontologically responded to the question of Being.
was hardly an accident,

So it

or a mere function of his patient

population,

that Jung took up the problem of spirit and

God at this

juncture.

On the contrary,

it was the logical

development of Jung's whole metaphysical Weltanschauung.
Yet we must finally wonder to what extent the religious
question cane up as a natural consequence of Jung's personality
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as well.

We have hinted already of the enthusiasm that per¬

meates both The Interpretation of Dreams and Symbols of Trans¬
formation.

Was it simply that,

in Jung's case, his enthusiasm

was of a more originary Kind, a true en theos, a being in God?
One certainly feels something of this sort in Jung's more
personal declarations.

Writing to Freud in 1911, when well

into the work on Symbols of Transformation, he observed:
I, too, have the feeling that this is a time full of
marvels, and, if the auguries do not deceive us, it may
well be that, thanks to your discoveries, we are on the
threshold of something really sensational, which I scarcely
know how to describe except with the Gnostic concept of
sophia, an Alexandrian term particularly suited to the
reincarnation of ancient wisdom in the shape of psycho¬
analysis .
Jung sought after wisdom.

So we might say he was seeker of

truth -- of that which lies revealed before us.
would therefore call him a thinker.
posed ourselves is,

indeed,

But the question we have

"Why was he a thinker?"

would say, he was called.

Called by what,

that is the question.

Heidegger

Because, Heidegger
you ask?

And

We shall answer one question

by another. Jung was called to ask the question,

"What is it

.
19
that calls on us to think?"
Further we cannot go.

METAPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

Up to now we have tried to present a coherent com¬
mentary on the development of Jung's early thought.

This

extended

which

through the period of his break with Freud,

may be broadly defined as

lasting ur.til

lication of Psychological Types.1
have been hampered by our

with the pub¬

The explication may v/ell

intentional forebearance in the use

of more refined concepts which Jung
has been so,

1921,

later developed.

If

this

it was only in the interests of aiding the reader

to visualize the actual thinking process that went
creation of Jung's

ideas.

Nevertheless,

since we now are

broaching the second half of Jung's career,
apparent that we can no
psychological theories.
ramification of symbol,
such concepts as

longer

into the

it

is readily

ignore the wider scope of his

If we are to understand the ultimate
we shall perforce have to touch upon

the collective unconscious,

the archetypes,

and the Self.
Perhaps the weakest part of
as elaborated thus far

lies

in the notion of

term strikes us today as quaint,
social Darwinism,

the theoretical system
instinct.

The

a throwback to the days of

the Will to Power,

and ^lan vital.

We some¬

how regard ourselves as having moved beyond this issue which
was so hotly debated
plain,

in the past.

Ethology has begun to ex¬

behavior modification to control,
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and psychopharmaco-
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logy to alter that which once gave lie to man's
power over himself.
reminder of
to dawn?

Why should we return to an uncomfortable

our frailty when a brave? new world is

But return we must,

iosity.

if

just about

only out of historical cur¬

For the instinct theory lies at the very heart of

psychoanalysis.

As Freud

remarked,

.

.

that they not only had spirit,

but

his aim was to show men

.

.

instinct as well.

Freud's position on the matter of
known.

illusion of

He distinguished

"by the fact that
the body,

that

instincts

2
is well

instinct from external stimulus

it arises from sources of

stimulation within

it operates as a constant force and that the

subject cannot avoid it by flight."

3

Instinct had a source,

an object and an aim:
Its source is a state of excitation in the body, its
aim is the removal of that excitation; on its path
from its source to its aim the instinct becomes
operative psychically.
Freud pictured
presses

in a

instinct as "a certain quota of energy which

particular direction."

lation of sexual and ego

instincts,

since "this distinction itself
light of further research.

After an initial formu¬
the latter was dropped

lost its foundation"

in the

But because Freud still felt

obliged to explain what he called "a contrariety in instinc¬
tual

life,"

instincts."
Thanatos

he replaced ego
And this

instincts with "the aggressive

is how the famous dichotomy of Bros and

is still framed today:

The instincts that we believe in divide themselves into
two groups -- the erotic instincts, which seek to combine
more and more living substance into ever greater unities,
and the death instincts, which oppose this effort and lead
what is living back into an inoxganic state.
From the
concurrent and opposing action cf these two proceed the
phenomenona of life which are brought to an end by death.
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Although he speaks

in the

pleural

("erotic instincts"),

it

would seem that little attempt was made to differentiate
within these classes.
reduced to these two:

Rather,

all ether instincts could be

"Every instinctual

impulse that we can

examine consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two
classes of

instinct."

A different point of view was expressed by another of
Jung*s contemporaries,
Jung.

4

William James,

who deeply influenced

...
James defined instinct as

the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain
ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous
education in the performance.^
Such a view obviously stemmed from a more biological orienta¬
tion than Freud*s.

Working within the framework of traditional

19th century science,
scious by choice.

ignored the realm of the uncon¬

In his definition he explicitly avoided

the unknown quality of
such,

James

instincts except to characterize

it as

preferring not to hypothesize about that which he could

not observe.

This was

in contradistinction to Freud,

sought to explain this unknown in the manner of a
tury psychoanalyst,
James stressed

that

is by way o:

20th cen¬

the unconscious.

the behavioral aspect of

instinct.

phenomenal events.

Secondly,

Not feel¬

ing himself competent to theorize about mechanisms,
only on repeated patterns of

who

he focused

Finally,

toe

also suggested that instincts have an innate content.

They

contained specific patterns of behavior which were not

learned.

From this starting point,
proclamation that men,

James was able

to make the bold

far from being impoverished of

as compared to lower animals,

"possess all the

instincts

impulses that

/
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they have,

and a great many more besides."6

to elaborate about
tion,

pugnacity,

aquisitiveness,
complexity,

infant reflex impulses,

sympathy,
love,

etc.

James compounded

(1919)

emula¬

fear,

Where Freud simplified

it.

It is fair to say that Jung was

conscious"

imitation,

the hunting instinct,

etc.,

of both these theories.

He then went on

influenced by elements

In his essay "Instinct and the Un¬

Jung called

instincts

typical modes of action, and whenever we meet with
uniform and regularly occuring modes of action and
reaction, we are dealing with instinct, no matter
whether it is associated with a conscious motive or
not. ^
We immediately recognize the effect of James here.
again is regarded as action,

indeed predictable action,

does not require consciousness for its expression.
Jung,

too,

chose to emphasize the numerous,

by nature,

that

Moreover,

distinctive phe-

ncHtnenal manifestations rather than the unified,
concept of Freud:

Instinct

generalized

"The instincts are not vague and indefinite

but are specifically formed motive forces which,
O

.

.

.

pursue their inherent goals."

It follows that there

are as many instincts as goals.
This characterization still
because it fails to account for

lacks clarity,

just

of behavioral phenomena translates

how this most biological

itself

meaning that we know as consciousne-is.
example,

however,

into the world of

The yucca moth,

for

knows exactly when and how to ovulate within the

yucca plant without ever having seen this done before.
must therefore have some internal "image" which allows
recognize the flower,

the pellet it

is going to form,

It
it to
the pistil.

'

•

' ■:

•

«

.

-

:

•

j

.

.

-
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.

.

and the opening it makes
mean to

.

m the pistil.

9

By image ve do not

impute a developed occipital cortex to the moth!

as Karl Pribram has noted,

the actuea performance of refined

motor activity seems to require a cc?rtain kind of
conception"

of

just what

"Image-of-Achievement'*
posed of

is coming next.

learned anticipations of

or "cast"

sequence.

He uses the term

from one position,

then,

It projects a neural

literal

slipping
images:

in a

into another.
after all,

There

blind people

too.

Jung recognized the need for

just such a mechanism

within the wider field of behavior

in general.

to mediate between pure intention,

"goals,"

ity.

in

becomes not only a matter of going

but also of

is no question here of

"com¬

the force and changes

of the next piece of complex movement

Motion,

can move about,

"pre¬

to describe a mechanism which is

force required to perform a task."1*"1
"mold"

But

Something had

and external

This mechanism he called the archetype.

real¬

The archetypes

are:
the unconscious
in other words,
behavior.,,

images of the instincts themselves,
. . . they are patterns of instinctual

Let us at once take note as
is used here.
literal

Jung,

to precisely how the word

no more than Piibram,

image

means to imply a

image:

The archetypal representations .images and ideas)
mediated to us by the unconsciois should not be con¬
fused with the archetypes as such.l2
Archetypes,

like the Image-of-Achievement,

are rather better

thought of as patterns of organization which translate pure
intention into plastic form:

images and patterns of behavior,

: r

:

,

*

) *•-
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in the case of archetypes;

bodily position in that of

of-Achievement.

themselves we have no knowledge of

them.

In and of

•
13
Only through their phenomenal expression,

guess of

Image-

can we

their existence:

Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them
at all, manifest themselves only through their ability
to organize images and ideas, and this is always an
unconscious process which cannot be detected until after¬
wards .
This point
quote at

is crucial,

and at the risk of

redundancy,

we shall

length one of Jung*s most eloquent statements of

it:

Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an
archetype is determined in regard to its content, in
other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if
such an expression be admissible.)
It is necessary to
point out once more that archetypes are not determined
as regards their content, but only as regards their form
and then only to limited degree.
A primordial image is
determined as to its content, only when it has become con¬
scious and is therefore filled out with the material of
conscious experience.
Its form, however, as I have ex¬
plained elsewhere, might perhaps be compared to the
axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms
the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although
it has no material existence of its own.
This first
appears according to the specific way in which the ions
and molecules aggregate. The archetype in itself is
empty and purely formal, nothing but a facultas praeformandi, a possibility of representation which is
given a priori. ^
A biological analogy presents
Konrad Lorenz and his ducklings.

itself

in the case of

By now every schoolchild

has seen the wonderful photograph of

the grey head emerging

from the water with a brood of ducklings trailing behind
Lorenz*

head,

exposed to the ducklings at a critical period

in the development of
as a visual

it.

their central nervous systems,

serves

image around which an instinctual pattern of

behavior crystalizes.
lings at birth,

The instinct

lies

but at the proper moment

latent
it

in the duck¬

is expressed by

46

organizing

itself around

the particular perceptual field

surroundinc

the duckling.

result fron

the

specific way that

effects the attainment of
within
head,

limits,

this perceptual organization

instinctual goals.

any percept,

the phenomenal world.

ducklings

still exhibit

facie evidence of
called

logical

its

science.

But that

regardless of

instrinsic formal

human

the accidental qual¬

the same pattern of

imprinting,

The fact that

including the figure of a

can crystalize the behavior proves

ity of

cess,

What, we call patterns of behavior

behavior

structure.

this the
is prima
This pro¬

is a well documented datum of

The concept of

the archetype

ethno¬

is essentially

no more mysterious than this.
What distinguishes human being
the further evolution of
"spirit"

itself,

instincts,

and of

For what Jung calls

.

in short,

the gods --

but a natural outgrowth of

like nature.

before which we bow down,
--

in man.

17

Spirit,

instincts.

.

these,

too,

So we may say with

is as much a

part of human nature to

govern as

live

a

to

in packs,

head bobbing in the water.

where Jung finds himself

derive from the brutish,

and

the original

justification that
love as to copulate,

And here,

strangely enough,

in agreement with Freud.

strates once again his keen
psychoanalysis owes

it
to

to worship as to paddle after

so accurately noted the "contrariety of

whole of

the numinosum

the highest aspirations of men

stereotyped and unconscious constellations of
animal

is

is not some additional construct to further compli¬

cate his theory of
instinct

instinct

from ducks however

powers of

That Freud

instinctual

perception,

its existence.

i.^

life"

demon¬

to which the

The unconscious
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is

indeed the cauldron of

"concurrent and opposing action"

from which the phenomenon of
conceivable

that Freud

opposition to

life proceeds.

But

is

it

just

stopped too soon in limiting this

just one dyad?

For everywhere one

the unconscious one finds contradiction.

looks

in

It will not do to

try and reduce every opposition to Eros and Thanatos.

There

is meaning

in each opposition as

itself

Of course,

this repetition of

certain kind of

it

stands,

the same structure

leads

level.

it makes a

this by no

is to be found

Every protein follows

peptide bonding between amino acids.

evolved because
themselves

However,

to the conclusion that the meaning

at this structural
pattern of

implies a

formal unity beneath the variegated phenomena

So far the structuralists are correct.
means

in and for

the same
But

life

difference which amino acids find

in the structure.

One could almost say that Jung

did nothing more than to accept the archetypes at face value,
as they presented themselves

to him.

ing the world to "first principles,"

In an era bent on reduc
that was a

revolutionary

accomplishment.
We have posited a multiplicity of
structures,

each of which extends along a

primary polar
continuum from the

lowest instinctual pole to the highest spiritual one.
function by determining the behavioral goals,
intentions of men.

They are translated

crete behavior and visual

They

objectives and

into patterns of con¬

images by archetypes,

which serve

to organize, these intentions around phenomenal realities.
(Nota bene;

These two ideas,

the

and the archetype are very close,

instinct/spirit continuum
as Jung points out,

and

-
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they are so carefully differentiated here only in order to
demonstrate a

theoretical point.

In common usage one finds

that the word archetype refers to both
and the translating mechanism.
gically they are the same.
only when necessary the
them by the terms
in itself.")

This

the continuum of goals

is because phenomenolo¬

We shall do

likewise,

noting

theoretical differentiation between

"instinct/spirit continuum"

Within the unconscious

and "archetype

itself there reigns per¬

petual contradiction and opposition as psychic energy flows
•
these continua,

now to one end of

called this area of

now to the other.
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primary oppositions the Pleroma,

term meaning the sphere of paradoxical

existence.

Jung
a Gnostic

It is also

known as the collective unconscious.
We now find ourselves better prepared to elaborate
upon the various
in the essay.

levels of

the unconscious alluded

to earlier

When Jung says something is unconscious,

intends three possible modes.

First,

it can mean "an origin¬

ally conscious content that became subliminal because
repressed on account of

its

he

incompatible nature."
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it was
This

is

the personal unconscious and accounts for a good deal of

the

material brought up in the reductive phase of analysis.

Second,

the unconscious can refer to a
process
because
That is
lack of
are not
But this

that never entered into consciousness at all
no possibilities exist there for apperceiving it.
to say, ego-consciousness cannot accept it for
understanding. . . . [[These are] contents that
yet conscious.

implies that they need not

can be mediated

through symbols.

point momentarily.

remain unconscious and

We shall return to this

.
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Thirdly,
ipso facto
of

there are unconscious elements which are

incapable of consciousness.

inattention on the ego's behalf;

consciousness cannot conceive of
Jung called psychoid.
instinctual pole,
themselves."
tulated a

it

It

is not a matter

is simply that ego

them directly.

They include,

These elements

by his account,

the spiritual pole,

and the "archetypes

.
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Such a view is not unique to Jung.

similar

"The Unconscious"

the

level of unconsciousness

in

Freud pos¬

in the essay on

(1923):

An instinct can never become an object of consciousness -only the idea that represents the instinct can.
Even in
the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be repre¬
sented otherwise than by an idea.22
But this

leaves us dangling in midair:

has this

idea

doubt.

in the unconscious?

who,

then,

For Jung there could be no

It was the Self.
The Self may be viewed as the first and

polar continuum from which all others derive.
sented

we may ask

in

fundamental
It

is repre¬

images through symbols of unity and centeredness.

Its two poles have been called metaphorically God and
Devil,

the

and between them the whole of psychological being

is encompassed.

The special significance of

from its primary position.
of direction

in life.

energy moves over the

As the prima causa

It

instinct/spirit continuum,
but

archetypes

is the source

sliding not

jumping from one continuum

is the Self which determines

psychic energy will go.
the various

it

We have mentioned before that psychic

only from cne pole to other,
to another.

the Self derives

just where the

The Self orchestrates and articulates
in that characteristic way which ren¬

ders every individual unique.

Only the Self can select and

'
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emphasize which archetypes will predominate and how,

for in

themselves archetypes are equivalent and ambivalent,

each

containing a whole range of contradictory possibilities.
We can now round out this description of Jung's most
mature metapsvchology by returning to the second level of
unconsciousness mentioned above.
theme,
Psyche"

the symbol.
(1946)

It was

Here we recover our central

in his essay "On the Nature of

the

that Jung first pictured pairs of opposites as

standing as the extreme poles of a continuum.

At first glance

the reader might find Jung's designation of the two poles as
"psychoid,"

i.e.

contradictory.

totally unknowable,
Why then call

extremes have such a

to be capricious and

it a continuum if

the two

radically different nature?

But once

again Jung's talent for the apt metaphor comes to the rescue.
For as with the electromagnetic spectrum,

.

,

.

tmuum which differs,

but we,

In moving from ultraviolet
the visible spectrum into

indeed,

is not the con-

the conscious perceivers.

into the visible spectrum,
infrared,

tinuity on the part of the energy.
and

it

Only the phenomena change,

them poles,

therefore,

and for all

the electromagnetic spectrum cares,

possibilities.
about what

So

and from

we encounter no discon¬

apparently vanish at the two poles.

the infrared "pole"
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What makes

is really the limitations of our senses,

may be right square

what we call

in the middle of

its

it is that we are unable to say anything

lies beyond our consciousness,

and indeed,

presume what we perceive to be totally relative to the
tations that define what we can know.
example of the spectrum,

This means,

must
limi¬

in the

that the two poles are really an

■
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illusion produced by consciousness.

There is no contrariety

in the reajm of the spectrum per se.

We

impose such polarity

upon it.
These

limitations on our knowledge are not necessarily

cause for despair,

however,

since there remains at

part of the spectrum which does reveal
matters

little

possibilities
sciousness,

itself

to us.

It

just how tiny a fraction of the range of
it represents.

that

total

From the point of view of con¬

is the whole world,

and it opens up to us

an infinite variety by its

infinite divisibility.

seem Xeno's

paradox can at

long last redeem itself.

the

realm to which we are confined,

limited

least that

It would
Within

there still

is

left more than we can ever hope to exhaust.
In addition,
which does reveal

by paying close attention to that fraction

itself

turning our

backs to

yet be able

to at

to us,

scientist,

spectrum,

it

instead of

it and taking it for granted,

we; may

least guess at the possibilities that

beyond the boundaries of our
a

by caring for

senses.

To extend the metaphor,

by studying the wave properties of

will surely reach a

dict the existence of

the visible

point where he can not only pre¬

infrared and ultraviolet,

spective qialities as well.

lie

but their re¬

So inherent in the visible light

which we dr- see are the secrets to

x

much wider world.

It

then becomes more a question of whether we choose to look
deeply or rot.
How

does this all relate to the symbol?

emerges from this middle ground of
zone of

the- "visible spectrum”

;he continuum.

The symbol
In this

things are at the second level
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of unconsciousness.

At first they are unknown because we

have our backs to them.

But

if we turn around and cooperate

in the effort of communication,
visible light,
lated via

arising from the middle of

the archetype

sciousness

we will see them.

in

itself,

the continuum,

it as early as

trans¬

and perceived by ego con¬

in terms of the phenomenal world ~~

As Jung put

And this

that is a

symbol.

1929,

the reflection and. formation of the Pleroma [the sphere
of paradoxical existence] in the individual consciousness
produce an image of it (of like nature in a certain sense),
and that is the symbol.^
It becomes clear now why all symbols must by definition con¬
tain within them the potential for a conflict of

opposites.

For as each one symbol stands to communicate the visible
part of

the spectrum,

are implied.

the two poles,

But at the same time,

of the continuum as

it does,

with their contradiction,
stemming from the middle

the symbol also unites the

opposites.
Now what happens
and instead chooses to
sibilities.
pressing
tions.

A

First,

itself,

if

ignore the symbol?

for example,

subliminally,

ex¬

through projec¬

young woman's difficulty in relating to older men

these men mean to her,

She has failed to examine what

and the symbol goes unrecognized.

and far worse,

the symbol may vanish.

certain extent the centering of
middle of

There are two pos¬

the symbol may simply remain latent,

might be a case in point.

Secondly,

the ego fails to turn around,

For to a

the psychic energy on the

the continuum depends not only on the Self,

requires the efforts of
fails to participate,

the ego as well.

the energy tends

but

When the latter

to drift to one end
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of

the spectrum or the other.

When that happens,

reaches the psychoid poles of

instinct or spirit,

and it
it no

longer

has the potential of being communicated to consciousness.
But this does not mean it will not affect us!
we are now totally under
it

is psychoid we no

its thumb,

as

it were.

Just because

longer have any say in the matter.

a state of affairs Jung called symptomatic.
think of the compulsiveness of a phobia,
of a saint,

On the contrary,

One need only

or the fanaticism

to appreciate the behavioral extremes to which

instinct and spirit can
In summation,

lead respectively.

then, we can establish a

two stage

hierarchy for both consciousness and the unconscious.
the

lower,

simpler

level,

that marvelously adaptive capacity

which bends external reality to our wishes.
the unconscious

is

At

we find consciousness merely to be

the function of awareness,

in

Such

Its counterpart

likewise mere unawareness.

It

is nothing.

Only we must not make the error of presuming that nothing
means no thing.
nothing to us.
in itself,

It

is

just that we cannot know it:

To itself

it

is something,

an ethical aspect as well.
jected out into the world,
turn around,

of

is

namely the thing

Kant*s Ding an sich.

But Jung saw another,

awareness.

it

to face
This,

higher level.

For millennia this has been pro¬
but in fact,

the calling

is to

inward and confront the unconscious wiuh

on the other hand,

requires something more

the unconscious than sheer nothingness.

of moral intentionality on behalf o'
city to reveal

Consciousness has

itself to us

It requires a kind

the unconscious,

a capa¬

in a way that changes attitudes

»
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and generates creativity.

In short,

it

requires the trans¬

cendent function of the Self.

*

*

We have been so
"turning around"
have

insistent upon the figure of

like to consider now is

is a word fraught with hazard:

in mind.

conundrum.

This need not happen,

a

What we
soul.

This

at every turn it threatens to

to trick us

patiently,

We do.

the function of

mislead us,

slowly,

speech

that the reader may well wonder whether we

something quite specific

should

*

into falling prey to some anachronistic
however.

through the course of

We have set out

this paper,

to make

clearing where the word can once more be understood in its

proper,

that

is,

its own relations.

By soul Jung means:
an organ of perception [which] apprehends the contents
of the unconscious, and, as the creative function, gives
birth to its dynamis in the form of a symbol.
How is this?

An organ of perception?

Hillman and explore
It is no

just what

longer enough to call

"represent"

reality.

An etymological,

it

We must follow James

is we mean by perception.

it a

faculty by which we

A great deal more is

but speculative,

analysis

implied by perception.
in German may help

us here.
To perceive means to have mages or ideas
of reality.
means

.

The German verb for this

literally,

for example,

function,

(Vorste 1 li.ngen)

sich vorstellen,

"to place oneself before oneself."

28
'

Thus,

the sentence "Per Mensch stellt sich die Welt \or"

(Man imagines or perceives the world)

might be more freely

translated as "Man places himself before himself

[and

thereby
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out into]] the world.”
This very translation,
an outside or “before,"
side to perception.
aspect of
stellen,

indeed there is:

the

in-side.

This

described by uhe German verb sich ein-

does not actively represent,

things to "appear,”
A

implies that there must be another

And

perception,

by attributing to consciousness

to "come,”

but passively allows

or to "be there”

("da

sein”).

literal rendering of this verb would be "to place itself

within oneself."

Note that our use of the double reflexive

has changed here.
the verb.

The sich always refers to the subject of

The prefix vor or ein always refers to the observing

consciousness which the verb implies.
vorstellen,
stellen,

these are the same.

But

ein."

in the case of

sich

sich ej.n-

the observing consciousness cannot be the subject:

it experiences the verb passively.
say,

In the case of

So,

for example,

we might

"Die Wirkungen der Psychotherapie stellen sich allmahlich
(The effects of psychotherapy take place or appear

gradually.)

Again,

an

interpretive translation might run,

"The effects of psychotherapy [are only perceived when these
effects]] place themselves within ourselves gradually."
effects "appear

in us,"

The

but we have nothing to do with it.

They place themselves there.
The

one exception to this

einstellen proves

the rule.

stellt sich auf den Patient
doctor puts himself
stand him.}

i iterpretation of

For suppose we say,
ein,

"Der Arzt

urn ihn zu verstehen."

in the patient* .5 place

This can also be translated,

himself within himself,

sich

but he is n3

(The

in order to under¬
"The doctor places

longer at himself,

he is
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at his patient."

The emphasis has shifted now to the movement

to another consciousness.

Nevertheless,

the active role

finished as soon as the doctor has moved.
he hopes

to gain,

however,

is

The insight which

is yet to come.

The doctor com¬

pletely lacks control over what he will see after he has moved,
because whatever appears or is revealed to him will come from
beyond his consciousness,
ness.

The intent of

meaning,

namely from the patient*s conscious¬

the verb,

remains passive:

therefore,

meaning will come to the doctor

after he has moved over to stand
It

is of

interest that

stand a

patient,

in the patient’s place.

in English this kind of

logical perception is expressed
intelligible metaphor.

the perception of

in a similar,

psycho¬

more readily

When a psychiatrist wishes to under¬

he does not concern himself overly with the

patient's external appearance.
that he "wants to get inside"
We may conclude,

Rather,

he says colloquially,

the patient's head.

then,

that these two words,

Vorstellung

and Einstellung tell us a great deal about perception.

When

we actively meet external reality with our senses and form
an

of

it

(sich eine Vorstellung davon machen),
Likewise.,

we say we

have consciousness of

it.

meet the unconscious,

ve assume a particular kind of passive

stance which allows things to come
we have a

when we turn inward to

to consciousness.

certain attitude toward the unconscious

auf das Unbewrusstes haben).

(eine Einstellung

Then we have soul.

This notion of attitude
to Jung's whole psychology.

We say

(Einstellung)

By means of

is fundamental

it we can at once

clarify one particular difference between Freud and Jung.
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Freud,

in Chapter II

of The Interpretation of Dreams,

ledged the possibility of

"symbolic”

acknow¬

dream interpretation,

where one "considers the content of the dream as a whole."29
But he felt this was by and
"it

large an unhelpful method,

because

invariably breaks down when faced by dreams which are not

merely unintelligible but also confused."
from the repetitious
dreams

in Freud*s

And as one gleans

insistence on the illogical nature of

1901 essay "On Dreams,"

Freud found confusion

to be a central feature of all dreams.
Now it seems obvious that this problem of confusion
is

inextricably linked to the attitude of

Freud’s argument
symbolic

is

really inconsistent.

He states that

interpretation uses a different method,

holistic one,

i.e.

namely a

not dependent on logical sequences.

he switches criteria,
are,

the interpreter.

and

judges dreams by how confused they

how suitable they are for a non-symbolic,

analysis by the ego.

How "confused”

story,

for that matter --

toward

it.

But then

is,

a dream --

logical

or a child*s

depends on the attitude we take

To drive home this point,

let us recall Freud’s

opinions concerning the nature of the manifest content.
Surely his rejection of

the apparent meaning of

the dream is

in no small way dependent upon his above-mentioned dismissal
of the manifest content as "confuse:]."
ledges that

he acknow¬

some manifest contents are more readily intelli¬

gible than others,

and he attributes this to

effects of secondary revision,
This

Nevertheless,

the greater

mediated by the preconscious.

is entirely compatible with a Jungian point of view,

for

'

'
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as we have tried to make clear,
always

a genuine symbol for Jung

involves the collaboration of

conscious.
attitude.

the ego with the un¬

The only difference is once again a question of
Where Freud sees secondary revision as basically

a variation

on defense,

able to the ego,
collaboration.

a means of making the dream-work accept¬

Jung would attribute a positive aspect to such
For Jung,

the proper attitude facilitates

communication between the ego and the unconscious.

And

it

is this conviction which allows him to dwell on the manifest
content of the dream,

treating it as Freud himself admits,

"symbolically."
Jung had already explicitly formulated this concept
of attitude by 1921:
To have an attitude means to be ready for something
definite, even though this something is unconsciousj
for having an attitude is synonymous with an a priori
orientation to a definite thing, no matter whether this
be represented in consciousness or not.^Q
To have an attitude "signifies expectation"

(bedeutet Erwartung)

and expectation means waiting for something

(warten auf etwas).

For what are we waiting?

Heidegger has already told us:

are waiting for that which calls us,
thought about.
already here?

32

.
Why is

.
it not

Eecause we have turned our backs on it and have

But moreover,

turned way from us.
from man.

that which wants to be

...
And why are we waiting for it?

failed to reach out for it.
attitude.

we

33

We have not taken the proper

we are waiting for

if because it hus

....
From the very beginning, it withdrew

What calls dung and Heidegger does not allow

itself

to be known.
This does not mean that we

should give up,

though.

31
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For we can hardly expect to refind that which calls us if we
do not even try to meet it,

and rest instead on the assumption

that we know everything about the world from its Vorstellungen.
We must reach out toward that which is withdrawing within us.
And where will that

leave us? Underway,

.
34
between different ways."
And
border zone;

better yet,

that

is, 'Inter vias,

this is really no more than a

an interface,

which exists only by

defining the relation between two distinct realms.
is also no

less:

it is somewhere.

It is soul.

But no more

As Jung puts

it psychologically,
soul never loses its intermediate position.
It must
therefore be regarded as a function of relation between
the subject and the inaccessible depths of the unconscious.
. . . It creates symbols and images and is itself only
an image.
To have soul means

to take the proper attitude,

symbolic attitude,

which is

that is,

the

a definite view of the world which assigns meanings to
events, whether great or small, and attaches to this
meaning a greater value than bare facts.^
Heidegger states the same thing philosophically,
that "soul

is not the principle of

the spirit has

.

.

its being."
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life,

when he says

but that

It is liemona,

not simple memory,

but the place where that which has meaning for us,
which is food for thought,
to see.

in which

i.e.

that

is kept and reflected back for us

Relating/Keeping and Imagiig/Reflecting:

these are

the properties of the soul.
It may be objected,
What

however,

that we go too far here.

is all this nonsense about "calling,"

and "keeping?"
a mythology?
"My soul,"

"food for thought,"

Are we trying to explain something or create
The answer is,

we are trying to understand.

says James Hillman,
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is not the result of objective facts that require expla¬
nation; rather, it reflects subjective experiences that
that require understanding. « . To understand anything
at all, we must envision it as having an independent sub¬
jective interior existence, capable of experience, obliged
to a history, motivated by purposes and intentions.
Vie
must always think anthropomorphically, even personally.„
The soul does not perceive in the same way that our ego
perceives external reality.
and make abstractions.
out,

The soul,

can do none of this.

is the

The ego can quantify,

order,

as Jung so often pointed

It can only speak in images.

Metaphor

language of the soul.

*

If that

*

is so,

exploring a metaphor.

*

then let us conclude this section by
Let us see what

simply for the imagining.

insights can be had

Thus far we have heard the boun¬

dary between consciousness and the unconscious described as
.
a kind of chasm,
This

implies,

.
.
.
which required a bridge

however,

that the gap can be closed,

two can be united as a whole.
of horizon.
knew it as

the "negative border";

and Heidegger,

in a city,

William James called it "the

when was the

If he shares my misfortune of

it may have been quite a while indeed.
in the way.
too,

Jung-

used the word horizon.

I presume to ask the reader,

buildings get

image

Nietzsche

or the "transmarginal field";

by way of Husserl,

time he sa.j a horizon?

that the

A better metaphor is the

It goes under a variety of names.

fringe of consciousness"

May

.
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m order to be crossed.

Of course,

the forest,

they,

a horizon.

After considering this,

40

last
living

All those

my friends who live

(or so they tell me)

in

seldom gaze upon

I began, to feel a bit
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better about a fact which had irked me since the day I
heard the expression "horizon"

used

in this way.

was that I could not easily visualize "horizon"

first

That fact
and could not

at first envision the relationship implied by the metaphor.
Was

I suffering from a poverty of

simply that
I did not
for

live

in the right place?

This

that this phenomenon of

just anywhere.

close at hand,

is no

the buildings,

less

of a mountain.

like because

is no small point,
soul cannot be con¬

the people,

the highways,

is

we

Our view is obstructed.

true for those in the forest who surround them¬

selves with nature.
open space --

it

When we are preoccupied with what

cannot look up to see the horizon.
This

Or was

I had forgotten what a horizon looks

it tells us

jured up

imagination?

that

To see the horizon,
is,

a clearing.

one must

be in a flat,

Or by the sea.

To see the horizon,

then,

Or on top

we must situate our¬

selves within a grander scale.
So what then is a horizon?
earth or the sea.
pure relation.

But what

Of course,

Where the sky meets

is that?
it

no beyond.

moves with us.

it

is a
for it

We often say we "lost

meaning he disappeared.

also as far as we can see.
no farther,

is nothing,

is not quite that empty,

seems to be constantly taking things.
him at the horizon,"

It

the

The horizon is

But that does not mean there

One other property.

We can travel for

and our horizon never leaves us.

is

A horizon always

100 miles on the Kansas pxains
We cannot escape

it,

except

perhaps by returning to the city.
There is one instance,
be moving in on our horizon,

however, where we do seem to

making some progress towards

it.
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That

is when there are mountains on our horizon.

mountains do but define the horizon,
so that

it cannot escape us.

on any side of
real,

not

the mountain.

nation that

it

just for us.

Hence,

and can soon,

Another horizon.

when we feel excitement

must we accept the standard expla¬

what do we find upon reaching the summit?
Consciousness cannot escape its limitations.

mountains are a

special place.

things here that cannot be seen down below.
horizon that encircles us completely.
Also,

For although

Truly,

the horizon from afar,

And we see two
We see an unbroken

It gives us an illusion

the mountains are soul.

they remind us of

when we take the trouble to scale their peaks,
to us.

mountainous: heights,
depth.

To be sure,

heights.

our vision now

we see the mountain peaks themselves,

emerging from the clouds below.

new horizons

our hor¬

is on the other side?

extends a much greater distance than before.

They herald

Might it not

last have grabbed hold of

we cannot see all the way into the other side,

of wholeness.

a

any minute now as we scurry to the top,

peer over and discover what
And yet,

For anyone,

landmark,

is because of their sheer size?

just be because here we at

Still,

fix it fast to the earth

Mountains are a

illusory boundary.

upon approaching mountains,

izon,

And not

What do

it.

And

they reveal

Here the gods,the archetypes dwell.

From

one can appreciate what Hillman calls
they are dangerous:

Nevertheless,

one can fall from such

it is here that Holderlin,

of both Heidegger and Jung,

mountain dwellers

to returns
Nah isl
Urd schver zu fassen der Gott,

the poet

themselves,

sought
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Wo aber Gefahr ist, wflchst
Das Rettende auch.
Im Finstern wchnen
Die Adler, und furchtlos gehen
Die Sbhne der Alpen liber den Abgrund weg
Auf leichtgebaueten Brhcken.
Drum, da gehauft sind rings
Die Gipfei der Zeit, und die Liebsten
Nah wohnen, ermattend auf
Getrenntesten Bergen,
So gib unschuldig Wasser,
0 Fittiche gib uns, treuesten Sinns
HinUberzugehen und wiederzukehren.^
So much for a metaphor,
preted

it;

a

single word.

inter¬

I have merely dwelled in it and experienced it.

I could never hope to categorize,

organize,

systematize the soul and its contents.
And

I have not

analyze or

Nor would I want to.

that brings us to the final section of this first part.

For wThat

is the business of psychoanalysis

interpretation of dreams?

if not the

THE ROLE

OF

INTER?RETATION

We are treading on thin ice here.
psychoanalyst or not,
Where will this

is perhaps starting to get a

lead?

And

if he

is new territory for him.
say that

it

But

It is Apollo,

bring bright

too.

the

it is because this

After all,

Rather,

it

our dreams and

is someone within

It

is he who would

illusory comfort when,

like the timid animals
light,

however.

in a forest from discovery

nothing but

Apollo

.

.,! We know

is anxious for a reason.

There is something there and he knows that
he also knows that he cannot know it,
it.

.

'‘There

Psychoanalysis has taught us this much in

last seventy-five years:

he cannot see

images.

the visions

he announces for ail to hear,

was really nothing there at all,
better,

little tense.

lights to bear upon the darkling field of

by his blinding

be he

it is not really accurate to

our consciousness.

It is Apollo who would find
having fled

is anxious,

is we who are anxious.

fantasies belong to us,
us.

The reader,

it

is there.

But

for by his very nature

And so he trembles:

With what astonishment must the Apollonian Greek have
beheld himj
With an astonishment that was all the
greater the more it was mingled with the shuddering
suspicion that all this was actually not so very alien
to him after all, in fact that it was only his Apollonian
consciousness which, like a veil, hid this Dionysian
world from his vision.,
JL

If we are anxious,

then,

it

is not without cause.

we not choose a different response?
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To be sure,

But might
there are
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good reasons for heaving a sigh of
pronouncement.

If

relief upon hearing Apollo's

there is nothing there,

if we have inter¬

preted everything and assigned it a reason,
back to work.

And that

nagging at us,

keeps

is useful.

But if

then we can go
this anxiety keeps

insisting upon its presence,

Might we not try to get to know this other?
it,

too,

belongs to us.

what then?

Let us repeat,

We have identified with Apollo and

mistaken his anxiety for ours.

Might we not

identify with

the other?
We should not fool ourselves,
price to pay.

though.

We must sacrifice Apollo's

that we may see more,

if not better.

There is a

intense light so

In this dimness,

cannot expect to understand with rational precision.
admitted to this realm,
the gate,

we
To be

one must humbly leave his torch at

as Aeneas did his golden bough.

As Jung put

it

in 1915:
Understanding [i.e. rational analysis]] is a fearfully
binding power, at times a veritable murder of the soul
as it flattens out important differences.
The core of
the individual is a mystery of life, which is snuffed
out when it is "grasped."
That is why symbols want to
be mysterious; they are not so merely because what is
at bottom of them cannot be clearly apprehended . . .
There should truly be no understanding in this regard . .
True understanding seems to be one which does not under¬
stand, yet lives and works . . . 'We should be connivers
at our own mysteries, but veil our eyes chastely before
the mystery of the other, so far as, being unable to
understand himself, he does not need 'understanding*
of others.£
Again we must distinguish between phases of analysis.
The solvent

power of rational understanding has

pensable uses

in

the reductive part of an analysis.

that are symptomatic,
ness,

its

meaningless,

that

habitual

is,

subliminal,

indis¬
Behaviors

beneath our aware¬

these must be exposed to a

.

■
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clear light so that we can at last see them for what they
really are.

Understanding here would then serve as a much

needed corrosive to strip away the tarnish we assumed to be
.
3
the natural color of things.
But what Jung is describing above is something quite
different.
of us

It is a

sacrifice of clarity which soul demands

if we are to change our attitude and

meet that which calls us.
eludes us.

That

enough in the
This
those
a

images.

is

its privilege.

images that

it withdraws and

We can find meaning

it vouchsafes to us.

implies something quite extraordinary about
They can communicate meaning to us without

laborious hermeneutic,

tude.

No matter that

turn around to

provided we adopt the proper atti¬

Jung described this process eit work in the creative

efforts of patient

in art therapy:

A dark impulse is the ultimate arbiter of the pattern
[of the painting], an unconscious a priori precipitates
itself into plastic form, and one has no inkling that
another person's consciousness is being guided by these
same principles at the very point where one feels utterly
exposed to the boundless subjective vagaries of chance.
Over the whole procedure there seems to reign a dim
foreknowledge not only of pattern, but of its meaning.
Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes
shape, so the latter becomes clear.
Actually, the
pattern needs no interpretations it portrays its own
meaning.^
There

is clearly something very special about this,

however.

We are speaking here of purely generated authentic symbols.
By calling them authentic,

we are making an explicit synthesis

of Heidegger and Jung which we will fully elaborate in Part

II,

Suffice it for now to say that we intend by authentic symbol
that aesthetic union of the collective unconscious with an
actively participating consciousness which expresses the Self.

'
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It derives
calls:

its authenticity from its origin,

the Self.

Authentic symbol formation is accomplished

by the transcendent function.
cendent function,
the Self,
puts

it,

from that which

To

live a

life in the trans¬

to thus be a dialogue between reality and

that would mean living symbolically.
"poetically man dwells."

As Heidegger

Being in this mode is as

though
We are a sign that is not read.
We feel no pain, we almost have
Lost our tongue in foreign lands.^
Like a

sign,

we point toward the meaning and need not speak

aloud.
Such moments are rare,
misconstrued as

life's sole value.

the state of fallenness
condition,

however,

and should not be

Heidegger reminds us that

is an inescapable fact of the human

and claims its own validity.

And

it is this state

of fallenness which is the defining characteristic of
inauthenticitv,

and if we may extrapolate,

of

inauthentic

symbols as well:
*Inauthenticity* does not mean anything like Being-nolonger-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite
distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world -- the kind which
is completely fascinated by the 'world* and by the
Dasein-with of Others in the * they.•
b

Here,
of

in this state of fallenness,

interpretation.

For

ve refind the usefulness

it is precisely in that state which

is so fascinated by the world,

so totally given over to

it,

that the tool which was explicitly designed to explain that
world --

rational

interpretation

Take dreams,

for example.

can serve us best.
These usually lack, the

transparency and authenticity of the: transcendent function.

...

■

.

•

68

Like all

inferior forms of unconscious production,

contaminated with personal contents,

i.e.

but nonetheless very real,

concerns.

they reflect a

"worldly"

our inauthentic
Moreover,

lower degree of participation by conscious¬

ness as compared with the transcendent function,
quires that a deliberate attitude be taken.'
quence,

they are

which re¬

As a conse¬

dreams often demonstrate a certain chaotic and capri¬

cious quality.

The somnolence of dream consciousness --

or

of any pharmacologically altered state of consciousness for
that matter --

does not provide adequate guidance nor the

necessary control to give the best expression to unconscious
contents.
tively,

Thus the ego must complete in waking life,

what

it failed to do while asleep,

deriva¬

directly:

it must

interpret the whole and finish the story that was begun the
night before.

Following the analogy we set forth on page 57,

one might say that conscious,

symbolic dream interpretation

is the waking version of Freud's secondary revision.
rational:

it follows certain rules,

thorough,

and relies on principles of

is fairly orderly and
similarity,

both to

subjective associations and objective mythologies.
although synthetic in the sense of
is also aric-.lytic insofar as

It is

"filling in"

And

the story,

it intentionally seeks to

pret the meaning behind images as well.

Of course,

it

inter¬

we all

know from firsthand experience thav there are different kin;, s
of dreams,

"big dreams and little dreams"

natives put it.

as Jung's African

And by and large big dreams fulfill

criteria for authentic symbols:

our

the ego remembers them,

feels that it has been touched by them.

and

Such dreams require

.
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-

much less

interpretation,

inauthentic as

it

is,

if any.

But the everyday dream,

lacking that crystaline clarity which

only a rare

joining of the conscious and unconscious can

accomplish,

needs that further effort of consciousness making

which only interpretation affords.

Jung repeatedly urged

that these everyday dream symbols must,
effective,

be

'understood*

be assimilated and

experience."0

by the conscious mind;

integrated.

remains a mere occurence;

"if they are to be

A dream that

understood,

they must

is not understood

it becomes a

living

There is no question as to the need for analytic

interpretation here.
It may be objected that it is all well and good to
hypothesize the existence of

interpretation-free symbols which

we are calling here authentic,

but where is the evidence?

Foregoing the personal testimony of analysands themselves as
perhaps biased,

we nevertheless find

this hypothesis creeping

into much of the current literature on visual perception.
Most of the corroborating opinions derive either directly or
indirectly from the Gestalt school of psychology,

whose impact

on 20th century thought has yet to be fully exhausted.
Rudolf Arnheim,
a radical critique of
conscious thought.

for example, lays the groundwork for

traditionally accepted "truths"

In his book Visi la1 Thinking

sets out to examine systematically the belief

(1969),

he

that thought

a form of consciousness limited to words and "pure"
Beginning with a demonstration of

about

is

concepts.

the rudiments of organization

implicit in every instance of visual perception

(but seldom

manifested explicitly as such without, specially designed
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experiments), he soon moves to higher, more abstract levels.
He shows hew actual thinking can take place visually,
ing being defined by conceptualization,
hierarchy formation,
might desire.

relation,

think¬

sequencing,

or whatever other rational criteria one

He goes even further,

however.

stract painting by one of his students,

Using an ab¬

he argues cogently for

the intellectual processes at work in making such a creation.
He •'interprets" the painting to the reader as a thoughtful
commentary on the girl’s life at the time it was painted.
But he insists that his interpretation is a secondary pheno¬
menon and that in itself "the constellation of the picture is
also the solution of a thought problem, although there may be
.
.
9
no words to tell about the finding."
Arnheim realizes the implications of his thesis and
does not shun to treat them.

Ultimately, visual creations are

expressions of a person’s inner being within the limitations
of our phenomenal reality.

To be effective,

they must repre¬

sent an accommodation between the demands of the unconscious
contents and the rigors of meaningful,

intelligible imagery.

Only the discipline of the latter can treat the unconscious
thoughtfully-.

When this happens, however, we have great art.

Paul Klee has said,

"I create pour re pas pleurer;

the first and last reason."

that is

Arnheim takes this to mean that

creation wcrks "only by clarifying for him what there was to
weep about and how one could live with and infspite of,
state of affairs."

10

Art,

chological significance.

this

then, takes on a profoundly psy¬
To live symbolically or dwell

poetically is an aesthetic mode of being.
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We hear this

same theme echoed by Thomas Kuhn in his

influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
taking his cue from Gestalt psychology,

Also

Kuhn demonstrates the

fundamentally perceptual nature of scientific theory con¬
struction.

He notes that scientists can resort to words and

explanations

in defense of their hypotheses only after a cer¬

tain ground,

which he calls a paradigm,

What that ground
deed cannot be,
knowledge."

11

is,
for

But

has been agreed upon.

is never explicitly articulated and
it

it

is,

as Michael Polanyi explains,

is no

less knowledge for

in¬
"tacit

its silence.

Anyone who would seriously entertain that doubt would also
have to disbelieve the manifest presence of a
is solidly rooted

in such intangibles as paradigms.

matters which paradigm is chosen,

These are not mere fantasies.

image or Gestalt,

it

in the history of
Indeed,

this perceptual point of view,

irreplaceable first step,

For

and as Kuhn amply shows,

there have been innumerable bad paradigms
science.

technology which

this

initial

remains the

upon which all further elaborations

of consciousness depend.
Based on this concept of paradigm,
tinction between perception and
example of the rabbit-duck
we perceive,
taneously.

interpretation.

(see figure 1),

either the rabbit or the duck,
Now of course we can step back,

upon this curious state of affairs,
carefully dissect

it,

In the famous

we see,

that

is,

never both simuJand reflecting

return to

the picture and

picking out features which lead toward

one or the other images.
comes aftei

Kuhn draws a dis¬

But this interpretive effort only

our initial perception.

Not only that,

but even

■
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2

Rabbit or cluck?

Figure

1

when we have completely analyzed the picture,
return to gaze at it as a whole,
a rabbit or a duck.

The

if we then

we again confront either

interpretive process,

tially different from perception,
perceptual effect on us.

has no

Perception,

immediate recognition of meaning

being essen¬

impact on the

the spontaneous and

in a visual stimulus,

not be reduced to merely an unconscious version of

.

tation.

12

It has

.

.

image's

can¬

interpre-

.

its own validity.

As Kuhn has dared
to the history of science,

to apply this perceptual paradigm
so may we,

too,

avail ourselves of

its insights by putting it to use in psychiatry.

We are

suggesting here that the process of visual perception is a
high order discriminator of meaning which modulates a
arid tenuous
phenomenal

interaction between unconscious processes and
reality.

As such,

it is primary,

such further manipulations upon the world as
to exert.
ings,

contirnous

First we "recognize”

then we take

and prior to
the ego may chcose

reality by assigning it mean¬

it apart to see how it works.

As concerr s
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the symbolic process,

what we have described

in the section

on metapsychology becomes nothing more than the inside of
this perception.
perception.

It faces the unconscious,

Only here it operates

but

it

is still

in the reverse direction.

Instead of recognizing reality by projecting meaning onto
forms,

it recognizes

meaning.

the unconscious by providing forms

In both instances

this transpires

for

in the silence

of the soul.
We must now consider a
Lawrence Kubie.
therapy,"
art,

final. counterargument

He notes the simple empirical fact that "art

as clinically practiced

does not

from

"work" very well.

in hospitals or as legitimate
His explanation for this is

complex,

but we can isolate three basic points.

queries,

"Why,

First,

if we cannot dream ou.r way to health,

he

should

we expect to write or paint or compose or invent or discover
our way to health?"

13

...
Coupled to this question is the obser¬

vation that "creative people
neurotic."
"metaphor"

Second,
of

"social value"

in every field are often highly

after disclaiming the utility of

the word "sublimation,"

the

he points out that the

of expressed behavior- has absolutely no

ence upon the unconscious

"id"

forces.

Art,

in ether words,

despite the esteem in which it is hold by society,
reach down to

its own unconscious sources.

no solution.

And as a

concluding point,

influ¬

Hence

Kubie

cannot
it offers

implies

that

the whole project for understanding artistic creativity,
and indeed unconscious processes in general,

is untenable as

things stand at the present,

because it rests upon mere

metaphors

discharge,

like "sublimation,

and abreaction."

74

He maintains that "concepts that are metaphorical analogies
can never be used as explanatory principles."
gesting that
therefore

insofar as

psychoanalysis

like art therapy,

it,

too,

Kubie is sug¬

is metaphorical and

will be doomed to failure.

What began as an analysis of art therapy has ended with a
re-evaluation of the whole psychotherapeutic enterprise.
It should be apparent
differs from our position.

just how widely such a view

In the first place,

just what goals Kubie sets for the artist.

we question

Even without

resorting to a critique of his dichotomizing the world into
.
the healthy and the sick

(a nefarious practice in our view),

14

we can still object to his expectations that art should some¬
how bring about resounding cures
psychologically.

it

to

justify itself

That Van Gogh or Nijinsky "did not get well"

in no way impugns
nor does

in order

the meaningfulness of their creativity,

inauthenticate

its truly symbolic nature.

made no claim that the transcendent function leads us
fection;

only that it best expresses our fate.

We
to per¬

And a man's

fate may be tragic.
Moreover,

Kubie clearly takes a different view of

significance of artistic activity when he speaks of its
value."

"social

We would agree that society's reaction to artistic

creations las little

impact on the artist's unconscious,

that is precisely because the "purpose"
whatsoever to do with "sublimating"
appropriate "social values."

It

but

of art has nothing

the unconscious to the

The meaningfulness of art comes

not from what society thinks of
artist.

the

it,

but what it means to the

is only at this most personal

level that we claim
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an impact for the effects of artistic images and symbols upon
unconscious processes.
Finally, Kubie betrays his fundamental objection to
art therapy by his discomfort with "metaphorical analogies."
We will not tire the reader with a recapitulation of our
thoughts on this topic.

Suffice it to mention here the elegant

distinctions that are currently being made within the philo¬
sophy of science with regard to this problem.
for example,

Stefan Kbrner,

has urged that we must separate out matters of

.
.
.
.
15
prediction from those of explanation m our analyses.
They
represent two independent categories), and operate with different
strategies.

It would seem what Kubie is really asking for

as he rankles over "mere metaphor" is a more "scientific"
vocabulary.

He wants precision,

reproducibility;

in short,

proof,

he wants what all science aspires

to -- a mathematical model.
to be sure.

logic, quantitation,

But such models,

And this is a worthy objective,
if Kbrner is right,

serve only

to guide our manipulations of reality. They help us to predict
reality, which is the ultimate accomplishment of Freud's fore¬
most "institution of the ego," reality testing.
model, however,

does not explain anything.

indeed need metaphors. And that is because,

A predictive,

For that, we do
in this post-

Kantian ere, we no longer aspire to some illusory "ultimate
explanation."

We have learned to accept the fact that we are

dealing with something which will remain inexplicable. And
with that in mind, we would sooner nave metaphors -- as deeply
and as broadly extended as possible, with all the finesse of
articulation that aesthetics provides us -- than nothing at all.

I
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If I have made any point in this chapter,

it is this:

Psychiatry deals not with the mind alone, nor the bodily in¬
stincts,

although these are its principle objects of investi¬

gation today.

We must again follow James Hillman, whose

thinking in this area has proven so rich and thought-provoking.
Psychiatry (and more properly speaking,
Jung observed in 1908,

psychology)

is, as

"the art of healing the soul."^

thus finds itself between mind and body.

It

But perhaps even

Jung remained too much bound to Apollo the Physician in this
pronouncement.

For psychotherapy does not cure souls.

You

can sometimes cure the body, and sometimes educate the mind.
The soul,

however,

you can only care for,

ginal meaning of cure as cura suggests.
.
.
.
17
therapy implies just that.
to watch its fragile images,
painful,

in silence:

And the word psycho-

.
To sit by and wait patiently,
however imperfect and however

that is our task.

guidance, and encouragement,

as indeed the ori¬

In it, we find our

through symbols.

INTERLUDE

A WORD ON METHOD,
AND A MEDITATION ON A WORD

Before proceding on with the argument,

let me take

a brief pause and step back from the urgency of my concerns.
The earnest tone of

the first half of this essay --

be undone by the second -take my thoughts.

not

to

tells the reader how seriously I

Thought acquires the force of

conviction,

and the prosaic but rhetorical expositi.cn molds the conviction
into a claim

And clearly,

the claim is for truth.

to conceive a thesis and defend its
sequence of

logical assertions,

that,

Cf course,

truth with a coherent
is the object of

the

exercise.
Unfortunately,
the generalized

"truth"

I myself am not so convinced about
of my claim:

I see no reason why it

should carry conviction for anyone who has not shared my
thoughts,
alone.

which leaves me with my truth,

Why then should
Thus

I disclose a

the second half of
ways of

I

fin ling

take up ary more of
lack,

and it

lack that

Now there are two

in this void which threatens to

leave my

One could set about

in an attempt to prove by method of

examples — appropriately interpreted to be sure!
evident nature of my truth.

to me

the reader’s time

is to this

this essay will respond.

argument so precariously ungrounded.
to amass"data"

important

innumerable
— the self-

But Jung and others have already

collected volumes of clinical and rrythological

78

instances whi eh
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demonstrate

this truth,

reasoning speaks for

and the power of their evidence and

itself

(assuming one reads

it).

The

other way to handle such a void is to pass over the endproduct of the argument,
truths,
tries

those crystalized and formulaic

and return to their source,

to insinuate oneself

feels confident enough to
another*s thought,

If

one

into the mind of another,

and

let oneself be swept along by

there opens the possibility of arriving

at the necessary conviction of a
This

to thinking.

is what

I

thought's truth from within.

propose to do.

By "locating"

thought on symbols within the context of
metaphysical

thinking,

Least of all do

I

I have

in mind

intimate some proof-by-similarity

if you prefer),

man's thought rests upon

19th and 20th century

do not presume to prove anything.

I want to

(or by contagion,

Jung's

whereby the truth of one

its resemblances to another's.

is rather a

kind of amplification.

What

In asking

the reader to think with me the thoughts of a few thoughtful
men,

I hope to entice him to think the thought of symbol as

Jung did.

I ask the reader to step into a

may well be foreign to him.

The intention is to urge him

to reflect genuinely upon the thoughts of
this essay,

discussion which

the first half of

by exposing him to the dialogue from which those

thoughts emerged.

I confess that such a method of filling the

void of

tri th is an insidious shirking of my responsibility,

because

it

I

leaves the ultimate task of

thinking to the reader.

trust he enjoys working.
As an initial

conclude our

instance of this method,

interlude with a

discussion of

then,

let us

the etymology of

.
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the word "symbol.'*
of words,

It pays at times to consider the history

especially ones which we use so frequently and yet

diversely.

This

literature.

is an old practice

in the psychoanalytic

Freud himself was intrigued by the "antithetical

meaning of primal words,"1 and Jung frequently resorted to
elucidating etymologies,

contending that "it often happens

that a word's history throws a
of

surprising light on the nature

the psychic fact underlying it."

2

Such inclinations per¬

haps reflect the ever present need to seek out
things,
mind,

the roots of

so intrinsic to the psychoanalyst's -- and philosopher's

a need which Freud dubbed "the predilection for the

prehistoric."
Ernest Jones was
etymology of

"symbol"

the first of many to research the

in part of his

1916 essay on symbolism.

Although seeking to connect the old meaning of
current Freudian concepts,

3

the word with

he was forced to admit that he could

not establish a valid correspondence.

In fact,

he specifically

noted that the Greek sumballon did not carry the present
Freudian

interpretation of

efforts,

therefore,

ancient Greek,

cind

and modern concepts

sign.

Jones had

to go even farther back than

identify the root similarity between archaic
in the Indogermanic stem bal,

from the even older Sanskrit gal,
of water."

In order to salvage his

This imagery of

meaning

which derives

"a flowing together

streams converging on a river he

interpreted as suggesting the multiplicity of

significations

which most dream symbols have.
This explication is entirely tenable,

especially since

the verb sumballein was used precisely in that sense of rivers

'
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.
flowing together
depths of

to;

Sumballon is composed of

meaning together,

and ballon,

verb ballein,

the

Now this word,
of meanings.

sum

(or

with or according
(from the

taken as a whole,

has

They can be divided

into

•

which are far from being unrelated thematically:

Literally,

together."

common,simultaneous,

to throw.)

four classes,
1)

two parts:

meaning that which has been thrown

an extraordinary number

eyes,"

However,

this remarkable word are hardly fathomed by this

account alone.
sun),

.
.
4
m ancient Greek as well.

s

sumballein means "to throw or dash

Taken personally,

it connotes

"a meeting of

the

and generalizing from that we get "a coming together

or meeting of men,"
st racto ."

and finally "a

joining or uniting

The ultimate implications of

lost on the Greeks,
suggests speech,

this concept were not

who took it one step farther:

words,

in afa¬

and so sumballein

to meet

loqous means

"to

converse."
2)

Never ones to ignore the darker side of things,

the Greeks knew that meeting means originally to meet the
unknown,

and that

of Odysseus,

is always unpredictable.

wandering alone

So

in the spirit

in a hostile world,

sumballein

could also mean "to come upon [someonej by chance,"
the worst,

"to

hostilities."
or "encounter,"
3)
together,"
spond,"

"to

join in fighting,"

"to faring men together

Thus we also have sunbole,
and

"an engaigement"

In another context,

as

meaning "a

in

juncture"

in battle.

sumballein could mean "to put

and this was understood
tally."

and fearing

in the sense of

"to corre¬

From this we get the word sumbo1on,

ing "tally," which as Leopold Stein explains

mean¬

in his fascinating

-

■
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article

is

two halves of corresponding pieces of bone, coin, or
other cbjects which two strangers or any other two
partners broke between them in order to have proof of
the identity of the presenter of the other part.^
In a

similar vein sumballein meant more generally "to compare

one's own opinion with facts"
out,

understand,

infer,

the word sumbolos,
4)
sense,

conjecture,

meaning

Finally,

and thereby "to conclude,
or interpret."

"augury"

meaning "to agree upon [a price],"

peculiar meaning of

in a commercial

"to fix £a price],"

In this way we arrive at the

sumbolon as "a covenant"

for the protection of commerce.

Hence

or "omen."

sumballein could be used

or "to settle [a transaction]."

make

between two states

Note how here again we have

characterized an ambivalent relationship.

Commerce,

the

flowering of a meeting between strangers who have something
to share,

always

theft,

little do men trust one another.

so

threatens

tally or covenant,
meeting of

yet unclarified,
unknown.

It

into brigandage and
The sumbolon,

as

is precisely what permits discourse at a

two strangers,

with the unknown.

to degenerate

at the confrontation of

the known

It alone points the way toward some as
but binding,

is this

relationship between known and

relationship which is at the core of

cluster of meanings.

And

lest it be

polated too far here,

let me complete my list with Jung's

judged that we have extra¬

observation that sumbolon also came to mean the creed in
Greek Orthcdox Church,

this

the

and as such represented the ultimate

covenant between man and the unknown.
If we muse upon this notion of the tally,
striking conceit for our theory of

symbol.

we find a

Imagine,

if you will,
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a dream about dreaming.

There is the ego,

walking through the dark forest,
beasts,

other men,

a man like him.

anthropomorphic as always.

trust him?

knows himself as Odysseus did,

Suddenly

He is the dream

Why should our traveller

Indeed,

if our traveller

he immediately suspects the

the same unbridled egoism and selfishness which

characterizes himself.
together?
reveals,

the

What reason does the ego have for taking dream

images as anything but a threat?

other of

prey to the weather,

and his own fears and frailties.

there appears a stranger,
image,

a solitary figure

What could possibly bring these two

And then the stranger produces his sumbolon,

he

makes visible

something perceptible that is the result of an activity
which throws together such things as have something in
common, and in such a way that one thing somehow accords
with another not presented to the senses, and is synchronous
with it.g
That

is,

our traveller recognizes the visible sumbolon as the

counterpart to his,

and that

implies a hidden relationship

between the two:
The symbol, the broken-off part* is not a separate element
but carries with it, and points to, wherever it goes, the
whole in which it participated as well as the situation
in which it was broken in half.
And so we again come by way of fanciful dream interpretation
to a notion of

the symbol as that which is

thrown across

abyss separating consciousness and the unconscious,

the

requirirg

the participation of both sides to make a whole.
That this
may be

interpretation of the two ’’sides"

is correct

judged by the further consideration of the related

word diabalio,

from which we get the words diabolic and devil.

Here "the other side"

is seen quite distinctly as violent and
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unfriendly,
session,"

and the invasion by the unconscious,

is onesided.

One thinks of Dostoevsky's The Possessed,

which translates more literally as The Devils.
consciousness

as in "pos¬

it is when

lacks the symbol and therewith the possibility

of communication,

just then do we succumb to devils,

throw synptoms across at us and disrupt our
side then remains dark and forbidding,
a creative relationship with it,

lives.

who
The other

and the potential for

as in a "trade agreement,"

requires the proper attitude of trust,

as

intimated by the

clue of the symbol.
Once again

I will ask,

ing etymology as proof?"
But

if my intention

a certain way,

"What right do I have in claim¬

And again I must confess,

is to seduce the reader into thinking in

then all

I claim to be doing

him to the thinking of a people,
thinking is of

is

or who "intended"

it?

But if we credit this
in a word's

we are doing no more than recognizing the power of

intuition,

something which ought not to be so foreign to

psychiatrists.
ing,

Such

Who can say how a

pre-reflective thinking which manifests itself
history,

introducing

the ancient Greeks.

course unself-conscious.

language develops

"None."

The mere fact that such pre-cntological think¬

as Heidegger calls

hardly invalidates
to us on another

it.

level,

boldly draw conclusions.

it,

is not yet formally expressed,

I will grant,

that it appeals

and one from which we cannot too
It is a dizzy business,

for a voice in a word's history,
quick to point out;

though,

listening

and as Heidegger himself

is

05

in citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited wordmysticism.
Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philo¬
sophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words
in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common
understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligi¬
bility which functions in turn 'us a source of pseudo
problems.
So it is probably going too far to suppose,
words

as Stein does,

that

"carry with them archaic meanings that survive in the

.

unconscious."

11

Such a claim really does require proof.

on the other hand,

merely want to suggest that for the Greeks,

word families were thought about,

.

.

ticed by such as Heraclitus,
the similarity of
food for thought.

We,

and such thinking,

often led to

.

.

insight.

their thought with Jung's

as prac-

12

is for us,

And yet
truly,

PART II
TH£ PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE

PREDECESSORS

The history of Germanic philosophy in the
dramatizes a

19th century

fundamental conflict within the European cultural

psyche which only finally erupted into articulate conscious¬
ness with the work of Freud,

Jung,

and Heidegger.

The conflict

varied from thinker to thinker,

but one side was always the

same:

reason was doing battle.

Depending on the point of

view,

one can cite various examples to demonstrate what reason

was

struggling with.

elevation of
of

Freudians can point to the one-sided

reason in Kant and especially Hegel as evidence

the repression of

instinctual

life.

Jungians see in

Zarathustra*s visions and dreams the confrontation of reason
with the archetypal unconscious.

And Heideggerians refer us

to Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer to emphasize the impact that
the "discovery"
era.

of Death had upon the reasonable man of that

In all cases,

not understand,

reason encountered experiences that

that were unfathomable in principle,

threatened it ominously.
theme this conflict of

and

it did
that

We propose: to take as our guiding

reason with the unknowable.

it from Kant through Schopenhauer ti Nietzsche,

Following

all of whom

Jung had read deeply,1 we will try to unpack some of

the key

issues and assumptions behind the arguments and thereby arrive
at the debate as

it presented itself

the century.

-
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to Jung at the end of
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Kant
The Enlightenment produced the man who defined it,
Immanuel Kant

(1742-1804),

and for him reason stood pre¬

eminently as the foundation of man's humanity.
known work.

The Critique of Pure Reason

the most thoroughgoing attempt

(1781)

he set out to

establishing the

represented

in the history of philosophy

to determine the scope and power afforded
ically,

His best

to reason.

investigate human "understanding"

limits of

"our faculty of knowledge."

much was human cognition bound to phenomenal reality,
and to what extent was

.

.

it by no means follows

of experience."

3

Becoming,

conceded Kant.

that all [knowledge] arises out

independent of experience,

impressions."

and even of

Such would be knowledge a priori,

and "knowledge a priori

is absolutely independent of all

experience,

this or that kind of experience,"

not

just of

The answer to this question marked a turning point
philosophy,

and much of

a commentary on

2

Kant wondered whether there might be "a

knowledge altogether
all sensuous

How

"That all knowledge

begins with experience there can be no doubt,"
"But

by

it possible for reason to transcend

experience and thereby attain Being?

.

Specif¬

it.

in Western

19th century philosophy proved to be

Kant concluded

that:

our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits
of possible experience; and yet this is precisely the most
essential object of this science [metaphysics].
The esti¬
mate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive
is that it has only to do with the phenomena, and that
things themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie
beyond its sphere.^
Here we have

in its essence the epistemological abyss

we alluded earlier in the paper.

to which

Such a pronouncement lays
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-

the groundwork for the possibility of a conception of man
in which human existence
in- the-world .

is deeply alienated from its Being-

As Heidegger points

aut cogently,

being a creative turn away from Descartes,

far from

Kant*s ontology

not only rested on the same basic assumptions about subject
and object,
up as

but cleared the way for Descartes*

vision,

held

it had been by the trappings of Christian metaphysics,

to find

its ultimate

•
,
•
gical
science.

logical expression in Western technolo-

5

And yet

it

is common knowledge that Kant himself did

not see such dehumanizing consequences stemming from his work.
Far from it.

As Peter Gay observes,

the tradition of Rousseau.6

Kant was a humanist

This naivete vis-^-vis his onto¬

logy was by no means a failure of

insight,

however.

Rather,

it derived from his wider conception of the human mind.
The Critique of Pure Reason could
his final word on
appear as such,

that art

of Judgment).

For

in no way be construed as

the human condition,

even if today it would

given our current relativization of morality

(contra The Critique of Practical Reason)
Hegel,

in

is now a
In these

thing of

the past

later works,

and our belief,

with

(contra The Critique

Kant elaborated other

structures which he thought would bridge over the chasm which
he had revealed

in his first Critique.

may find a clue pointing toward our

And perhaps here we

theme.

If The Critique of Pure Reason dealt with the
of human "understanding,”
this "understanding"
that

is not

limits

we mast be quick to point out that

was conceived in a very particular manner

to be equated with "reaeon."

the utter rationality of

"understanding."

This is not to der.y
But

reason remained
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for Kant a precisely defined word
faculties.
tique,
reason,

Theoretical reason,

embracing two general

the topic of

dealt with the rational faculty of
on the other hand,

denoted

the first Cri¬

cognition.

that structure,

Practical

also rational,

which expressed the faculty of desire.
Thus the second Critique,
Reason,

was

the will"

The Critique of Practical

"concerned with the grounds of determination of

--

in short,

with freedom,

The first Critique had

grappled with the problem of demonstrating by means of pure
theoretical reason the a priori cognizability of God,
and

.
.
immortality,

.
7
only to fail.

the explicit acknowledgement of

freedom,

. .
The second Critique began with
this ungroundedness,

and thus

merely attempted to define the scope? of human freedom,
lating God and

immortality along the' way.

postu¬

This theoretical

ungroundedness did not undermine Kant's certainty about his
arguments,

however.

By means of

the: Categorical Imperative,

the details of which need not concern us here,
was still able to formulate a

he thought he

system of ethical absolutes

which would escape any rational refutation.
from a contemporary standpoint we find

Nevertheless,

little

in this second

Critique that speaks to our present-day problem of ethical
rootlessness,

which seems

ground ethics

in reason alone.

There remains a
more promising.

to scoff at any futile attempts to

third struc ture,

hox^ever,

Kant acknowledged a curious middle ground

between the faculties of cognition and desire,
"the feeling of pleasure and displeasure."
judgment,

which appears

which he called

The principle of

standing between understanding and reason,

expressed
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this middle realm.

It is here in The Critique of Judgment

that we find a hint of how it might be possible to
the epistemological abyss of the first Critique,
very special context.
(sec.
the

43-54),

albeit in a

In the discussion of art and genius

Kant introduces us to the irrational realm of

imagination,

understanding.

which constitutes a counterbalance to the
In this realm of

aesthetic sense,

imagination we find,

nothing less than that "spirit"

is the very "animating principle in the mind."
spirit is equated to
ideas."

jump across

in an

(Geist)

which

And this

"the faculty of presenting aesthetic

With the aesthetic idea,

Kant gives content to the

imaginal and thereby offers a concrete structure to complement
the concepts of understanding.
nature by definition,

Of a radically different

this structure eludes understanding:

By an aesthetic idea I mean, that representation of the
imagination which induces much thought, yet without the
possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept,
being adequate to it, and which language consequently, can
never get quite on level terms with or render completely
intelligible.g
Artistic genius consists
relation"
concepts

in the power to unify "in a certain

the two realms of aesthetic ideas
(understanding):

happy relation,
9
given concept."'
spondence,
pression of

.

.

.

(imagination)

"Genius properly consists

enabling one to find out

and

in the

ideas for a

.
...
This unifying is not merely a barren corre¬

but a synthetic event which gives birth to the ex¬
these aesthetic ideas,

an "expression by means

of which the subjective mental condition induced by the
ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated
to others.
The latter talent is properly that which is
called spirit.
Trie to his colors,

Kant seemed determined to

leave

..
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at the very least a token priority to the understanding,
as the aesthetic idea comes as a

response to the concept.

we see in his discussion of poetry,
rank among all arts,"
this

But

which "holds the first

just how much he was willing to valorize

irrational and un-understandable realm of

Poetry,

insofar

imagination.

Kant tells us,

expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination
and by offering, from among the boundless multiplicity
of possible forms accordant with a given concept, to
whose bounds it is restricted, that one which couples
with the presentation of the concept a wealth of thought
to which no verbal expression is completely adequate,
and by thus rising aesthetically to ideas.
Poetry reveals a transcendent world to us by
regarding and estimating nature as phenomenon in the
light of aspects which nature of itself does not afford
us in experience, either for sense or understanding, and
of employing it accordingly in behalf of, and as a sort
of schema for, the supersensible.
Poetry and
short,

the aesthetic idea

disciplined

from which it springs is,

in

intuition.

Nov; we make no claim that Kant was any less the ration¬
alist for this view.
that this
to

Above all,

we do not mean

to suggest

interpretation of the aesthetic should be expanded

include all aspects of Kant's epistemology.

it is no accident

that Kant

in the middle ground of

Nevertheless,

located this aesthetic function

judgment,

which he conceived as

"a

means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in a whole."1'1'
But it would, be up to
to give a

later philosophers,

"strong reading"

to Kant's doctrine on poetry,

thereby emphasize the primacy of
general

especially Nietzsche,

the aesthetic

interpretation of epistemology.

in a more

and
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Schopenhauer
To Arthur Schopenhauer

(1783-1860)

fell the task of

bringing Kant's philosophy into line with the prevailing
spirit of post-Romantic Europe.
reduction of nature u

la

Kant

To be sure,

to space,

had become the predominant leitmotiv of
logy,

the powerful

time and causality
19th century techno¬

so successfully blossoming in the

industrial revolution.

But at the same time the heirs of Napoleonic Europe were also
beginning to come to terms with the weightiness of
as animals:

as animals with corruptible bodies

rise of modern medicine from the
histology and pathology);
passions

1830 and 1848,

tion

in

19th century foundations of

rea.son

species

in the demises of

in Plant Hybridiza¬

Schopenhauer was the most eloquent philoso¬

phical spokesman for this new consciousness.

12

man as the animal metaphysicum, '
stress on animal,

with the spirit of

thinking,

and how

laid equal

if we are to see

it was so in keeping

his era.

Schopenhauer,

valuation of reason,

the

with forms and patterns,
insistence

it supplied content,

Kant's metaphysics,

was no

iences and problems of

to Kant's

In describing

Schopenhauer

and we must rememlier this

what was new in his

For

and

(witness Darwin's Origin of

1860 and Mendel's Experiments

in 1866).

instinctual

with the subsequent political cynicism);

as animals belonging to a
Species

(witness the

as animals with unruly,

(witness the failure of

their being

with its over¬

longer commensurate to the exper¬
19th century.

Reason supplied men

but Schopenhauer took strong exception

in the Critique of Practical Reason that
in the shape o::

human values,

as well.
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On the contrary,

at the

of knowledge per se,
in nature;

level of specific content,

that is,

Schopenhauer regarded reason as "feminine

it can give only after it has received:

To know means generally to have within the power of the
mind, teady to reproduce at will, such judgements as
have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something
outside them, in other words, such judgements as are true.^ ~
True

judgments were not to be located in the realm of

however.

Where Kant offered us a

abyss of

the first Critigue,

solace as

rational alternative to

the

Schopenhauer now dismissed such

reason misunderstanding

a new solution.

reason,

itself.

Instead,

he offered

Schopenhauer *s creative contribution to West¬

ern philosophy lay in his re-introduction of the body as the
source of human truth.

The

transcendental, and alienating Kant¬

ian abyss was not actually bridged,
renewed value to
True,

but made narrower,

by giving

the experience of man's Being-in-the-world.

the abyss remained.

The thing in

tinued to escape man's metaphysical questing,

itself con¬

which Schopen¬

hauer practically accepted by definition:
By metaphysics I understand all so-called knowledge that
goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond
nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things, in
order to give information about that . . . which is hidden
behind nature, and renders nature possible.^
But Schopenhauer attributed the apparent elusiveness of such
knowledge to the effects of
as emptying

sterile reasoning,

which, he regarded

out the content of human life by means of reduction

and abstraction.

To this reasoning he objected:

Does it not seem positively wrong-headed that in order to
solve the riddle of experience, in other words, of the
world which alone lies before us, that we should close
our eyes to it, and ignore its contents? , » , It is true
that the task of metaphysics is not the observation of
particular experiences; but yet it is the correct explana¬
tion of experience as a whole, its foundation, therefore,
must certainly be of an empirical nature.^
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Essence,
to the

the thing in itself,

.

intellect."

16

"remains unknowable,

But this opacity of

at least

the world in the

face of human reason could in no way be construed as a cause
for nihilism,

which alternative seems so much more plausible

to us toda}.

For Schopenhauer,

efforts at regarding the world

it required the barest of
in its everydayness --

have the origins of phenomenology here —
meanings and values were

and we

to realize that

immediately available to man as a

Being-in-the-worId:
Therefore this thing-in-itself must express its inner
nature and character in the world of experience; conse¬
quently it must be possible to interpret these from it,
and indeed from the material, not the mere form, of ex¬
perience.
Accordingly, philosophy is nothing more but
the correct and universal understanding of experience
itself, the interpretation of meaning and content. 1^
Note the words "correct understanding"
tation."

and "interpre¬

We must now give some content to his hermeneutical

apparatus.

Schopenhauer did so by turning to feelings as that

bodily faculty in which the truth of

our perceptions was grounded.

He was acutely aware that from the point of view of
"feeling has only a negative content."

18

reason,

But Schopenhauer

found reason to be rather perspectival and one-sided,
as

it may sound,"

"strange

and guilty of a pride which fostered crude

ignorance,
since it classifies under the one concept of feeling
every modification of consciousness which does not belong
directly to its own method of representation, in other
words, which is not abstract concept.
The fact of

the matter for Schopenhauer was that feeling con¬

stituted the ground "of all knowledge,

of all

we are at first conscious only intuitively,
net yet formulated into abstract concepts.

truth,

of which

but which we have

20

He rejected as

■
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pedantry any theoretical maxims,

rationally constructed and

removed frcm the reality of daily living,
guide human

conduct with absolute values

being a case
hauer,

in point.)

which presumed to
(Kant’s Categories

Ethical behavior,

maintained Schopen¬

as opposed to rigid and sterile dogma,

happens in accordance with feelings, that is to say, net
precisely according to concepts, but to ethical worth and
quality. . . . Conduct in the end pursues its own course
independently of [dogmas], usually in accordance not with
abstract, but with unspoken maxims, the expression of which
is precisely the whole man himself.^,
This

insistence on feelings and the whole man,

returns us foursquare to the body,
With this move,
the metaphor,

the

of course,

instincts,

and the Will.

Piantian metaphysics was regrounded,

to extend

in "earth."

To take a concrete example of what Schopenhauer has
in mind with this dichotomizing

of reason and experience,

shall examine his categories of concept and Idea.
us at once of
idea,

but

we

This reminds

the distinction Kant drew with his aesthetic

it becomes clear that Schopenhauer broadened its base.

"The concept,"

he tell us,

is abstract, discursive, wholly undetermined within its
sphere, determined only by its limits, attainable and
intelligible only to him who has. the faculty of reason,
communicable by words without further assistance, entirely
exhausted by its definition.^
The concept
knowledge,

is "dead,"
a mere,

"barren,"

incapable of producing new

though not on theit account unhelpful,

"receptacle."
On

the other hand the Idea,

definable perhaps as the adequate representative of the
concept, is absolutely perceptive, and although repre¬
senting an infinite number of irdividual things, is yet
thoroughly definite

.^
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By insisting on the perceptive nature of

Ideas,

Schopenhauer

grounds them in experience and hence in the body,
earth.

It is only because Ideas derive from this fertile

matrix that

Schopenhauer can claim that an Idea

living organism,
force,

.

into

will and

"is

like a

developing itself and endowed with generative

which brings forth that which was not previously put

.

it."

24

Ideas can be the source of

because any phenomenal

reality which we might constitute is

only one possible combination of
set of all possible relations.
able forms,"

such creativity only

relations.

But Ideas are the

As the "permanent,

unchange¬

Ideas make up "the sum of all relations of an

object.
The Idea is the root point of all these relations, and thus
the complete and perfect phenomenon, the adequate objecti¬
vity of the will at this stage of its phenomenal appearance.25
It should be understood,
were out of

however,

space and time,

as a tangible image of

and

things.

that for Schopenhauer

Ideas

in no wise could be envisioned
In this sense,

they are very

far from the Flatonic Ideas to which Schopenhauer ostensibly
attributed them.

Ideas are rather something purer,

to the reality of the thing in itself.
gravity and causality.

Examples

closer

include force,

Such entities are totally divorced from

the particular because they include the possibility of all
particulars.

As Wittgenstein later observed,

causality .is not a
then filled
theless,

lav;,

but the form of a

"the lav; of

law,"

26
'

which is

out by the particulars of Newtonian physics.

Ideas do not go so far

in the opposite direction as

to "reveal the being-in-itself of things,
jective character,

Never¬

but only their ob¬

and thus a1ways uhe phenomenon."^'

The
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notion of

Idea

thus stands between the imagery of Platonic

Forms and the ineffability of
even say that Schopenhauer’s

the thing in itself*

One might

Ideas are analogous to archetypes.20

Let us recall how careful we were to specify archetypes
as "patterns of organization which translate pure intention
into plastic form."

(supra,

Schopenhauerian Idea,

p.

44)

The archetype,

organizes and gives form to,

like the
just as the

law of causality helps to structure our world.

What is organ¬

ized,

just as

namely the pure intention or instinct,

is

inef¬

fable for Jung as the thing in itself was for Schopenhauer.
And neither the archetype nor the Idea are in themselves con¬
crete
tent.

images.

Both must be filled out with a specific con¬

To paraphrase Wittgenstein,

is not a

psychology,

the archetype of

but the form of a psychology,

out by the particulars of Freudian theory.

the child
to be filled

And neither New¬

tonian physics nor Freudian theory exhaust these fundamental
forms which they embrace.
By calling Ideas universalia ante rem
concepts,

which were universalia post rem),

(as opposed to

and thereby ground¬

ing truth in the possibility of bodily experience,
accomplished a
about the

revolution in European philosophical thinking

locus of

Schopenhauer’s

truth.

"inversion"

In what Karsten Harries calls
of the Platonic cosmos,

gories of experience and truth were kept,
upside down.

29

Schopenhauer

the cate¬

but were now turned

...
For the first time in the modern era,

meta¬

physics entertained the possibility that truth might not reside
in the higher,

below,

ethereal realm of the disembodied spirit, but

in the dank morass of an instinctual body.

'
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What

is especially remarkable about this move is that

once again the philosopher found himself
best illustrate his claims.
seen as a unique realm,
was confined,

This time,

turning to art to
however,

art was not

to which the special status of

as with Kant.

idea

Schopenhauer simply regarded art

as most demonstrative of a basic relationship which governed
all human knowledge.

For the artist was merely that man who

immersed himself most fully in experience.
This

immersion,

a certain truth.

this opening up to the world,

But such artistic truth remained suspect

from reason's point of view,
and "implicit,"

revealed

because it was somehow "virtual"

or worst of all,

unspoken;

Just because the Idea is and remains perceptive, the
artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention
and aim of his work. [Nor for that matter is the viewer!]
Not a concept but an Idea is present in his mind; hence
he cannot give an account of his actions.
He works, as
people say, from mere feelings and unconsciously, indeed
instinctively.
So we see that the artist,
stands

as unwitting interpreter of Ideas,

in a privileged relation to his audience,

sense world of

reason.

truth by giving form to
to Ideas,

He translates,
Ideas.

as

the common-

it were,

artistic

By rendering material expression

he serves to remind us of our sources.

It

is the

artist's genius to transcend his own personal point of view
and allow himself

to be guided by a

as that truth escapes us
and instincts,

in the ver_>

of our own being,

deeper truth.

And insofar

mystery of our own body

thus does

it suggest a key

step on the way to Jung's symbolic/archetypal truth.

.

'

100

Nietzsche
In 1872,

a twenty-eight year old professor of philosophy

at the University of Basel,
dissertation,

published a

who had never even written his

little book on Greek drama.

name was Friedrich Nietzsche
The Birth of Tragedy,
brevity,

it

(1844-1900),

his book was entitled

and despite its youthful exuberance and

launched him forthwith into the intellectual scene

as European culture's most formidable critic.

.

or Schopenhauer before him,
Nietzsche forewent a
structure

His

to whom
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he was admittedly indebted,"

rigorous and elaborate metaphysical super¬

in which to couch his ideas.

Instead,

the theme of art which dominated his book,
start upon metaphor,

Unlike Kant

faithful to

he relied from the

specifically mythic imagery,

to carry

the weight of his arguments and speak with Authority.

And

what aspect of contemporary Western civilization was he criti¬
cizing?

Fourteen years

later he explained that the problem

with which the book dealt was "the problem of
How odd,

science itself.’'''"

in a book on Greek drama!
To see how Nietzsche arrived at such a position,

let

us consider for a moment the book's characters and plot.

We

are introduced staightaway to Apollo and Dionysus,

clearly

intended to represent metaphysical categories.
Apollo, god
the
of reason and/principium individuationis, is moreover god of
(artistic)
of

illusion

form.

It

(Schein),

is he that governs
of dreams.

the world of

He is the soothsaying god,

and sees the truth by means of his "sunlike"
ment is light;

his affect,

imagery,

eyes.

His ele¬

joy.

Opposed to Apollo is Dionysus,

god of chaos,

drink,
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and the dissolution of
matter,

the individual.

He is the god of

matter which resists ever yielding

crets to form and transparency.

its ultimate se¬

He is a dumb god whose truths

are unspoken.

He conceals;

his time is the night.

form is music,

escaping all

images.

His art

His affect is either

terror or "blissful ecstasy."
Nietzsche *s

thesis,

plify and psychologize it,

if we may make so bold as to sim¬
is that something very special

happened in the history of Western culture when Attic tra¬
gedy flourished.

The Greek dramatists succeeded for the first

time in uniting the

instinctual,

meaningful,

unconscious side

of human life with the necessary symbolic and artistic articu¬
lation of ego consciousness.
been unequally related,

Heretofore these two realms had

the unconscious having literally to

force itself upon the forms of ego consciousness and thus
.
.
robbing consciousness of
of

.
.
34
its potential autonomy.
*

the Greek experience was the birth of

The marvel

the Apollonian ego,

which no longer satisfied itself with the mere molding and
manipulating of external reality by waking consciousness.
Exercising

a new found dream consciousness,

the Apollonian

ego now dared to approach the Dionysian realm as well,
actively participate in

it.

Such an Apollonian ego,

intimately with its own bodily Dionysian roots,
the third character in Nietzsche’s story:

and

coupled

constitutes

the new artist.

In such a man.
Through Apollonian dream-inspiration, his own state,
i.e. his own oneness with the inmost ground of the
world [Dionysusj, is revealed to him in a symbolical
dream miage.oc
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What makes this new artist so unique is that he
creates symbols consciously.

Greek drama

surpasses the

earlier Dionysian rituals from which it derives
the touchstone of consciousness.

just here on

For Greek drama

is not a

mindless ecstasy nor a mythology lacking an interpretation.
Rather,

it represents the triumph of consciousness

that first step toward
atively.

Apollo,

illusion

(Schein),

joining with the unconscious collator-

the dream-interpreter,

makes possible the

the symbolic representation,

which is otherwise incompatible with,
able to,

in taking

consciousness.

of a content

and therefore unavail¬

That Dionysus

appears at all, with such epic precision and clarity is
the work of the dream interpreter, Apollo, who through
this symbolic appearance interprets to the chorus its
Dionysian state,^
Nevertheless,

the Dionysian,

escapes our direct perception.
directly would be to
it.

It

the unspeakable,

To "perceive"

ultimately

the Dionysian

lose oneself and one's consciousness

in

is in this sense that Nietzsche can maintain that "the

symbolic image of the myth saves us from the immediate perception
.
.
37
of the highest world-idea,"

For example,

we as spectators

are saved from the very horror that we witness as Fentheus
and his mother

lose themselves

in the immediacy of

scious and the power of Dionysus.
Apollonian

illusion j_which! makes

Symbolic truth is "as
all creativity without

The symbol
it appear as

the uncon¬

is that "glorious
if.

.

."

if" we were returning to the source of
in fact regressing to the dissolution

of the ego in the primary process.
In order to appreciate fully the task which the symbol
accomplishes,

we must say something more about this Dionysian
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realm besides characterizing it as dangerous,
creative.
(Triebe),

To begin with,

obscure,

it surely includes Freud's

but

instincts

if we hold the Dionysian to be the reality in which

the Apollonian

illusion is grounded,

In Beyond Good and Evil,

Nietzsche admonishes us about the true nature of reality:
Let us assume that nothing is 'given* as real except cur
world of desires and passions, that we cannot step down
or step up to any kind of 'reality' except the reality of
our drives (Triebe) --- for thinking is nothing but the
interrelation and interaction of our drives.
But this cannot be all there
an account fails

is to the Dionysian,

to explain the tremendum,

the reverent silence,

the speechless awe,

which is demanded before Dionysus.

also leaves unclarified
only be experienced as

for such

It

that strange requirement that Dionysus
illusion.

terious about mere drives,

after

What is so awesome and mys¬
all?

Have we not succeeded

today in physiologizing them to the limbic system,
to be controlled at will?

mere circuits

Surely they can still compel us,

but do we not now truly see through them?
We take as our clue here another passage in Beyond
Good, and Evil,

in which Nietzsche describes the body as "nothing

but a social structure of many souls."

40

This is not a mere

metaphorical repetition of what he said about drives.
thing new has been added here.
and

into daimones.

of Zarathustra,

as

As

instinctual

is clear from the dream-visions
Nietzsche

symbolic world of gods in which his

ideal tragic artist,

atively anc

the

as well as from his personal biography,

constellated for himself a
ego,

The metaphor reminds us of Jung

suggests a radical personificat Lon of

complexes

Some¬

succeeded in confronting cooper¬

creatively the power of his drives

(Triebe).

Much
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of Zarathustra

in particular is reminiscent of active fantasy,

in J ung * s specific sense.

And as James Hillman stresses,41

what makes such a confrontation of consciousness with the un¬
conscious possible is

just this move; to the personified,

regarding complexes first as "souls,"
then as souls

to

to use Nietzsche's term,

in a community alien to the ego,

next as souls

in a community which includes the ego,

and finally as gods,

which in that peculiarly Greek manner,

have discourse with men.

Yet there remains an enigma.

Despite the images,

know that something remains hidden.

Indeed,

we

as we learn from

the theme of Metamorphoses,

the gods- are forever changing form

and disguising themselves.

This seems essential to them,

as

Nietzsche intimates when he observes that "everything deep loves
masks;

the deepest things have a veritable hatred of

likeness."
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image and

.

It is almost as though the bright light of

Apollonian consciousness,

which makes

images possible,

same time blots out some crucial truth.

at the

Nietzsche expresses

this metaphorically:
There are countless dark bodies which must be inferred
to lie near the sun; we shall never be able to see them.
Among outselves, that is a parable: a moral psychologist
reads the whole language of the stars as only an allegor¬
ical and symbolic language.
Many things can be kept dark
with it.^2
In Zarathustra Nietzsche again tantalizes us with another,
similar trope.

Addressing the sky,

he once more speaks of

how the stars are lost with the onset of
The [god's own] beauty veils the god:
sky] hide your stars,A.
What does

the dawn's

light:

thus do you [the

it mean that god's beauty should veil him?

Why

should personifying a power and thus masking it be necessary?

■
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Is it not precisely because we,
capable of

love,

as human beings

are fascinated by the other?

fascination fall prey to the other*s power?
the god

And

in such

The genius of

is not so much the fact that he hides behind the mask,

as that we are compelled to

look into

it,

seeking ourselves

,

and thus

4n

losing ourselves

like Narcissus before his reflection.

Only with masks can the gods,
catch the attention and

far from fleeing us,

interest of consciousness.

first come
This

is

the import of Nietzsche’s description of Dionysus as never
"looking a

look in which there is not some hind-sight,

some complexity of allure, whose craftsmanship includes
knowing how to be an illusion -- not an illusion of what
he is, but of what constitutes one more compulsion upon
his followers to follow him ever more intimately and
thoroughly.
And yet once again we ask,

given this need to disguise,

what could it be that would exert such a claim on man?
the concept of

instinct,

consciousness,

is not enough here.

itself could,
totally.

which exerts

and needs to,

To quote Heidegger,

for whom being

is an issue.

mental ontology,
Nietzsche,

too,

SureLy

its will heedless of

Only man’s very being

compel nan* s consciousness so
only man

(Dasein)

is that being

Only man is compelled to funda¬

which is the essence of metaphysics.
gives us this answer.

And

Even in The Birth of

Tragedy he singles out the Dionysian dream image as belonging
to "that mysterious ground of our being of which we are the
phenomenon."

47

interpretation:

,
This remarkable passage substantiates our
the god*s claim on man rests most profoundly

on the mystery of being.
But

further,

Nietzsche makes an astonishing reversal

\
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of

the familiar mirror metaphor,

where consciousness

usually depicted as seeking itself
though the mask were a mirror.
consciousness
nomenon."

is but a

says that the ego

as

The deeper truth is that
"we are the phe¬

this is what is meant when Jung

(consciousness)

which allows the Self

:.n the god»s mask,

reflection of Being;

Psychologically,

is

is really that complex

to contemplate itself.

The ego,

Jung

writes.
Is a relatively constant personification of [the totality
of3 the unconscious itself. . . the Schopenhauerian
mirror in which the unconscious becomes aware of its
own face.^g
This echoes a similar interpretation by Nietzsche.
after the passage in Beyond Good and Evil

Immediately

in which he describes

the ego's desire for the illusion as a way of discovering its
reflection,
dynamic.

Nietzsche abruptly reverses the polarity of

With the introduction of

he reconceives the ego,
image,

no

the "genius of

the

the heart,"

longer as the active source of

the

but as the passive mirror in which the essence of being

can be reflected.

The image itself,

becomes the source,
sciousness,

This

to be reflected

the natural,

illusion,

now

in the mirror of con¬

is "the genius of the heart,

which, renders dumb all that is loud and complaisant,
teaching it how to listen, which smoothes rough souls
and creates a taste in them for a new desire: to lie
still like a mirror so that the deep sky might be
reflected in them.^g
Here we find at last an appropriate explanation for
the

long misunderstood nature of Dionysus.

terious and unfathomable,
But this

is

unspeakable,

Truly he is mys¬

hiding behind

images.

not to be accounted for by facile analogies to the

'

-
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Gordian knot of the mind-body problem,

or to the over-valuation by

infantile

"of which we are the

love.

phenomenon,"

The mystery of Being,

cannot be dismissed so easily by adults.

is that we exist as Dasein.

The fact

We are aware that we exist and

are forever caught up in the co-mirroring of Dasein in Being
and Being in Dasein.
sprechbare,"

This

is the unspeakable,

"das Unaus-

before which even a god blushes with modesty:

the shame and modesty before the other,

*

"die Sham zu zweien.

*

*

As a contrapuntal harmony to underscore our theme,
let us return to the plot of The Birth of Tragedy where we
left it.
Artist,

We had

introduced Apollo,

and had followed

Nietzsche*s

Greek tragedy.

He

But why did we need to use Nietzsche

lived

2300 years after the origin of

If his thesis

been a great deal of

is correct,

should there not have

tragedy written in the ensuing ages?

To explain this enormous hiatus,
the

and the Tragic

their triumphant synthesis through

later works.

as the examplar?

Dionysus,

we must now take note of

last character's arrival on our stage:

Socrates.

For it

is Socrates whom Nietzsche accuses cf having cut short this
portentous flowering of Greek art.
West,

The greatest spirit of the

the creator of the scientific attitude,

is calumniated

mercilessly by Nietzsche as the murderer of the tragic artisifs
special soul.
understand him.

Though the scion of /.polio,
He mistook Apollo*s

and was therefore blinded by it.
hubris of consciousness,

Socrates did not

light for the truth,

Socrates succumbed to the

and proclaimed that "to be good,

■
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everything must be conscious."
synthesis of

the ego and

Tragic Artist*s soul,

the unconscious achieved by the

he derided him for practicing his

craft "only by instinct."
stinct,

Far from admiring the

So

long as poets relied on in¬

there remained a mystery and a threat to consciousness.

But Socrates would have none of

this.

His hubris rested on

his "faith in the explicability of nature and
panacea."

in nature as a

Such pride was nonetheless a flight into fantasy,

no matter how much it stressed consciousness,

because it

covered up the tenuousness which is the lot of ego conscious¬
ness.

It covered up the anxiety of Dasein before Death with

"the delusion of being able
of existence

(Dasein).

.

.

.

tc heal

the eternal wound
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How Nietzsche raged against Socrates!
against modern scientism,

Socrates*

heir!

How he raged

And how he would

have raged against any current psychology which dares presume
to fill

in the mystery of human existence with predictive

formulae,
"symbols."

chemicals,

or even literalistic and concretized

All such attempts can only lead

inversion of the natural order of
Nietzsche saw had

things,

to a fundamental

an inversion which

indeed already come about in his time.

Note his succinct description of a 20th century neurosis:
While in all productive men it is instinct that is the
creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts
critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is instinct
that becomes the critic, and consciousness that becomes
the creator -- truly a monstrosity per defectum.^
And what indeed does happen as "instinct becomes the critic"
if not the development of
it?

The symptom,

the symptom as Freud first identified

that remorseless

if not humorous commentator

■
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on our daily lives,

gives

lie to the illusion of omniscience

and omnipotence of our ego consciousness.
Nietzsche felt that in the long run Socrates,
more than any other man,
be forced

could not escape death,

to acknowledge the

the world*s

transparency.

and so would

inauthenticity of his claim for

In his groping attempts to

to play a musical instrument,
Socrates a

no

learn

Nietzsche saw in the doomed

last minute turning towaid the unconscious.

He

began to express a dim insight into the richness which he had
dismissed with such hauteur.

"Perhaps,"

says Socrates,

what is not intelligible to me is not necessarily unin¬
telligent:
Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from
which the logician is exiled?
Perhaps art is even a
necessary correlative of, and supplement for, science?^
And yet

in the end,

Can it not be objected

that all that,

is the crushing power of
of men into children?

what guarantee does Socrates have?

death that turns even the greatest

What basis dc

lieving that the unconscious,
anything more than a
their despair?

is proved by this fable

we really have for be¬

the myth,

the illusion are finally

thin gruel and sop to solace men in

Can we not say with the disenchanted Faust,

Welch Schauspiel!

Aber ach!

eir

Schauspiel nur!

,_
\

JL ,

.

1.

Ar
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This charge of mere aestheticism constitutes perhaps
the most trenchant attack on Nietzsche's Tragic Artist,
on Jung's doctrine of symbolism as well.

and

Nietzsche was acutely

sensitive to the problem of aestheticism from the very begin¬
ning.

In the first pages of The Biith of Tragedy he observed:

But even when this dream reality is most intense, we
still have, glimmering through it, the sensation that
it is mere appearance (nur Schei n). ,-c
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We shall refrain from dealing with this problem until after
we take up the work of Heidegger.

But we can only conclude

this section by agreeing that thus far,
and Nietzsche,

in Kant,

Schopenhauer,

the aesthetic realm has served to ground all

the objections and alternatives to the rationality of con¬
sciousness.
fire.

Heidegger's poeticizing will only add fuel to the

It remains to be seen how we will ground "mere illusion"

in what Karsten Harries calls the authentic "natural illusion."

A CONTEMPORARY; ERNST CASSIRER

The early 20th century may some day come to be known
as

"The Great Return to Myth."

The disappointment and dis¬

satisfaction of modern man with the opulently hollow life
passed on to him as the

last century's heritage were

trievably compounded by the sheer horror of
Finding no comfort
more of

the same,

thinkers sought out their forgotten roots
Freud returned to the myth of

to the myth of ancient gods;

originary of all myths,
noch."1

and Heidegger,

haps an unwitting tendency to

their return,

impugn these men with some
Rather,

to the most

fascination with myth,
indulge

There was nothing capricious.,
in

the child;

the myth of beginnings: "Per Anfang ist

Common to all was a

indulgent

the two World Wars.

in the few remaining voices calling for yet

in the distant past.
Jung,

irre¬

however,
infantile

and per¬

in myth-making as well.
fanciful,

or self-

if by that one intends to
flight from reality.

their return represented the- completion of efforts

begun in the last century to rediscover
scientifically)
folklore,

it might be strassed,

the secrets of history in Greek antiquity,

and classical philology.

this project,

(and

But although culminating

yet at the same time their work marked a pro¬

found transformation of

the original program as outlined

the Enlightenment.

these new thinkers no longer suffered

"the myopia

For

of proximity":

in

they did not seek explicit solutions
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from the past.
century was a
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The change so characteristic of the 20th
step back to a new,

broader self-awareness,

a

recognition that mythologized history was not to be taken
literally.

Instead,

the new consciousness perceived the core

truth of myth not in the work itself,

but

in the very fact

that rnan took that work so seriously;

not

in the perceived

object,

but

in

the motivated perceiver.

We find an appropriate example of

this transfcrmation

in the Neo-Kantian philosophy of Ernst Cassirer
In his famous opus,

(1874-1945).

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,

voted an entire volume to the question of mythology.
digious scholar of
and anthropological
its findings

the past century’s historical,
investigations,

he de¬
A pro¬

philological,

he set out to reinterpret

in the self-conscious spirit of

the new age.

And

although it may be unfair to saddle him with the assuredly
unwanted epithet of
how,

"psychologist,"

I nevertheless hope to show

in his attempt to understand myth "from the

symbol,

as

Cassirer essentially recapitulated the psychological

move of Jung.

A contemporary of Jung's,

Cassirer stands out

as the clearest philosophical parallel to Jung,
a more or

less

identical ontology.

insights analogous to Jung's,

ideas which best

operating with

In his writing we find

only slightly altered by way o::

vocabulary and source material.
of

inside"

It

illustrates the

is this unspoken kinship
idea of Zeitgeist which

we have been pursuing.

*

*

*

Cassirer began by stating the challenge posed by myth:
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Myth became a problem for philosophy insofar as it
expresses an original direction of the human spirit,
an independent configuration of nan's consciousness^
To conceive of myth as an "independent configuration"

imme¬

diately calls our attention to something unique in Cassirer's
point of view.

He takes exception with all

that would reduce myth to primitive science
social euhemerism
collectivity

(Graves),

(Durkheim).

interpretations
(Max Mueller),

or the reflection of a particular

On the other hand,

relegate myth to the status of

fiction,

he does not

devoid of all reality:

The philosophical understanding of myth begins with the
insight that it does not move in a purely invented or
made-up world, but has its own mode of necessity and
therefore in accordance with the idealist concept of
the object, its own mode of reality.^
Such a point of view leads to two alternative approache
to the material.
reality"

Either one can disengage from this "mode of

and try to place

it

in a wider context,

enter

into

it and experience

.
native

leads,

second

leads first to a mystical

.
among other things,

and then subsequently,
logy.

It

it for itself.

or one can

The first alter-

.
4
to structuralism.

The

participation in the myth,

with greater self-awareness,

is this second move which will

to psycho¬

interest us here.

Cassirer used the German Romantic philosopher Friedrich
Schelling

(1775-1854)

direct engagement

to exemplify the preliminary stage of

in the myth.

Schelling defined myth in a

most thought-provoking way when he said that "mythology is
recognized

in its truth."*"

tautegorical interpretation,

He approached

the myth by way of

looking

upon mythical figures as autonomous configurations of the
human spirit, which one must understand from within by
knowing the way in which they take on meaning and form.^

■
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The truth of a myth did not depend upon a rational translation
of a meaning,
day.

bringing forth a

On the contrary,

diately,

dark secret into the light of

the truth of myth was experienced

imme¬

in its own terms:

The [mythological] process consists not merely of repre¬
sented potencies, but of those very potencies which
create consciousness . . . and are actual powers.
As Cassirer explains.
The phenomenon which is here to be considered is not the
mythical content as such, but the significance it possesses
for human consciousness and the power it exerts on con¬
sciousness.
The problem is not the material content of
mythology, but the intensity with which it is experienced,
with which it is believed -~ as only something endowed
with objective reality can have . . . It is a real force
that seizes upon consciousness in myth, i.e. a force thac
is not within its control.^
We see here at once

just how far such a vision differs from

the structuralist alternative.

First,

there

question of attitude as we have developed
essay.

it earlier in this

Just as on the one hand L<§vi~Strauss seeks relentlessly

to divest himself of the

last shreds of tenacious meaning that

might still cling to his perspective,
hand plunges
and

is the fundamental

so Schelling on the other

into the morass of personalizations,

intuitions

insights which bind him inextricably to the immediacy of

the myth.

Second,

there arises the

Where L^vi-Strauss demonstrates the

issue of "the ego alien."
inexorable subordination

of human and natural reality to the logical power of
mind

(translated here as ego),

the human

Schelling freely submits himself

to the higher irrationality which compels man without his
understanding it.

Lastly,

we confront the problem of affect.

The world of L£vi-Strauss manages to reduce reality to the
cold abstraction of dialectical thought,

while Schelling con-

.

.
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cedes that to be real and to be emotionally effective amount

q
to the same thing,

L^vi—Strauss fails

myths should matter so much,,
Schelling's

and this

"proto-Dionysian"

As suggested above,

to account for why

is precisely what

explanation is concerned with.

the difficulty inherent

in Schel¬

ling's understanding of mythical phenomena derives from his
all too ready willingness to collapse myth and reality into
a

literal unity.

His argument for the value of myth rests on

the contention that

"myth is a form of

life,"

and

Schelling "is neither subjective nor objective,
the exact borderline between the two?

it is a

ference between subjective and objective."10
objectification,

a necessary development of,

life for

but stands on

realm of

indif¬

Life is an
the absolute:

The mythic process is a theogonic process: one in which
God himself becomes, by creating himself step by step
as the true God,.^
With this move,

Schelling threatens to abandon his status as

critic for the more engaging role of mystic.
This

is of course not to denigrate mysticism per se,

which is a perfectly valid form of

thought.

However,

one

cannot help but feel that Schelling strands his readers
a compromised position.
philosopher

to clarify,

far enough,

and

more precisely,

Although promising in his role as
he

in fact fails to take consciousness

instead sinks back into unconsciousness,

because the

or

the unself-consciousness which is the partici¬

pation mystique of the "savage mind,"
sciousness

in

Genuine mythical con¬

leaves no room for reflection,
ego has dispersed

.

as Cassirer puts it,

.

"it

.

itself

for understanding,

in the world such that,

.

.

.

is bound by its mere factxcity."

]

2

.
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The mythic world

is so exceptionlessly concrete "because in

it the two factors, thing and signification,
.
13
tiated."

Schelling recognized

line concept,

but neglected to

able contribution of

are undifferen-

the essence of the border¬

lay emphasis on the indispens¬

an actively collaborating self-consciousness.

It was a fault of Romantics generally,
Apollonian side of Nietzsche

and one for which the

justly took them to task.1^

Cassirer's own refinement of Schelling's groundbreaking
work focused on this
too,

regarded

thorny issue of consciousness.

the history of mythology as the gradual unfold¬

ing and self-expression of human spirit.
teles,

Cassirer,

But he saw as

its

not the mystical submersion of man into the oneness of

the world,

but the progressive differentiation and heightening

of human consciousness,

as befits a Neo-Kantian:

Thus, although myth, language, and art interpenetrate one
another in their concrete historical manifestations, the
relation between them reveals a definite systematic gra¬
dation, an ideal progression toward a point where the
spirit noh only is and lives in its own creations, its
self-created symbols, but also knows them for what they are.
A crucial move

in Cassirer's

interpretation was his

insight that the very motivation for this differentiation
toward consciousness
the power of

lay with the mythic image

the symbol which callec

itself and its own true task,

itself.

ego consciousness

It was
to

that of self-ref3ection:

The mythical image seems not solely to designate already
existing differences, but also to fixate them for con¬
sciousness, to make them visible as such: it does not
merely reproduce existing distinctions, but in the strict
sense evokes distinctions.,
So Cassire:;,

too,

came out in favor of the priority of

unconscious,

even while granting full credit to the higher

goal of consciousness.

Moreover,

Cassirer,

like Jung,

the

inder-

_
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tified the locus of
sciousness of

this transformation out of

the uncon¬

the mythic world in religion;

Religion takes the decisive step that is essentially
alien to myth: in its use of sersuous images and signs
it recognizes them as such —— a means of expression which,
though they reveal a determinate meaning, must necessarily
remain inadequate to it, which point to this meaning but
never wholly exhaust it»17
The function of

symbols

is consciousness making,

understood with the proviso that,

tc

quote Heidegger,

revealing at the same time conceals.
culates

this paradoxical

temporary of HOlderlin's,

all

Cassirer clearly arti¬

function when he quotes
Friedrich H.

Jacobi

from a con¬

(1601):

Always there is something between us and the true essence:
feeling, image, and word.
Everywhere we see only some¬
thing that is hidden; but that hidden thing we see and
sense.
For what is seen and surmised, we set the "word,
the living word, as a sign.
There lies the dignity of
the word.
It does not itself reveal, but it shows reve¬
lation, consolidates it, and helps to disseminate it..Q
lo

The profound insight of this passage
reader.

must not be

lost to the

We have here an extremely condensed but complete

expression of a whole metapsychology.

As with Freud,

Jacobi

identifies affects and words as principal representatives of
the unknown.
of the
words.

19

image,

As with Jung,

since we see first,

ard only afterwards set into

A paraphrase might run as follows:

Consciousness
as

he also stresses the priority

it

is

indifferent to the world except insofar

is affected by it,

reality intrude upon it.
and most of the time"

as when instinct or external

20

...

Sucn intrusion "first of ala.

takes the form of visual

either real or fantasy.

imagery,

Only as the last and highest

achievement of consciousness does the word come to fix
such meaning-laden images
makes

in a referential context which

it generally available to others.
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Cassirer prepares the way in his own thinking for such
a formulation when he identifies the
ity Oi

consciousness as

by what

is new.

specifically human qual¬

its capacity to be affected and moved

In his discussion of consciousness he explains

the phenomena of mana and taboo,

those two pre-eminently emo¬

tive structures of primitive life,
of the mythical consciousness,"

a

as

"a primary interjection

"cry of mythical emotion"

originating from the discovery of something new,
unusual or uncommon.

The making conscious of what was previ¬

ously unknown and unconscious
ence.

To be sure,

reflex arc model,

extraordinary,

is first of all a felt experi¬

in lower biological systems,
such experience

based on the

is usually negative.

The

new is what interferes with equilibrium and is therefore un¬
pleasant.
Cassirer,

And thus far we are in keeping with Freud.

But for

what distinguishes the uniquely human quality of

such an encounter is the possibility for a positive relation
to the new,

as opposed to simply repressing or otherwise

avoiding it:
When mere bestial terror becomes an astonishment moving
in a two-fold direction, composed of opposite emotions
fear and hope, awe and admiration -- when sensory
agitation thus seeks for the first time an issue and an
expression, man stands on the threshold of a new spirit¬
uality.
It is this characteristic spirituality which is
in a sense reflected in the ide£ of the sacred.22
Cassirer then goes on to elaborate how next
verbalization follow in turn upon t.iis
coming into consciousness.

imagery and then

initial,

affective,

We can now begin to appreciate

the deeper rationale for Cassirer*s above-mentioned emphasis
on. religion.

There seems to be something "wonder"-ful that

devolves upon this coming into consciousness,

something that
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cannot be taken for granted,

and

it

is in the context of

religious symbols that the first explicit self-consciousness
of this event finds expression.
Cassirer takes great pains to give concrete examples
of

this symbolizing trend in religion.

if not all,

He notes that many,

great religions began with a pointed and self-

conscious rejection of the "natural,"
from which they sprang.

i.e.

mythical,

Thus we find that the familiar insis¬

tence on destroying images

in early Jewish,

Hindu and Buddhist doctrine,

can be

in Fart I,

(And as we have

the Freudian emphasis on the word,

expense of the dream-,

obsessional-,

also serves this same purpose of
stood representations,

at the

or fantasy-image per se,

lysing frozen and misunder¬

thereby making that which they stand

for psychologically more accessible.)
Christianity,

Persian-Iranian,

interpreted as an attempt

to de-literalize mythological consciousness.
noted

religions

Cassirer notes that

especially in the form of medieval Catholicism,

attempted an even more daring experiment in consciousness rais¬
ing,

for

instead of banishing its pagan roots,

them in the most glorious of artistic,
litugical forms.

In so doing,

tation by illiterate peasants,

it celebrated

architectural,

it risked possible misinterpre¬
whose* mythological consciousness

would continue to take Christian symbols

literally.

happened fcr example that a powerful anima symbol
of

the Virgin degenerated

Thus

it

in the form

into an unconscious pagan cult rooted

in the Demeter myth of antiquity.
worth it,

and even

Still,

the risk was well

because for those few who could transcend mythological

consciousness,

the rich and pregnant

imagery of the Church
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served as the nidus around which to spin genuine symbols,
Dante*s vision culminated this episode of Christian symbolic
consciousness-making,

and

is the most striking example of what

Cassirer means by religious self-consciousness.
Finally,

again echoing Jung,

the function of myth and therefore of

Cassirer speculates that
symbol might be

mately connected to the very essence of human being.

inti¬
It is

in

the nature of man to be fundamentally hidden from himself.
Cassirer envisions human existence
meaningful event
forever

in the history of Being,

threatening to cut

he suggest that "the I,"
Jung's

(Dasein)

as a profoundly

but one which is

itself off from itself.

and here we might

Thus can

instead read

"Self,"

creates for itself a kind of opposite in its own products
which seem to it wholly objective.
And it can contempla be
itself only in this kind of projection. . « . Man can
apprehend and know his own being only insofar as he can
make it visible in the image of his gods. ... He draws
from his spiritual creations - - language, myth, and art
the objective standards by which to measure himself as aa
independent cosmos with its peculiar structural flaws,^3
With this statement,
Schelling and moves

Cassirer transcends the literalism of
into the domain of psychology,

sophjcal anthropology,
And

if you prefer

so to conclude,

Cassirer's arguments.

He,

or philc-

(as Heidegger dees.)

24

we recognize a familiar theme in
too,

refuses to dismiss the fasci¬

nation with myth in the 20th century as mere atavism or cowardice.
Cassirer valorizes mythology and religion as fundamental steps
on the road
vital

to consciousness,

and with Jung,

link with the unconscious.

never severs

their

And thinking these thoughts,

he becomes another member in our growing family of thinkers.

HEIDEGGER AND THE NEW ONTOLOGY

In arriving at

the figure of Martin Heidegger

we come to the synthesis of this essay.
on the unknowable,
pretaion,
all

this

(1889-1976)

The long discourse

the perplexing reservations about

inter-

the historical account of antecedent philosophers —
should now be reconsidered

cussion of Heidegger's work.

in the light of our dis¬

It will become apparent that in

many respects Heidegger's thinking shares enough in common
with Jung's that the two men must be classed
lectual milieu.
of

I hope to reveal the remarkable confluence

their Weltanschauungen,

which they rely,

in the same intel¬

as well as of the metaphors upon

in spite of their disparate backgrounds and

methodologies.
Interestingly,
to Jung

(and

to a

ment of our time,

Heidegger has

lesser extent,
enjoying

sure of disenchantment.

experienced a fate similar

Freud)

in the collective

initial acclaim,

Making his debut

publication of Being and Time,

followed by a mea¬

in 1927 with the

Heidegger at once rose to pro¬

minence as a critic of modern European culture,
detached

judg¬

describing with

reserve the profound misconception of human nature

and of man's experience

in

the worlc

the technological nightmare of Worlc
war Germany,

Heidegger could not fail

which had made possible
War I.

Writing in post¬

to have appreciated the

deep-seated alienation of a people whose only apparent recourse
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in the face of disaster was to rebuild once again upon the
very principles which had set the stage for tragedy in the
first place.
self,

Like Jung,

and proposed a

he announced a return to the "true"

solution to the dilemma of a dehumanized

society by recalling men to what it is to be authentically in the
world.

He received

philosophers,
ness,

immediate recognition from Continental

notably the young Sartre,

a take-off on Being and Time,

of existential philosophy.

who

in Being and nothing

went on to found the school

Similarly did Ludwig Binswanger

reconceive a portion of Heidegger's work in his Being-in-theWorld and thereby begin the school of existential psychoanalysis
But wherever post-empiricist.,
has flourished,
been regarded
anachronism,
philosophy,

analytical philosophy

especially in the United States,

Heidegger has

in most academic circles as anything from an
a quaint holdover from 19th century transcendental

to a raving mystic,

whose presumption to speak

about what Wittgenstein definitively outlawed as non-discussabie
relegates him to the status of an illogical,
fuzzy thinker.
all

(One also hears Jung cast in this same mold

too often.)

There has been a

American philosophy of

innocent students.

sophy — truly a philosophy of
--

tendency to purge current

this dangerous Heideggerian element,

which threatens to corrupt

tive sense

word-mongering,

Analytic philo¬

inauthenticity in the descrip¬

continues to assure us that not only can we no

longer do metaphysics

in the modern era,

need to and thus should not want to.

but that we do not

It asserts that all

relevant problems can be solved by a careful
we use everyday words,

and

if anyone: is

inspection of hjw

left dissatisfied,

he
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will

surely,

as the malcontent

in Nietzsche's

take himself voluntarily to the madhouse.
too,

"Last Man,"

For naturally,

will see how unreasonable his dissatisfaction is

.

,

he,
.

Likewise is Jung's psychology of the depths dispensed
with by contemporary psychiatry.

Even Freud's depth psycho¬

logy has suffered from a certain "refinement."

After an initial

flurry of excitement created by the early Freud's discovery of
the unconscious,
from its roots
cleaner,
personal,
to

psychiatry slowly but relentlessly moved away

in the unconscious,

to find refuge

more everyday psychology of

the ego.1

in a

safer,

The unique and

in the form of dreams and fantasy imagery,

ceased

interest a new school whose efforts were directed at bol¬

stering the patient's defenses and restoring him to the strength
of the everyday collectivity.
dayness,

which at

is quickly being replaced by

the present-at-hand;

exhibiting modifiable behavior,
environment,

even that every¬

least gave pretense to granting a certain

basic humanity to the patient,
a philosophy of

And yet today,

people are now systems,

to be manipulated by rewards,

drugs and surgery.

Dreams have been debased to

a mere electroencephalographic datum which clinicians are
warned not to disturb with REM-blocking drugs.
meaning?

Today,

But as to their

the very structure which alone can re-move

man from his fascination with the world of television and
machine,

which can throw him back upon his authentic possibility-

for-Being-in-the-world -- namely,

anxiety — has begun to crumble

before the onslaught of a drug which has come to be the most
prescribed compound
of the Last

Mans

in the world.

.Again we hear the echoes

; it
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A little poison now and then: that makes
for pleasant dreams.
And a lot of poison at the end,
for a pleasant death.2
Who needs Jung and all his
is the new battle cry,
Heidegger has shown,

irrelevancies?

"Show me the data'."

and of course data by definition,

as

requires that we continue to think of

people as present-at-hand.

3

One could argue that Jung and Heidegger are most
valuable in their critique of
the much needed

But that will not do,

reading of both thinkers.

as

For it

and

is not

instances of depersonalization and

it were,

and render

service of tempering the pretensions of sci-

entific excess.

lated

20th century culture,

by accident.

implies a

superficial

just that some iso¬
inhumanity occur,

Again to quote Nietzsche:

The time is over, when accidents might still
happen to me; and what is it that could still happen
to me now, that would not already by my own?^
We must take responsibility for these accidents and admit
that they derive

logically and unavoidably from the most fun¬

damental of our presuppositions about man and his
such an admission can only lead —

in Heidegger’s return to

and Jung's return to the forgotten,
scious.

As we shall try to show,

Such a re-evaluation

"origins"

repressed,

and

in Freud’s

"archaic"

the points in common which their solutions share.

*

uncon¬

what is more remarkable than

the similarity of Heidegger and Jung in their critique,

*

And

i.n the honest man -- to a

re-evaluation of those presuppositions.
is reflected

life.

*

are
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Heidegger's doctrine or
controversial

ideas

truth remains one of the more

in contemporary philosophical debate.

Jung’s positing of an absolutely unknowable unconscious,

Like
it

confronts rationalists with a brazen challenge to the omnipo¬
tence of their method,
To begin with,
(Dasein),

and considerably shrinks their horizon.

Heidegger maintained that human consciousness

insofar as "it

and hence aware of

is

itself as Being-in-the-world,

scribed. by the metaphorical
has

its roots

in such a way as to be its

imagery of

in medieval ontology and

light.
the

•there',"D

was best de¬

Although this

lumen naturale,

Heidegger made the crucial move of collapsing the traditionally
separated

light of consciousness and seat of consciousness

into

one phenomenon:
To say that [Dasein] is 'illuminated* [erleuchtet] means
that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [qelichtet] in
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way
that it is itself the clearing.
Only for such an entity
. . . does that which is present-at-hand become accessible
in the light or hidden in the dark. . . . Dasein is its
disclosedness.
o
It follows from this

that the very possibility of

is grounded upon Dasein,

truth itself

which "as constituted by disclosedness,

is essentially in the truth.Truth is therefore primarily
tied to Dasein*s uncovering and not to some absolute state of
affairs that exists
laws,

independently of man's knowledge.

according to Heidegger,

Newton the

were before Newton,

Newton's

but "through

la\/s became true."

It is

interesting to note here

just how close Jung

comes

in paraphrasing this Heideggerian conception of

Jung,

too,

"cf a

light

speaks of human existence

(Dasein)

in the darkness of mere being."

the phenomenon of

9

truth.

as the kindling
Moreover,

he ties

the world to the unique nature of Dasein's
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Being-in-the-world:
The self embodies both the aspect of intrinsic being
and the aspect of its being known, without which no",
wotld exists. . ,
if a man succeeded in extinguishing
this light [of consciousness], the world would sink
into nothingness. ^
Jung,

like Heidegger,

therefore envisioned a truth for man.

Heidegger offers as

"evidence"

for this conception of

truth an etymological exploration of the early Greek use of
the word alethia,

which defines the Being™true of

"taking entities out of

their hiddenness and

seen in their unhiddenness

letting them be

(their uncoveredness)."11

important about this definition for our purposes
it

lays on the phenomenological,

everyday experience of

For

roots of our

it underscores the fact

judgment which passes

respondence theory of truth nowadays

What is

is the stress

the very visual,

the world.

that the whole process of

logos as

for the cor¬

-- the logical assertion

of an agreeing subject and predicate -- must first and foremost
be for consciousness

in order for the question of correct or

incorrect agreement to be an issue at all.

If,

for example,

we do not see the sexual conflicts of an hysteric,
"primary"

truth,

we can in no wise

judge the "secondary"

of his assertions about such conflicts.
more comprehensive sense,

Freud*s

Likewise,

and.

truth

in a

it echoes the Gestaltist arguments

of Kuhn in maintaining that the most fundamental characteristic
of scientific truth is not the whole chain of
which ties a

system

together,

logical assertions

but the paradigm,

explicitly after visual phenomena,

which,

modeled

IF

* reveals the object of study

in a new way.
This uncovering of truth is not simply a matter of
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bringing

light

to dsrkhsss}

going transformation of

however0

It involves a thorough—

the object before our very eyes,

an

uncovering of something we always thought we understood.
ponder the surprise of

To

someone who after years of seeing a

rabbit in our rabbit-duck example,

now suddenly sees a duck,

will amplify our meaning here — providing,

that is,

that one

•
13
is open to the wonder of the event."
It may be objected here that the foregoing is obvious
(if not too oovious?),

but that all that really matters for

the correspondence theory of truth is the
of terms

in

the assertion,

logical agreement

once we are "underway."

blocks this mode of retreat,

however,

Heidegger

by posing the question,

"What is agreement?":
Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a
relation.
But not every relation is an agreement.
A
sign points at what is indicated.
Such indicating is
a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what
is indicated, ^
One cannot escape the problematics of ontology.

Agreement

(between artificial structures of consciousness and nature,
as

in scientific

laws,

for example)

presupposes the more fun¬

damental relation of Dasein and World,

And that relation is

precisely Being-in [-the-vorlcl.
Nov

this relation of Being-in

have we not already claimed

is rather peculiar,

for

that Being-in as conceived by

Heidegger involves the collapse of the subject and object of
consciousness

into one another?

If Dasein is uncovering,

how

can we speak of relation?
To account for this we must now recall that Heidegger
makes covering-up equiprimordlal

(g.eichursprUnglich)

with

• '

■
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uncovering.
falling

.

.

Because "to Dasein*s state of Being belongs
.

its state of Being

Hence logos becomes

This double possibility is what

in the Being-true of

There are two ways of
First of all it
ticity into
of falling.

implies

logos."16

interpreting this statement.

inauthenticity as characterized by the structure
The magic of

never be grasped and kept.
becomes one among many,
located

the

the unavoid^^ble degeneration of authen¬

truth as the "appearance"

is

in a

the moment: when even so trivial a
of

the duck is

revealed to us can

Immediately the new perception

associates with other experiences and

referential net which binds

Soon it becomes the way to see the figure,
serves

Secondly,

and as such now

indicated.

truths of

perspective,
As the

lie

lines.

and harkening back to Nietzsche,

to regard truth as a
is

it to the everyday.

in turn to cover-up whatever other possibilities

potentially within that collection of

what

is in untruth."15

"that way of being in which Dasein can

either uncover or cover up.
is distinctive

is such that it

one comes

as a sign pointing toward

innumerable

(and contradictory!)

historical Dasein prove only too well,

the being¬

uncovering of Dasein at any particular time and place in his¬
tory has never amounted to more than a partial uncovering.
Truth is always
Dasein.

relative to the perspective of a particular

Newton's physics

Aristotle's or Einstein's,
of

is no

less true for Heidegger than

Each one accounts for some aspect

reality at the expense of an equally valid experience of

the world.
Uncovering as an event primarily presupposes "the hidden"
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as most primordial and therefore never totally uncoverable.
This

is not to minimize the truth of a

in any way.
truth.

And

But
it

it does

is

particular uncovering

insist on the relative nature of

in this context that we return to the funda¬

mental relation of Dasein's Being-in as uncovering.
Being-in,

is Being-in-truth,

one also admits

that

but that

to Being-in-untruth.

inherently perspectival,
hiddenness which its

and

is so only as

Dasein's
long as

Being-uncovering is

in no way can transcend the very

perspective creates;

Dasein conceals as

it reveals.
Thus the relation which we have been speaking of
one of
if

truth to untruth,

of

uncovering to covering up -- and

I may be permitted to make the

the unconscious.

leap —- of consciousness to

Fundamental to Dasein and consciousness

this continuous relating of
to unknown.

is

revealed to concealed,

is

of known

The primordial experience of knowledge does not

come from the recognition of

logical agreements,

but from the

more basic confrontation of consciousness with the opacity of
nature,

an opacity which gives

itself

to our persistent

inquir¬

ies only by simultaneously reminding us ever so forcefully of
just how much it still withholds.
It

Is obvious that the concept of

tion"

follows from this account,

ence,

and structuralism deal with the ont.ic relationships of

known entities.

and

And equally obvious

by staying on the known,
problem of epistemology.

ontic

level,

that

"thinking as rela¬
logic,

natural sci¬

is the observation that
there ceases to be a

But to cor fine oneself to such a

level constitutes a radical

(although at times useful and even

130

necessary)
source of

evasion of

the ground of Dasein’s creativity,

its aims and purpose,

the

all of which are only first

constellated in the uncertainty of man’s original encounter
with the world.

Let us not be mistaken here:

ontic and avoid the
••free"

inherent opacity of existence does not

man from anything.

of ontology,

to elect the

It by no means dissolves the problem

as Wittgenstein initially had hoped

The choice of

covering over man’s Being-uncovering is

response to this most primordial uncertainty,
an explicit recognition of
one.

it would.

such uncertainty,

Even by fleeing the ontological

one succumbs to

it

in that way,

into

and

in

is therefore

albeit a negative

inauthenticity,

and thereby guarantees

its

primordiality.
So

we see that Heidegger arrives at a similar epistem¬

ological roadblock to that described by Kant and Jung.
note that this
both accounts

is a

leave man cut off

of the unknown,
about.

Kant

from the absolute knowability

continues the subject-object split

to alienate man from Being,

the scientific "truth"
the subject's reason,
which is grounded
ering,

in the world.

By defining Dasein as uncov¬

is a

truth in a way that all

he connects uncovering -- Dasein

the world itself.

but it

logic grounded in

Heidegger gives us a measure of truth

logical absolutes cannot:

the truth,

and so perpetuates

of a transcendental

Heidegger gives substance tc

to the truth of

Although

the explanations differ as to how this comes

For whereas

which tends

similarity of net result only.

But

partial one,

To be sure,

it

is not all

and as such a totally gen¬

uine revelation and self-disclosure of one piece of the world.
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Heidegger
matters:

is a
he

tion to the
certain,

phenomenalogist

in the only way that really

establishes a ground for man's being in his
world.

Granted that this ground

even mysterious,

it

is man's

but serves as the

truth.

*

*

From Heidegger's doctrine of truth,
second of

his

themes,

the

*between,9

let us turn to

das Zwischen.

this concept should have a familiar air about
reader.

un¬

himself which is appropriate to his existence:

*

a

limited,

nevertheless man's experience of

the world not only cannot be denied to him,
only measure of

is

rela¬

By now

it for the

It has proved to be one of the most characteristic

metaphors for the family of
For Heidegger,
fascination

too,

this

thinkers we have been following.

intermediate realm exerted a continual

over the years.

Fortunately for us,

simplify the idea to a formulaic banality,

he did not

but developed and

expanded it over the course of his thinking to

include a wide

variety of differing applications and readings.
It

is perhaps to be expected that a phenornenologist,

especially if concerned with the phenomenology of spatiality,
would sooner or later be forced to

take up the problem of the

•between.*

in this context of Casein's

And sure enough,

it

experience of

"here and there"

the notion of

the

'between.'

is

that Heidegger first announces
He begins by stating the scien¬

tific understanding of'between,•
and the object
at-hand.

(there)

which requires

that Dasedn (here)

both be thought of as something present-

From this perspective we derive the commonsense view
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of

distance as objectively measured space.

way,

"Dasein can subsequently traverse the

distance.
full
it
the

.

."

17

But this

"normal"

illusion to

'between':

is viewing)

of

space.

For in fact

a body can close the spatial gap on the object,

than to what

what is far away

is "near"

(e.g.

(the horizon

its eyeglasses).

To traverse an objective distance hardly overcomes the
but only now brings clearly into focus
tance

this

imagine that Dasein itself ever traverses

but Dasein may be "closer to"
it

‘between'

in this

understanding does not do

justice to the actual experience of

is an

Regarded

'between,'

the fact that "the dis¬

itself becomes one which has been desevered*"

and

is

therefore "something that Dasein can never cross over."
Heidegger then offers an alternative explanation of
the

'between'

as such.

in the next chapter,

when he analyzes Being-in

Again starting from the scientific understanding of

subject and object,

he asks:

What else is presented with this phenomenon [Being-in]
than the commercium which is present-at-hand between
a subject present-at-hand and an object present-at-hand?
Such an interpretation would cone closer to the phenomenal
content if we were to say Dasein is the Being of this ’between.
But even this Heidegger presents only as a bad metaphor,

depen¬

dent on sloppy ontology.

is

He offers

it to the reader who

too caught up in the traditional subject-object split to grasp
Heidegger's

deeper meaning.

Heidegger goes on to say,

19

phenomenon." '
to note

"What

.is decisive for ontology,"

"is to pi event the splitting of

For our purposes,

however,

is not whether he succeeds

but how he harps on the metaphor of

.

what is

the

important

in this ontological task,
the

'between,*

when he

operates within the traditional subject-object context.
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If this
spatial,

Heidegger's

Being and Time
half

initial formulation of
reconception of

is temporal.

the

it at a

later point

in

of this book is to ensure "the possibility of bringing

project of authenticity.

20

But he

upon which depends the whole
is now confronted with the

problem that his method up to this point,
phenomenological bedrock of
zumeist,

seems

in itself

which he seeks.

.

is

Heidegger's concern in the second

Dasem into view as a whole,"

is

'between'

'between*

two ends,

"the everyday,"

the zunachst und

to bar him from attaining the whole

For "everydayness

.

birth and death,"

21

is precisely that Being which

and thus does not include the

without which there cannot be a whole.

Heidegger rescues
temporality of Dasein.
towards-death,
bility,

founded upon the

the

'between'

by re-evaluating the

Noting his emphasis

in Part I on Being-

with its consequent stress on future and possi¬

he finds such "facing forward"

deficient:

Not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticedi
but so too, and above all, has the way in which Dasein
stretches along between birth and death.
The 'connectedness
of life,' in which Dasein somehow maintains itself con¬
stantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our
analysis of Being-a-whole

.^2

This

re-visioning of the

(erstrecken)

re-instates

'between*
the

ture in Heidegger's system.

'between*

'between*

as a

Ontologically,

of Dasein stretching along in such
own Being is constituted

as "stretching along"

\

fundamental struc¬
the possibility

way implies that "its

in advance as a

stretching along:

vhich relates to birth and death already lies

Being of Dasein.”

23

As human beings,

meaning for us as mere points

in time,

"the

in the

birth and death have no
a then and a when.

Bather,
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"factical Dasein exists as born;
dying,

and as born,

it

in the sense of Being-towards-death."

possible given the analysis

in Part

is already

But this

is onlv

I of Dasein as care:

As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 'ends*
and their *between* are, and they are in the only way
which is possible on the basis of Dasein*s Being as
care ... As care, Dasein is 'the between.*
In this manner,

Heidegger reverses the connection of every-

davness and the

'between*

instead of
ties

the

with which he opened Part II,

despairing at the prospect of the

'between*

'between*

birth and death presents

the whole which we have been seeking."24

And so once again,

in a much less tentative manner than with the analysis

of spatiality,
of a

Heidegger raises the

fundamental metaphor
It

at

now

to nothing less than authenticity itself:

"Only that entity which is

and

'between,*

and

is

last finds

in the realm of poetry,

For in his

however,

its ultimate development.

literature,

to the status

in his ontology.

refer not only to Heidegger's
branch of

'between'

that the

'between'

By poetry we mean to

investigation of that particular

but also to Heidegger's own work itself.

later writing,

Heidegger abandons the rigorous ana¬

lytical style of Being and Time in favor of a freer immersion
in the poetic metaphor for
example,

its own sake.

In the following

taken from the essay "...Poetically Man Dwells,.,"

the reader will

immediately note the dramatic change

(1951),

in style

and tone that permeates the writing;
Only in the realm of sheer toil does man toil for 'merits.'
There he obtains them for himself in abundance.
But at
the sane time, in this realm, man is allowed to look up,
out of it, through it, toward the divinities. . . . The
upward glance spans the between of sky and earth.
This
between is measured out for the dwelling of man.
We now
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call the span thus meted out the dimension. . . . The nature
of the dimension is the meting out —* which is lightened
and so can be spanned
of the between. . . . Man spans
the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly.
Man does not undertake this spanning just now and then;
rather, man is man at all only in such spanning. . . .
Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two,
heaven and earth, to one another. ocr
Zd

Despite the change in language,
sents a

logical progression from the final formulation of

•between*
the

of Being and Time.

‘between*

is

As

in Being and Time,

is defined as a dispersal of
"the realm of sheer toil";

gaze down

(i.e.

fallen).

and of productivity.
from his work,

It

the

In "...Poetically Man Dwells..."

is again tied to authenticity,

different s;>rt.
man

this passage repre¬

it

but of a slightly

the everyday state of

the Self

in the world.

This

is earthbound and draws our

is the realm of

the ready-to-hand

But man is also that animal who

looks up

who hears himself called to his true Self,

a

Self which

like Nietzsche's finds itself reflected in the sky

— or what

is the same thing

in German --

in heaven.

°

This sky/heaven metaphor recalls the earlier discussion
about truth,

for: it is a powerful symbol of the paradox of how

revealing conceals.

The sky is the most manifest sight we

encounter uoon lifting our gaze up from the earth,
is the dwelling place of God.
vision,

Hence the sky evokes grandeur,

and a measure by which man

Nevertheless,

for Hblderlin,

and heaven

judges his achievements.

Heidegger tells us,

God, as the one who he is, is unknown and it is just as
this Unknown One that he is the measure of the poet.
[But] how can that which by its very nature remains
unknown ever become a measure?-,Despite the imminent presence of
for guidance while on earth,

the' sky,

to which we lock

the sky covers up that which we
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seek:
What is the
consists in
is revealed
god appears
Thus,

it

measure for human measuring? . . . The measure
the way in which the god who remains unknown,
as such by the sky. . . . Thus the unknown
as the unknown by way of the sky4 s manifestness.

is not only God,

the unconscious,

— whatever you care to call
God's manifestness as well,
to consciousness,

is

the thing in

itself

it — that remains mysterious.
the relation of

the unconscious

just as problematical.

For it

is

just

those things that we are most conscious of and take most for
granted that conceal a deeper,
remains alien to the god,
is familiar

but unconscious truth:

"What

the sight of the sky -- that

is what

to man."

And this

insight forms the basis of Jungian symbolism

as well.

It

is precisely "in the familiar appearances"

conscious

imagery that the patient's soul can concoct a meta¬

phorical vessel,
tent,
■what

"fundamentally alien"

"to which the invisible imparts
it is

-- unknown."

what the patient's symbols
It
to the

to the unconscious con¬
itself

in order to remain

To paraphrase Heidegger,

necessity of psychoanalysis

of

the sole

is to think one's way soberly into
say,

in order to

learn what is unspoken."

is also via this metaphor' of sky/heaven that we gat

interesting transformation of conscience.

From that

bodiless abstraction in Being and Time which calls the Self
to

its Self out of

its dispersal

in the world,

created by way of personification a more
the Call;

the divinities.

After all,

in heaven?

Clearly,

conscience,

for as Heidegger tells us,

Heidegger has

immediate source for

what is

it that dwells

the divinities function analogously to
"man spans the dimension

by measuring himself against the heavenly."

And what is

such
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measuring

if not conscience?

Last of all,

Heidegger continues

emphasize the synthetic,
aspect of

holistic and therefore authentic

this poetic existence in the

at all only

in this passage to

* between':

"man is man

in such spanning"-- again the strict demand for

authenticity;
one another"

"measure taking
-- again the

see that much in his

.

.

.

brings the two

insistence on wholeness.

later,

...

to

Thus we

poeticized philosophy has

its

foundation in the dry and soberly argued text of Being and Time.
Why,

then,

the change of format?

What else

is Hei¬

degger now saying that eluded the style of Being and Time?
There seems to be something peculiar about this "spanning of
the

'between*"

And that

which is not captured in the analytic mode.

is because such "spanning"

If"man is man"

only in such poetry,

is nothing other than poetry.
then man is a poet.

Ergo

the title "...Poetically Man Dwells...".
What,

then,

does Heidegger mean by poetry?

Already

in 1936 Heidegger had crystalized his thinking on this point
in "Hblderlin and Essence of Poetry,"

"In poetry,"

he tells us,

man is re-united on the foundation of his existence. , .
Poetry rouses the appearance of the unreal and of dream
in the face of the paloable and clamorous reality, in
which we believe ourselves at home.
And yet in just the
reverse manner, what the poet says and undertakes to be,
is the real . . .
jjPoetryJ is itself essentially estab¬
lishment -- that is to say: an act of firm foundation.
Again we hear the strident emphasis on re-uniting that which
is split apart from itself,
Time.
apart

But now Heidegger
in man:

by way of

a theme so familiar from Being and

is more specific about what is split

man finds himself estranged from his gods

interpretation — from his unconscious:

-- and
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It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god
that is coming.
It is the time of need, because it lies
under a double lack and a double Not: the No-more of the
gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is
coming.
Man as the being that is caught
•between*

is truly fallen into

in the chasm of
it.

this abysmal

But man as the being who

spans this chasm and brings the voices of the gods to mankind,
such a man is man.

And this authentic man is a poet:

In this way the essence of poetry is joined on to the
laws of the signs of the gods and of the voice of the
people, laws which tend towards and away from each
other.
The poet himself stands between the former -the gods, and the latter — the people.
He is one who
has been cast out -- out into that Between, between
gods and men.
But only and for the first time in this
Between is it decided, who man is and where he is settling
his existence.
'Poetically, dwells man on this earth.e
How does the poet accomplish his task?

Heidegger tells us,

harkening back to Nietzsche’s Tragic Artist,

.

.

that "the writing

of poetry is the fundamental naming of the gods."

32

Now we

recognize the significance of that seemingly arbitrary trans¬
formation of conscience to divinity..
if Heidegger

is right:

This

is the poetic move

to personalize the unconscious that we

may speak with it.
The poet

is characterized by a radical shift of

consciousness which makes such personalizations possible.
Poetry,

Heidegger tells us,

concerns the inner recalling conversion of consciousness
which turns our unshieldedness into the invisible of the
world8 s inner space.
[The poet4s J saying, because it
concerns the conversion, speaks not only from both realrrs
but from the oneness of the two, insofar as that oneness
has already come to be as the saving unification,^
This shift

in consciousness

is most emphatically not

some ur-

disciplined Dionysian self-dissolution in the unconscious.
The proof of this

is that the poet does not become a god,

nor
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evenjholds discourse with them.
a

symbo 1,

Instead,

which spans the

and the unconscious.

Such a

traditionally enough,

an Angels

he converses with

‘between'

of consciousness

symbol or archetype Heidegger calls,

This being, for whom borderlines and differences between
the drawings [of inner and outer] hardly exist any longer,
is the being who governs the unheard-of center of the
widest orbit and causes it to appear.
The Angel,
contents,
Rilke,

as the symbolic representative of the unconscious
has the specific function of consciousness making.

from whom Heidegger borrowed the word Angel,

makes this

point himself:
The Angel ... is that creature in whom the transmutation
of the visible into the invisible, which we achieve, seems
already accomplished.
The Angel ... is that being who
assures the recognition of a higher order of reality in
the invisible.
Note Rilke's reversal of the usual order of the visible and
the

invisible.

In so doing he emphasizes the concealing na¬

ture of even the Angel's

revelation,.

For here,

too,

it

is the

very manifestness of the daimon which implies something yet
more mysterious,
of the Angel,

more hidden.

is

in the mask

the god does no more than fascinate us and cap¬

ture our attention.
striking,

By showing himself

The parallel with Nietzsche here

is

and Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that the Angel

"metaphysically the same"

as Nietzsche's Zarathustra.

36

But this personalization is not by itself enough.
Even assuming a

proper attitude toward the unconscious,

archetypes cannot be coerced:

the

"the poetic word only acquires

its power cf naming when the gods themselves bring us to
uage."

37

The role of the poet

is not to be a

god.

but to

lang-
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await signs from the gods,

and "intercepting"

them,

"to pass

them on to his own people":
'In the first signs' the poet catches sight of the com¬
pleted message and in his word boldly presents what he
has glimpsed, so as to tell in advance of the not-yetfulfilled.3g
Like the Tragic Artist,
Dionysian unconscious,

the poet catches a glimpse of
where everything

("the completed message").
the one form,
however
seen.

And he does

in

its wholeness,

To him falls the task of

the one possibility of many,

incompletely

stand for "a

is

("not-yet-fulfilled")

so by means of symbols,

relatively unknown thing":

the

selecting

to give expression,
to what he has
which as Jung says,

relative,

that

is,

to

gods and men.
Finally,

it also remains for Heidegger's poet to

interpret a culture's collective symbols
a proper understanding of
Heidegger,

them.

quoting Hblderlin,

to explain the holy sayings."
wisdoms of a
that

in order to assure

"Sayings are good,"

says

"yet something is also needed

39

Sayings,

.

those distilled

hundred generations "in which a people remembers

it belongs

.

.

to the totality of all that exists,"

40

are

pre-ontological manifestations of the collective unconscious.
But

like all pre-ontological expressions,

gree of articulation which consciousness
symbols.

So when a poet

interprets a

does not mean that he puts

it

lends to

"Saying,"

into rational,

uage.

Poetic interpretation,

bolic,

but with this difference:

ref lective,

they lack that de¬
true poetic

Heidegger

analytical

like the Saying itself,

lang¬

is sym¬

whereas the Saying is un-

an unconscious production like a dream,

self-conscious and broadens the interpretation to

poetry is

include the

-
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-

poet * s own consciousness as well.
makes even the interpretation of

*

Thus,

like Jung,

Heidegger

symbols a symbolic process.

*

*

We must take a moment and reflect on the overall
of Heidegger*s argument.

We have demonstrated his

ness to Nietzsche and his kinship to Jung,
highlighted

the continuous elements

trast to the usual

beginning with the Rektoratsrede.
what relevance Heidegger's

Moreover,

the turn

we have
in con¬

(die Kehre)

We need to consider now

thesis has for depth psychology5

what claim can we make for the truth —
of

indebted¬

in his thinking,

reading which stresses

impact

in an everyday sense —

his poeticizing?
If we return to Jung,

we find that he,

too,

was deeply

influenced by the temptation to speak metaphorically,
clinical matters.
that all

But if

the reader accepts Kuhn's proposition

scientific description is metaphorical

not it chooses

to admit

it),

tuate the self-conscious manner

wanted to

By this v/e mean to accen¬

in which Jung employed poetic

He did not speak poetically for

existent "precise"

(whether or

then we must go one step further

and say that Jung spoke poetically.

metaphors.

even in

description,

lack of

but because he

some non¬

intentionally

include all the nuances of a metaphor which v/ould

fill out his description.
his choice of

Thus,

the name "shadow"

scious contents,

for example,

in explaining

to represent repressed uncon¬

he said:

The essence . . .has been expressed so trenchantly and
so plastically in. poetic language . . . that it v/ould be
almost presumptuous not to avail oneself of this linguis¬
tic heritage,^-
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But Jung did not stop with a mere stylistic enrichment of his
vocabulary.

He took poetic

language seriously,

this viewpoint to

its

psychic essences,

then poets must be: regarded as quasi¬

psychoanalysts.
ical analysis.

logical conclusion:

Poetic
Thus,

if

and followed

poetry expressed

insight had a validity equal

as early as

anticipating Heidegger's

later

1908,

line of

to clin¬

the fledgling Jung was
thought:

Hitherto we psychiatrists were unable to suppress a smile
when we read of a poet's attempts to describe a psychosis.
. . . But if the poet has not actually set out to copy a
case from a textbook of psychiatry, he usually knows better
than the psychiatrist.^
Despite this affinity to Heidegger,

however,

Jung

failed to find anything attractive

in the philosopher's work.

Judging from hints

Jung probably did not go

in his Letters,

beyond Being and Time,
that.

In addition,

and it

it would appear that much of what he knew

of Heidegger was by way of

direct conversations with Medard

43

Boss,

is unlikely that he finished even

.

a

prominent member of

the existential school of Pagein-

analyse,

which we have already noted as having modified Hei¬

degger.

Clearly,

of Being and Time,
to Heidegger's

Jung was not sympathetic to the wordplays
relatively modest though they were compared

later work.

Above all,

he did not consider

it

poetry:
This credulity and entrapment in words is becoming more
and more striking nowadays.
Proof of this is the rise
of such a comical philosophy as existentialism, which
labors to help being become being through the magical
power of the word.
People still believe that they can
posit cr replace reality by words, or that something has
happened when a thing is given a different name<44
And there

is certainly some validity to this criticism as

applies to Being and Time.

For as ire have made clear.

it

Being
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and Time tries

to straddle two traditions,

cendental philosophy and poetry,

traditional trans¬

and the result

leaves the

reader with an unresolved tension which can be distracting.
It

is this tension,

because

above all,

which Jung found so unpalatable,

in it he thought he detected a

symptom,

rather than

a philosophy:
Heidegger's modus philosophandi is neurotic through and
through and it is ultimately rooted in his psychic crank¬
iness. . . . For all its critical analysis, philosophy
has not yet managed to root out its psychopaths. . . .
Philosophy has still to learn that it is made by human
beings and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic
constitution. . . . Neurosis addles the brain of every
philosopher because he is at odds with himself.
His
struggle is then nothing but a systemized struggle with
his own uncertainty.^
Jung was objecting to what he regarded as Heidegger's unselfconsciousness.
of

By couching his arguments

19th century transcendental philosophy,

in the formalism
Heidegger was rely¬

ing on the weight of a customarily accepted method and pro¬
cedure to

insure the collective validity of his assertions.

But insofar as he

indulged in personalistic word-interpretations,

he was abandoning any claim for a universal theory.
move to a poetic use of words,
psychology,
philosophy.

With the

Heidegger began to write depth

but under the misleading guise of traditional
As a depth psychologist,

however,

Heidegger was

committing the worst sin,

because by failing to admit the poetic

nature of his enterprise,

he was ignoring Jung's dictum that

"every psychological theory should be criticized in the first
instance as a subjective confession "
Moreover,

46

Jung did not accept what he understood as

Heidegger's ontology.

In no way sympathetic to the Husserlian
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tradition cf

phenomenology from which Heidegger sprang,

Jung

maintained that "in spite of all existential philosophy the
opposition between ego and world,
annulled."

47

Jung's part,

subject and object,

is not

This certainly represents a misunderstanding on
and it seems

likely that Jung get this conception

of Heidegger's ontology by way of Binswanger and his Diltheyesque notion of "understanding,"
radical

interpenetration of

our foregoing discussion of
section on deseverance*
over,

which does

indeed suggest a

subject and object.
the

'between,'

But from

especially in the

and the gap which Dasein can never cross

it should be clear that Heidegger

in no way intended to

imply the possibility of Dasein somehow "dissolving"
into the world.
than that.

itself

Heidegger's conception was much more subtle

Dasein is a fundamentally different kind of being

from the world.

Dasein dwells a3.ongsj.de

Dasein is at home in the world,

(bei)

the world,

but Dasein is not the world.

When we speak of Heidegger's collapse of subject and object,
we refer to the phenomenological moment of the
which requires Dasein*s experience of
other being.

'between,'

itself as distinct from

And certainly Heidegger’s doctrine of truth does

not encourage any misconception about the world's transparency
to man,

either.

But

vocal distinction of

it

is

later works,

gods from men,

Heidegger most explicitly
by the ego.

in his

with the unequi¬

and of sky from earth,

that

rules out a willful transcendency.,

He accepts neither the Indian project of self-

dissolution nor the Western alternative of

total ego-mastery

as adequate to

Of

possibility,

the true nature of Dasein.

which offers

the latter

the prospect of a harmoniously tech-
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nologized utopia,

he says

-

in particular:

The peace of this peacefulness is merely the undisturbed
continuing restlessness of the fury of self-assertion
which is resolutely self-reliant,A0
'lo

Both the traditional Western and Eastern attitudes foster
what Nietzsche called so aptly the “Spirit of Revenge.”
degger,

on the contrary,

which was a

elaborated a philosophy of

*between*

statement of faith in man's ability to accept the

tension of this middle ground.
it

the

Hei¬

is hard to

Understood in this way,

then,

imagine that Jung would have found much to dis¬

agree with in the ontology of
More than that,

the later Heidegger.

however,

the

later Heidegger corrects

the "errors” which Jung objected to,

The significance of d_ie

Kehre was the adoption of

real poetry,

both as theme and form.

And along with this turn to poetry came the personal "confession”
which Jung had found so
liness”

lacking.

of Hblderlin's poetry,

In speaking of the "untime¬

Heidegger is tacitly acknow¬

ledging the unique nature of his own thought as well.
he regards his work as no
academic philosophy,
gress,”

but

with Being,

longer the; objective forefront of

the cutting edge of philosophical "pro¬

rather as

the revelation of one man's confrontation

Heidegger has become a genuine depth psychologist.

In saying this,
is no mere

we mean to imply that depth psychology

theoretical enterprise of the mind.

Freud's famous "self-analysis” and Jung's
"descent

When

into the unconscious”

tised by the soul.

As such,

while depth psychology may be
observations,

it

show,-,

Rather,

as

(ofttimes infamous)

depth psychology is prac¬

it is bindingly personal.

And

justified in making some general

is only because of

the collective,

archetypal

Mil.
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nature of

the soul's experience.

is poetry,

whether it be

to unravel

the Sphinx's

Jung's visions.

moreover,

the heroic epic of Freud's struggle
riddle,

Finally,

a commitment to the soul,
opinions,

Depth psychology,

or the lyric inspiration of

to be a depth psychologist reguires
over and above all conventional

as all three men learned with some bitterness.

to view Heidegger as a depth psychologist
misinterpret his work as psychology,

as

to

Thus,

is not so much to
locate the man himself

in a very special undertaking.
A different criticism of Heidegger's
well-founded than that of Jung,
of Gaston Eachelard

(1884-1962).

what

more

is suggested by the writings
An improbable concatenation

of first the philosophy of science,
later depth psychology,

thinking,

then phenomenology,

and

this French thinker's work represents

is unquestionably the best synthesis of philosophy and

psychoanalysis as yet accomplished.

Unfortunately,

out of a French tradition as he did,

Eachelard does not readily

lend himself

working

to an easy integration into our heavily Germanic

cluster of thinkers.
Jung and Heidegger,

Nevertheless,

as a student of Freud,

he was fluently conversant with the debate

which we have been describing.
BachelarcFs principal objection to Heidegger would,
we believe,

have centered around Heidegger's failure to give

explicit credit to the concrete ontogenetic aspect of Dasein:
man develops from the child,
must seek the "myth of
"Isn't that
themselves,"

and

it

is

in the child that we

origins" which so fascinated Heidegger.

opening on the world of which philosophers avail
asks Eachelard with implicit reference to Husserlian
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and Heideggarian phenomenology,
a reopening upon the prestigious world of original con¬
templations?
But put another way, is this intuition of
the world, this Weltanschauung, anything other than a
childhood which dares not speak its name?^g
Bachelard made the crucial move from phenomenology to psycho¬
logy by tying a philosophical attitude to a real,
stage of Casein*s past being.
of being,

historical

Taking as his cue this question

he observed:

Reverie teaches us that the essence of being is well-being,
a well-being rooted in the archaic being.
Without having
been, how can a philosopher be sure of being?
The archaic
being teaches me to be the same as myself.^
But note that Bachelard

in no way reduced philosophy to a

neurotic compensation for unresolved
,

infantile conflicts,

as

.

g-i

Jung did m the passage above,
“’Childhood,"

Bachelard

ological meaning,

and as many Freudians would do.

insisted,

"...

has a proper phenomen¬

a pure phenomenological meaning since

under the sign of wonder."
who marvels at the world,

52

. .
.
By recognizing the child

Bachelard was making firm,

it is
in us

establishing,

and at the same time valorizing this very special consciousness.
But one cannot experience the consciousness of
an adult unless one accepts

it for vhat it is

And such total acceptance is not easy.
mates,

it

the child as
in its entirety.

As Hans Loewald

inti¬

is perhaps the sign of the; most developed and mature

ego that can actively embrace

its childhood:

It would seem that people are more alive (though not
necessarily more 'stable'), the broader their range of
ego-reality levels is.
Perhaps the so-called fully
developed, the mature ego is not one that has become fix¬
ated at the presumably highest or latest stage of devel¬
opment, having left the others behind it, but is an ego
that integrates its reality in such a way that the earlier
and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive
as dynamic sources of higher organization.^

I L
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We may conclude that Bachelard would dismiss Heidegger*s
etymologizing as forced and

unnatural reveries.

Bachelard

felt that most philosophers were too unwilling to abandon
themselves consciously to “the child within."
who cannot freely admit his child,
upon him,

But the adult

and yet insists on dwelling

ends up distorting the child.

As Bachelard notes,

"grown-ups write children's stories too easily.

Thus they make

.
.
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childish fables."
If such a critique hits the mark vis-S-vis the early
Heidegger,

nevertheless Bachelard agrees with the later Hei¬

degger about the priviledged status of poetry.
crucial

linking of poetry to childhood,

It is

in the

however,that Bachelard

advances Heidegger one step further;
By the poet's grace we have become the pure and simple
subject of the [child's] verb, to marvel.
Poetry,

as conceived by Bachelard,

becomes analogous to the

originary speech of Loewald's earlier ego-stages.
is not merely to be
of creativity.
"the child

indulged,

but eagerly turned to as a

Speaking of "reverie"

within us,"

As such it

as

source

the consciousness of

Bachelard explains;

Poetic values make the reverie psychically beneficial.
Through poetry, reverie becomes positive, becomes an
activity which ought to interest the psychologist. . .
[Such is] the working reverie, the reverie which prepares
works.cr
Poetry,

then,

is the ego's refinement of

It is that perplexing middle ground
as the archetypal child,

the child's speech.

in which the unconscious,

creates and renews

the freely-willed cooperation of the ego.
child who torments us with symptoms,
disciplined child, brings new life.

in concert with
Far from the repressed

the poetic child,
And it

the

is partially the
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object of
of

psychoanalysis

the child:

to accomplish this

transformation

"The ultimate cause of a neurosis,"

said Jung,

is something positive which needs to be safeguarded for
the patient . . . The childhood experience of a neurotic
is not, in itself, negative: far from it.
It becomes
negative only when it finds no suitable place in the
life and outlook of the adult.
The real task of analysis,
it seems to me, is to bring about a synthesis between
the two.
In his grounding of poetry in the archetypal child,
Bachelard gives
which saves

substance to Heidegger's poeticizing in a way

it from becoming empty rhetoric.

Heidegger a great service,

He thus does

despite whatever other reservations

he might have had about the rest of Heidegger's writings.
Moreover,

.

n .

in such a groudmg,
A

Bachelard gives us a clue as to

how to meet the more fundamental charge of aetheticism which
we raised

in the earlier discussion of Nietzsche.

Aestheticism,
"mere

illusion,"

the criticism that the poetic

haunts our argument

flaunts all exorcism.

image is

like a spirit that

Can we never be done with this

lurking

feeling that all these efforts are merely self-indulgent dil¬
ettantism,

lacking rigor?

After all,

had really valued the poet,

if Heidegger or Nietzsche

should they not have restricted

themselves to writing poetry instead of contaminating their
artistry with wordy philosophizing?
unappealing mixture of

We need to explain this

forms.

We can begin by observing that many of the thinkers
whom we have mentioned belong to what Philip Wheelwright calls
the "empathic"
to

trend

in philosophy.

interpret the essence of outer

light of characteristics

that we

They exhibit

"the tendency

things and activities

in the

inwardly discern as belonging
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to ourselves."
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This

is an old tradition

stems from philosophy's roots

in philosophy and

in ancient Greece

itself,

as

both Wheelwright and Heidegger have pointed out.

It

the very ambivalence around,

the substan¬

tive,

verbal,

indifference to,

the pre-ontological suppositions

the ancient Greek language,

"The cool becomes

ontological connotation,
is nothing more

the warm"

(Fr.

intermediary third,

shifts the weight of

it."

the carrier of
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into the background.

only it makes any qualities possible?.
to be sure,

perience reality,

because

it not only requires

the immediacy of our own sensations,

matter altogether,

is sub¬

that we ex¬

limiting us

On the other hand,

labeled as merely subjective

to
whether

is another

and depends on how much in common one wishes

to credit lasein's experience of Bemg-in-the-world.
insofar as we all share the same body,
as Bachelaid tells us,
we

Know¬

for it and

Such an account

but also stipulates the way,

this account must be

This dropping

these qualities,

thereby inextricably tied to the body,

the world;

thing

the experience onto the observer himself,

while the objective element fades

jective,

has a precise

than the complete set of all the qualities

out of

is

22),

namely that "for Heraclitus a

that belong to and constitute

ledge

in

as Heraclitus does when

and powers
the

inherent

which pervaded pre-Socratic think¬

To use an adjective as a noun.,

he says,

in

and adjectival forms of a word that we find the

first hints of

ing.

and

is

take root

"the

But

images have roous,"

and "in following them we adhere to
in the world."

Now the relevance of

o0

this ei.ipathic trend of

philosophy

for contemporary thinking stands or falls upon our evaluation
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of Heidegger’s doctrine of

-

truth.

If the subjective,

bodily

and phenomenological experience of Being-in-the-world

is not

to be minimized as a mere step along the way toward higher
realities,

then we must acknowledge that

for objectivity is

the Cartesian claim

indeed founded upon a particular way of

Being-in-the-world.

That decision,

of

course,

we must each

make for ourselves.
If one grants Heidegger’s thesis,

however,

acknowledges certain universal experiences
then the conclusion seems
of

truth;

in the

and also
lived body,

inescapable that there are two kinds

objective and subjective.

Jung himself had

intimated

this already as early as Symbols of Transformation in the intro¬
ductory chapter,

"Two Kinds

of Thinking."

Let us take care

to avoid any confusion on this distinction.

No one who has

responsibly reflected on the enormous progress of

post-Cartesian

science can seriously entertain doubts as

to the power of

objective truth.

the thinkers

Of course.

colloquy have succumbed to
equally hard to dismiss

And none of

such obscurantism.

it

the other truth,

it as anxiety,

as pain.
tive

It

the time fuel

as depression,

is no accident

ignored that we

this other truth.

as mania,

We

and above all,

that Freud discovered

truth of the unconscious

first hysterical patients.

its toll:

the truth of the body.

is because this very bodily truth is

first of ail and most of
feel

so radically alienated

The Cartesian disengagement takes

objective truth denies
And

But it seems

the urgency of the distress felt by

an entire culture that has found itself
from itself.

in our

the subjec¬

in the. bodily symptoms of his

He rightly characterized such

.
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symptoms as the body's mode of "mitsprechen, "
to a consciousness

that would not otherwise

instincts are our body,
us though the body,

and

insofar as

We may not

in all manner of ways.

very frenzy with which we seek to escape
fundamental

listen.

The

they grab us and claim

we feel their truth.

and we may seek to avoid it

speaking back

like it,
But the

it only proves how

instinctual truth really is.

Subjective truth,

encountered first of all and most

of the time in our feelings,

can be likened to

experience of the archetype,

or to be more traditional,

the da imo n and god.
metaphor and ask,
sprechen )
unhelpful,

This

the bodily
of

is to do no more than pursue Freud's

"With whom do we

join in conversation

when we have our bodily symptoms?"

It is not at all

as Heidegger discovered with his Angels,

sion our affective experience in the world

(mit¬

to envi¬

in the body --

as the tangible commun1cation of an inescapable reality in
ourselves.

Again we must

credit Jung with first

identifying

this connection of man to god as a personified instinctual
complex.

Complaining of

the shortsighted pride with which

post-Enlightenment thinkers claimed to have demythologized
the world,

he remarked:

But what we have left behind are only verbal spectres,
not the psychic facts that were responsible for the birth
of the gods.
We are still as much possessed by autonomous
psychic contents as if they vers Olympians.
Today they
are ca led . . . neurotic symptoms.
The gods have become
diseases.
Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the
solar plexus.
Oftentimes

it may seem that subjective truth expresses

an alien consciousness,
it

in the above manner.

especially .if we choose to personify
That being so,

then the task of ana-
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lysis
St.

is to claim our particular gods as our own.

Paul was blinded

(hysterically,

to be sure)

Just as

by his refusal

to accept Christ as his own god. and as a part of himself,
fact which he could not bear to "see"),

so cure came by inte¬

grating the split-off complex bade into his ego.
repressing it,
of

Instead of

so dramatically expressed by his persecution

the Christians,

him.

Paul accepted the complex as belonging to

So we see that subjective truth is not necessarily an

"obvious"

truth.

On the contrary,

in demanding that we take

responsibility for what we are conscious of,
tantly, for what we are not,
Heideggerian ontology,
difficulty!

and more impor¬

we are demanding a

radically

which has given many people no

For when Heidegger says Dasein is

the emphasis should be on the "is":
permit ourselves to see and feel.

its disclosedness,

And recalling Nietzsche,

is we who give it shape and meaning.

is our own,

no

of course,

responsibility,

which renders

it,

to

life,

insofar as it

invoke Churchill,

We believe our eyes,

we know in the pits of
daimones

and to

its meaning.

A war or natural catastrophe

Subjective truth is visceral:
physical beings.

due to

the same argument can be extended to

transparent examples.

less our

it

is to give up any personal claim one might

have to the uniqueness of one's
Ultimately,

for

To disavow hysterical

paralysis or a psychogenic ulcer as somehow "really"
extrinsic causes,

little

we are the world which we

we must remember that what happens to us

less

(a

our stomachs.

is

is our consciousness

triumph or tragedy.
it happens
we

to us as

trust our senses,

The various gods and

inhabit different parts of the body.

One especially
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hallowed metaphor for a certain aspect of
feeling truth is
heart

the heart.

Certainly the

in the Western Middle Ages defines

the center of eros,

of

love,

iconography of the

it unmistakably as

passion and feeling.

tradition is much older than even this.
quity this

this subjective,

Moreover,

But the
in anti¬

locus of feeling was associated with consciousness.

As Neumann has noted.
For the Greeks, the midriff was the seat of consciousness,
for the Indians and Hebrews, the heart.
In both cases
thinking is emotional, bound up with affects and passions.
Ths dissolution of emotional components is not yet com¬
plete.
Only if a thought is a passion that grins the
heart can it reach ego consciousness and be perceived. ,,

--So,

too,

\j z.

dees Kundalini Yoga

of consciousness

in anahata,

identify the first glimmerings
the chakra of

the heart.
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It is crucial to see here that the truth of feeling
is not merely the facticity of
ing to valorize "the
is

that feeling,

consciousness,

our passions.

instinctual

like thought,

life."

We are not try¬

What is emphasized

serves to bring contents to

and that of the two,

it is

the more primordial

means of accomplishing this end.

Understanding requires both

knowledge and affect.

the objective truth,

Knowledge,

permits

the clear articulation and differentiation that communication
with others requires.
the subjective truth of

But as Jung has stressed,
the body,
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affect,

makes possible consciousness

in the first place.
Now Heidegger also distinguished between these two
realms of

truth when he announced "the

logic of

the heart":

At nearly the same time as Descartes, Pascal discovers
the logic of the heart as over against the logic of cal¬
culating reason.
The inner and invisible domain of the
heart is not only more inward t lan the interior that
belongs tc calculating representation, and therefore
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more invisible: it also extends further than does the realm
of merely producible objects.
And Bacheiard,

following the spirit of

this dichotomizing,

also

found himself unable to harmonize these two truths;
Dreaming reveries and thinking thoughts are certainly
two disciplines which are hard to reconcile.
At the
end of a jostled culture I believe more and more that
they aie disciplines of two different lives. ^
ob
The poetical thinking which Heidegger unveils for us
in What
of

Is Called Thinking?

the heart.

is thinking guided by the

logic

In his move away from Cartesian ontology,

Heidegger sought to reground Dasein's thinking about Dasein
in the
body:

immediacy of his feelings,
hence his emphasis on earth.

which are experienced in the
Like Jung's old Pueblo

C. 7
friend, '
Heidegger accused Western civilization of"thinking
with its head,''

and

reminded

it that all original thinking

is with the heart.
The truth of
verification,

poetic thinking does not depend on rational

although it does not rule that out either.

The

truth of poetic thinking -- and of Jung's symbolic life —
tested in the heart,
iences of

where our feelings,

the archetypes,

imagine is true poetry.
that not

arbitrary,
a

The

however,

those bodily exper¬

will tell us whether or not what we
And Heidegger makes

just any poetry will do:

thentic poetry.

is

it quite clear

there is authentic and

judgment of authenticity is
simply because

it is

inau¬

in no way

irrational.

There is

standard for subjective truth:
Man is capable of poetry at any time only to the degree
to which his being is appropriate to that which has a
liking for man and therefore needs his presence.
Poetry
is authentic or inauthentic to the degree of this
appropriation.
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This appropriation,
distills

the quintessential relationship of ego consciousness

with the bodily,
scious,

again stressing the question of attitude,

which,

affective,

instinctual realm of

as we have said above,

‘

does

the uncon-

indeed need mar's

presence.
Authenticity constitutes the ethical bedrock of Hei¬
degger's thought.

To be sure,

he disclaims ever so often that

we should attribute to authenticity a normative function.
Nonetheless,
as

given that we accept a certain amount of existence

irredeemably

and perhaps fortunately -- fallen,

there

still remains the question of how each man acts when he hears
the call of conscience explicitly calling him.
text

it

is hard net to give authenticity a

In this con¬

pre-eminent status.

Now authenticity deals with that mode of human exis¬
tence

in which the whole of a man's

focus as the criterion of any
that man is not God,

life

judgment.

is brought

into

The difficulty is

and cannot assume the all-knowing per¬

spective which medieval ontology attributed to God:
Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence
{ji.e. Ease in] is essentially opposed to the possibility
of our getting it in our grasp as an entity which is
a whole.
Authentic man must therefore insure the whole by spanning the
'between'
city,

of the soul,

and he does so with poetry.

which derives from the German eigen meaning "one's own,"

is therefore tied to the soul's own aesthetics.
tried to suggest,
sion,"

Authenti¬

however,

As we have

such aesthetics are not "mere illu¬

because of the special nature of the soul.

which Nietz.sche calls the "I"

of the lyricist.

The soul,
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. . . sounds from the depths of his being: its •subjectivity*
in the sense of modern aestheticism is a fiction.7
Authenticity,

founded on the true Self,

poetry because poetry,

as

the purest expression of
lective unconscious.

finds

its source

the original speech of

in

the soul,

is

the archetypal metaphors of the col¬

In "the images of the

lyricist,"

says

Nietzsche,
are nothing but his very self, find, as it were, only
different projections of himself, so he, as the moving
center of this world, may say 'I*: of course, this self
is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real
man, but the only true existent and eternal self resting
at the has is of things, through whose images lyric genius
sees this very basis,. ^
Given Nietzsche*s reading,

.

with Jung*s Self.

the authentic Self becomes

identical
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It may be objected that authenticity is also charac¬
terized by potentiality-for-being-a-whole,
the possibility of all possibilities.

the openness to

But here,

too our anal¬

ogy to the collective unconscious holds.

For poetry is the

originary giving of form to

the unformed;

but the unformed is,

by definition,

in potentia,

all possibility.

unconscious

not pot.entia,

if

after all?

And what

is the

Even so narrow a view

of the unconscious as the locus of unfulfilled wishes approx¬
imates this view,

for a wish is pure possibility.

By every criterion then,
ness,

or possibility,

in the unconscious.

be

instinct,

whole¬

the concept of authentic poetry is rooted
It

is precisely the unconscious which

grounds authentic poetry and raises
illusion.

it body,

In this context,

it from "mere"

therefore,

to the concept of authentic symbolism,
authenticity by which Heidegger

it

to "natural"

is but a short step

for every measure of

judges true poetry may be
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equally applied to symbols in the psychological sense.
authentic symbol,
abolish,

like authentic poetry,

The

spans but does not

the gap of human existence.
Of course,

the unconscious can mislead us, too:

the source of all possibilities.

it is

Heidegger's flirtation with

National Socialism is ample proof of the dangers inherent in
inspired truth.

Therefore,

the ultimate test of authenticity

cannot rest on its feeling connection to the unconscious alone.
The authentic man must also constantly immerse himself in the
reality of everyday living,

the reality of Being-in-the-vorld,

On this issue Jung commented wisely;
Life is the touchstone for the truth of the spirit.
Spirit that drags a man away from life seeking ful¬
fillment only in itself is a false [and therefore
inauthentic] spirit -- though the man too is to blame
since he can choose whether he will give himself up to
this spirit or not.^^
This double requirement,

that symbolic truth guarantee its

authenticity both from its sources in the unconscious and
from its praxis in life, makes a stringent demand upon whom¬
ever would seek it.

It might in fact turn out to be much

harder to secure than the everyday commonplaces of objective
truth.

And yet once won,

does it not at long last re-found

man's existence upon the very core of what he is?

CONCLUSION

All men by nature desire to know. ... It is
owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first
began to philosophize.
- Aristotle's Metaphysics

The word "metaphysics" comes supposedly from the
Alexandrian librarians who first gave a name to Aristotle's
book on "first philosophy."
They named it such, because
it was the book which came after the books on physics, and
was hence the next on the shelf . . .

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is
called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline,
as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot
answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. , . .
The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysics.
- Kant

Quand on parle de ce qu'on ne comprend pas et. que
ceux qui entendent ne comprenent pas non plus, on fait de la
metaphysique.
- Voltaire

Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate
effort to think clearly.
- William James

Philosophy is the world stood on its head.
- Hegel

Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is,
with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality
for our understanding,
- Heidegger

Though we do not possess a physics of the soul, and
are not even able to observe it and judge it from some
Archimedean point "outside" ourselves, and can therefore
know nothing about it since all knowledge of the psyche is
itself psychic, in spite of all this the soul is the only
experient of life and existence.
It .is, in fact, the only
immediate experience we can have and the sine qua non or the
subjective reality of the world.
Jung

CONCLUSION

In these closing pages,

I would like to turn our

attention to this paper itself.
fication,

May one not ask with

justi¬

toward what useful end this tenuous merger of phi¬

losophy and psychoanalysis

is directed?

To be sure,

boundaries of psychoanalysis have always been fluid,

the
but the

movement has heretofore usually involved the arrogant appro¬
priation of another field by psychoanalysis,
anthropology of Symbols

as

in the pseudo¬

of Transformation or Totem and Taboo.

But even where psychoanalysis has
on unwilling subject matter,

so rudely imposed itself

at least there were always very

real and practical problems which it was trying to clarify.
But

in our synthesis of philosophy and psychoanalysis

an explanation of philosophy by psychoanalysis
be addressing no concrete issue at all.

—= not

-= we seem to

Why then did I write

this paper?
The

impetus to attempt this synthesis derived from

my fundamental conviction that psychoanalysis and philosophy
are two sices of the same coin.
mind’s commentary on life,
reaction tc

the mind.

point.

"cubist”

The

Fhilosophy articulates

and psychoanalysis elucidates

The difference

the
life’s

is a question of view¬

enchantment with multiple perspectives

which this essay demonstrates,

recognizes the limitations on

knowledae that any one point of view must perforce confine us
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to.

It

is based on the value

judgment that,

to quote Jung,

it is a good thing to make occasional incursions into
other territories and to look at our subject throuch
different pairs of spectacles..
Nevertheless,

we cannot too

that by mixing fields,
nomous

lightly dismiss the objection

we vitiate

in a crucial way the auto¬

insights of each discipline.

alive to this danger when he argued

Kant was particularly
that

we do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we
lose sight of their respective limits and allow them
to run into one another^
We have a three-fold response to this
reservation.

First,

justifiable

we would argue that the self-conscious

attitude that permeates

this paper -- and of which this

conclusion is an example — ought precisely to preclude ever
"losing sight"

of the larger context of things.

ciplinary thinking need not be myopic.

Interdis¬

Second,

we take re¬

fuge in history and note that the whole field of Philosophical
Anthropology,

taking its

inspiration from Schopenhaer,

repre¬

sents nothing less than an extensively developed tradition of
just the kind of synthesis we are attempting.
takes
field,

its cue from Kant himself,

it

who gave birth to this very

despite his own reservations!

attempting anything new.

Moreover,

So we are not really-

It is only in America,

where

the

level of philosophical sophisticaticn among otherwise educated
people is so comically low,

that someone in his

even be surprised by such a synthesis.
willfully ignore the

But

ignorance can

it is no

joke to

intellectual efforts directed by some of

Europe*s greatest minds at the same problems which we today
couch in psychoanalytic

jargon.

■v
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Thirdly, and most importantly, we must consider the
specific content of philosophy and psychoanalysis.

We are

not randomly mixing two unrelated fields of endeavor.

Even

if we suspend judgment for the moment on the larger question
of perspective,

philosophy still speaks to the concerns of

psychoanalysis insofar as the latter is a form of human
knowledge, and like any branch of knowledge,
epistemological criticism.

is subject to

Psychoanalysis occupies no pri¬

vileged status vis-u-vis its theoretical foundations, and it
would do well to take advantage of the philosophical insights
which have so radically refined the theory of science in recent years.

As a theoretical system,

psychoanalysis is ter¬

ribly amateurish and provincial, and its very claim to intel¬
lectual respectability is being undermined by this laxity.
As Paul Pvicoeur observes,

n c/j

this epistemology of psychoanalysis is an urgent tasks
we can no longer content ourselves as we did twenty year
ago by distinguishing method and theory; we know now tha
in the human sciences "theory" is not something contingent,
just added on: it is constitutive of the object itself;
it is •constituting.•^
This summons to self-criticism, moreover,
one's preference for analytic,
phenomenology,
tisan:

holds regardless of

linguistic investigations over

or for Freud over Jung.

The issue is not par¬

it is rather a matter of intellectual broadmindedness

which values the insights of different perspectives, and
admits the subjectivity of ajry point of view.
There is really very little choice in the matter.
Of course, one may choose to ignore one’s limitations,
that is a debased choice.

but

If one confronts the challenge of
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perspective squarely, however,

the conclusion is inevitable

that no deep criticism from within is possible.

As Heidegger

warns us.
No sphere can say by its own methods what it is.
History
will not tell what history is.
The essence of the sphere
is the domain of thinking.^
And Nietzsche,

too,

concluded that "the problem of science

cannot be recognized in the context of science."

with that

in mind, we begin to see why it is that philosophy might pro¬
vide the most relevant critique of psychoanalysis.

Statis¬

ticians and pharmacologists may comfort themselves as much as
they please with their "damning" evidence against psycho¬
analysis, but the only essential criticism comes from that
discipline which seeks out the foundations of all forms of
hurnan knowledge.
Our only difficulty with this proposition is that
such fundamental explanations are precisely what psychoanalysis
thinks it has to offer in turn to philosophy1.

This psychol¬

ogizing of philosophy would seem to discredit Heidegger's
claim for the priority of "thinking."

To quote Jung,

in a

passage reminiscent of Nietzsche:
Not only philosophers, but our own predilections in
philosophy, and even what we are: fond of calling our
•best* truths are affected, if not dangerously under¬
mined, by this recognition of a personal premise. . .
Can it be possible that a man only thinks cr says or
does what he himself is?^
Such apparently irreconcilable claims to priority
need not lead to barren estrangement, however.

It seems to me

that by regarding both psychoanalysis and philosophy as two
different perspectives on the fundamental questions, we can
find a way to enrich and strengthen each side with the insights
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of the other.

Remember:

it

is not the perspective of psycho-

analysis or philosophy which is fun<iamental,
of

our existence as human beings._it

is prior,

is not the method which

but the question which it addresses.

There
for one,

but the experience

is precedent for such an opinion.

Nietzsche,

had no difficulty making room for two kinds of

deep-thinkers,

and afforded equal status to philosopher and

dream-interpreter:
Thus the aesthetically sensitive; man stands in the same
relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher
does to the reality of existence; he is a close and
willing observer, for these images afford him an inter¬
pretation of life, and by reflecting on these processes
he trains himself for life..-,
And the figure of Gaston Bachelard exemplifies how creative
the synthesis of

these two realms

in one man can be!

As Jung
o

insisted,

what

is really needed are "philosophic doctors.

The final charge which we must take up is a curiously
deflating one.

For it may be asked by someone outside of

both psychoanalysis and philosophy,
talk of

fundamentals?"

May we not wonder with G.J.Warnock

whether this quest after foundations
Who cares,

ask the "new"

roots of a neurosis

"Why worry about all this

is not

psychiatrists,

if we can drug-,

in fact misguided?

9

about the obscure

modify-,

or shock-away

the symptoms?
I can only reply to this protestation by indulging
momentarily in a grander view of human history.
time of Aristotle,

Since

the

Western culture has progressed on the basis

of an unchanging ontology which has covered up the "fundamental
wound of human existence."

For the past 2000 years we have
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not sought out our foundations,
let culture evolve where

but have remained content to

it would,

in whatever way it "happened."

Western thought is already well versed in the superficial ac¬
ceptance of the everyday:

there

is nothing new in Warnock's

suggestion.
As science began to make its ravaging inroads
the sturdy edifice of

the "common man,"

however,

into

its damage

to him was temporarily minimized by an uncritical reliance on
supra-personal
church,

institutions to shore up his

the state,

a kind of

society,

"natural"

valueless Leviathan.

and the family all were invoked as

But today the spectre of
we can no

or disclaim any responsibility for
There are no more accidents,
in the service of being,

technology is

longer take it for granted,
its course and future.

Technology,

as Heidegger says,

and with it our being can today

realize almost any possibility.
with

The problem of coming to terms

just what this being is can no longer be dismissed as the

idle task of a few quaintly irrelevant Greeks.
doctors and psychiatrists are making

are being made,

and these definitions

whether we choose to be aware of

it not therefore timely,

sider consciously

The decisions

right now require the

most thoroughgoing definitions of man,

Is

The

bulwark against the encroachments of this

upon us with avengeance;

is

identity.

it or not.

and incumbent upon us,

just what we human beings are,

to recon-

and what we

want from our technology?
The challenge to psychiatry is a

real one.

And yet,

we have been started off on the right track already with the
initial

insights of

psychoanalysis.

As Jung said in praise
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of Freud,
It was Freud*s momentous discovery that the neurosis is
not a mere agglomeration of symptoms, but a wrong func¬
tioning which affects the whole psyche.
The important
thing is not the neurosis, but j:he man who has the neurosis.
We have set to work on the human being, and we must be
able to do him justice as a human being. Q
The danger of

the new psychotherapeutics

is that it threatens

to throw away this key insight in the rush to "correct malfunc¬
tioning systems."

People are not machines,

at-hand attitude which says
ters,

they are,

and the present-

and which science fos¬

may well be the most pernicious result of that uneasy

wedding of psychology with medicine.
its commitment to the human psyche,
temporary setbacks

in "progress."

Psychiatry must

renew

even at the expense of
Psychoanalysis has a higher

responsibility than to the demands of an anxious public or a
soulless mental health bureaucracy.
obligation to authentic man,
its ramifications.

Psychoanalysis has an

to guarantee his humanity in all

Said Jung,

. t . one cannot treat the psyche without touching on
man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and
deepest issues, anymore than one can treat the sick
body without regard to the totality of its functions,
or rather . . . the totality of the sick man himself.
Insofar as philosophy spurs the psychoanalyst on to remembering
his true

task --

indispensable and
In that spirit,

the patient*s authenticity —

it becomes

integral to his cnm authentic functioning.

I will be satisfied if this essay encourages

even a single psychiatrist to reflect for a moment on the
meaning of his work.

At least I am content in knowing that

it caused a psychiatrist-to-be,

its author,

to do so.
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Is Called Thinking?,

H176.

p.

225,

-

179

-

9
Rudolf Arnheim,
10

Ibid.,

,
Michael

p.

Visual Thinking,

p.

120

(italics added).

254.

11
12

Folanyi,

Thomas Kuhn,

p.

The Tacit Dimension,

Lecture I.

198.

13

Lawrence Kubie, "Unresolved Problems Concerning the
Relation of Art to Psychotherapy," Am j Art Ther, 2:95, 1973.
14

.
We follow Hillman here in stressing the universality
and necessity of pathologizing.
Pain is not always the
result of illness, and in fact should be given the respect
that is due a messenger of the soul.
To call someone sick
suggests that we try to get rid of his pain, instead of trying
to understand its meaning.
For a "full account of this point
of view, see Revisioning Psychology, Chapter II.
15

Stefan Kbrner, Lectures delivered at Berkeley College
(Yale University) in the fall of 1976.
16CP,

CW 3,

para.

320.

17

.
Hillman, p. 192.
Hillman notes that therapeut.es meant
in ancient Greek "one who attends to anything" and "one who
attends to the sick."
It is used by Socrates to denote "one
who serves the Gods" (see Phaedrus, 252C; Laws, 740B). But
to serve and to attend to also means to care for.
And in
this connection the reader is directed to Heidegger*s analysis
of the fable of cura in Being and Time, p. H 197-199.

Interlude

SE

^Freud, "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words",
11, pp. 153-161.

2

Jung, "Spirit and Life", CW 8, para, 626.
Jung began
his etymological investigations as early as Symbols of Trans¬
formation, and even had his wife woiking on them (F/J Letters,
297J).
For examples, see the discussion of "libido" in
Symbols of Transformation, CW 5, paras. 186-189.
3

Ernest Jones, "Theory of
Analysis , pa. I30ff.
\s

in

the Iliad,

4,453

Symbolism",

Papers on Psycho-

or 5,774.

5

....
All th? following definitions are taken from Liddell
and Scott's Greek-Bnglish Dictionary unless otherwise noted,
^Leopoli Stein, "What is a Symbol Supposed to Be?",
J Anal Psyci, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 3957, p. 77,

180

Jung,
210.

para.

"A Psychological Approach to the Trinity". CW 9 i
*2*45*789

8Stein,
9

Ibid.,

p.

74.

p.

77

10Heidegger,
11Stein,

p.

(italics added).
Being and Time,

p.

H 220.

74.

12„

For example, m Fr. 81 Heraclitus says: "Men should
speak with rational awareness (xuo no) and thereby hold on
strongly to that which is shared" in common (to xuno) ." Quoted
from Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus, p. 120.

Predecessors

Hlarie Louise von Franz,
Spring 1970, p. 190.

2

Immanuel Kant,

"The Library of C.G.Jung",

The Critique of Pure Reason,

p.

14.

^Ibid.
4Ibid.,

p.

8.

5
Heidegger,

Being and Time,

pp.

Peter Gay,

The Enlightenment,

H 318-321.

0
Vol.

II,

p.

534.

7

". , .we must take up these arms again in order to seek
in the mortal use of [practical] reason, and to base on this,
the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility
of which speculation-III•e. theoretical reason] cannot adequately
prove." Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 292,
Note that
freedom occupies a special place, since Kant argues that of
these three ideas, only freedom is such that we must know that
it exists a priori. Yet we cannot give any content to this
knowledge.
See p. 29In.

8
9

Kant,

The Critique of Judgment,

Ibid, i

p.

530

p.

528.

(and the following quotes).

18>Ibid. ,

p.

^Ibid.,

Introduction to Section III,

i 2

534.

■“ Arthur Schopenhauer,
Vol. II, p. 160.

The World as Will and Representation,

’

*

-

13 , .
Ibid.,

Vol.

I,

14,.,
Ibid.,

Vol.

II

loIbid.,

p.

181.

16 , . ,
Ibid,,

p.

364.

^Ibid.,

p.

183.

,

181

—1

-u

-

-J-o ui. AA-iiiy »

Jj veil

Cllt:

V 6J

Ci xJ'

ulary is the same.
For example: Metaphysics Mdiscloses only
the true understanding of the world lying before it in exper¬
ience. " (p. 183) .
18

Ibid.,

Vol.

I.,

p.

51.

19

Ibid., p. 52. Cne recalls in this context Jung's concept
of attitude, especially as he elaborates it with respect to
the feeling function in Psychological Types, paras. 687ff,
especially para. 690.

20 , .

Ibid.

21

Ibid.,

p.

58.

^Ibid, ,

p.

234.

23

Ibid.

24 , . ,
Ibid.
25Ibid.,

26
6.32f

Vol.

II,

364.

Ludwig Wittgenstein,
(italics added).

^Schopenhauer,

28

p.

Vol.

Tractatus Logicophilosophicus,

II,

p.

364.

One should also note at this point Schopenhauer's careful
definitions of "allegory5' and "symbol," as opposed to Idea.
Allegory was a work of art signifying something different from
what it depicts.
It always signified a concept, not an Idea.
A symbol, cn the other hand, is an "allegory" in which there
is no connexion between signifier and concept.
Because it is
based on a stipulated (but not on that account arbitrary!)
agreement, the signifier can be forgotten over the course of
time, and then the symbol becomes "dumb." (Vol. I, para. 50.)
Note that both allegory and symbol in Schopenhauer's sense
are explicitly tied to concepts, that is, to a known, expressible
thing.
Herce they recall Piaget's definitions in Play, Drea ns
and Imitation in Childhood (pp. 168-170), where he defines,
after de Saussure, a symbol (i.e, Schopenhauer's "allegory")
as a motivated signifier in which there is a resemblance of
some kind between it and the thing signified; and a sign
(i.e. Schopenhauer's "symbol") as an arbitrary signifier,
related to the signified by social or other convention.
It is

182

precisely the unfathomable quality of Ideas, on the other
hand, which would lead Piaget to classify them as "secondary"
symbols, which distinguishes them from these other categories.
We include this observation to emphasize that Schopenhauer
fully understood the subtleties of his definitions, and was
not ignoring a whole additional set of refinements which has
recently captured so much attention.
29

Karsten Harries, Lectures delivered on Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche at Yale College in the fall of 1976.
The following
passage from Rilke, quoted by Heidegger, is an eloquent
example of such an inversion:
However vast the 'outer space' may be, yet with all its
sidereal distances it hardly bears comparison with the
dimensions, with the depth dimensions of our inner being,
which does not even need the spaciousness of the universe
to be within itself unfathomable . . . To me it seems more
and more as though our customary consciousness lives on
the tip of a pyramid whose base within us (and in a cer¬
tain way beneath us) widens out so fully that the farther
we find ourselves able to descend into it, the more gen¬
erally we appear to be merged into those things that in¬
dependent of time and space, are given in our earthly,
in the widest sense, worldly, existence. From "What are
Poets for?", p. 128.
20

Schopenhauer,

Vol.

II,

p.

407.

O I

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 235.
debate on pp. 69-75 supra.
37

Nietzsche,

33Ibid.,

p.

One recalls here the Arnheim/Kubie

The Birth of Tragedy,

p.

24.

18.

34

See Ernst Cassirer's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,
Vol. II, in this regard.
We will have more to say about
Cassirer below.
35Nietzsche,

The Birth of Tragedy,

36Ibid.,

p.

73,

3^Ibid.,

p.

123.

p.

38

(original

italics).

38Ibid
See Jung on the psychology of "as if" in "The Psy¬
chology of the Child Archetype", CN 9,i, para. 265.
oq

D^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil,
The Interpretation of Dreams, ”p. o67 :
can”set”our"mental apparatus at work."

40

Ibid.,

p.

21.

p. 42. Cf. Freud,
"Nothing but a wish

'
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-

41

James Hillman, "Demonology: Jungian Self-Knowledge and
the Pandemonium of Images", Lecture delivered under the
auspices of the Kanzer Fund at Yale University on 8 November,
42

.
Nietzsche,

^3Ibid. ,

p.

Beyond Good and Evil,

p,

1976,

46.

104.

44

"Den Gott verhUllt seine Schttnheit: so verbirgst du
deine Sterne." (translation mine). Also Sprach Zarathustra,
"Vor Sonnen-Aufgang", p. 414.

45

This connection between Narcissism and Nietzsche*s
account of how consciousness is fascinated by the other who
looks like oneself, is further developed in Edward Edinger’s
book, Ego and Archetype (Baltimore, 1973).
He explains this
fascination with one's self-image as one of the first driving
forces towards an encounter with the unconscious.
Naturally,
as the Narcissus myth shows so well, from the point of view
of the ego, initial immersion in the unconscious is experi¬
enced as a kind of death (drowning).
But as the metamorphosis
into a flower demonstrates, it is a symbolic death only.
See Edinger, pp. 161-162.
46

Nietzsche,

Beyond Good and Evil,

p.

233.

^Nietzsche,

The Birth of Tragedy,

p.

44.

^3Jung,

Mysterium Conjunctionis,

CW

15,

para.

129.

49

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and EvjI, p. 233,
Note that
Nietzsche uses similar imagery in Zarathustra ("Vor SonnenAufgang"), when Zarathustra demands that the sky be purified
of any clouds that would mar the immediacy of Zarathustra's
relationship with the sky, "das ungeheure unbegrenzte Jaund Amen-sagen." (p. 415).
50

Nietzsche,

51Nietzsche,

Also Sprach Zarathustra,

p,

The Birth of Tragedy,

86.

52Jbid.,

p.

109.

53Ibid,,

p.

88.

3^Ibid,,

p.

93.

^3Ibid.,

p.

34.

p.

416.

A Contemporary:_Ernst Cassirer

p.

^Heidegger, "Die Selfostbehaupturg der DeutschenUniversitat",
11,
The examples of 20th century mythologizing in every

.
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field of endeavor surpass documentation: Yeats' Irish fables,
Pound's Cantos, Mann's Faustus and Zauberer, Chagall's visions,
Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, even the very burgeoning of whole
disciplines such as ethnography and anthropology.

2
p.

Ernst Cassirer,

The Philosophy of

Symbolic Forms,

Vol.

II,

3.
3Ibid.,

p.

4.

4It should be noted that this structuralist alternative
is implicitly anticipated by Cassierer himself: ’’Even if a
merely factual unity of the basic mythical configurations
could be demonstrated beyond any doubt, this unity would still
remain a puzzle unless it could be referred back to an under¬
lying structural form. (p. 19).
5

Schellmg,

quoted by Cassirer,

^Schelling,

ibid.,

p.

4

7

. .
ibid. ,

p.

8.

p.

37.

.
Schellmg,

^Ibid.,

p.

ibid.,

10Schelling,

ibid.,

11Schelling,

ibid.

^Ibid,,

p.

36.

ibid.,

p,

24.

(italics added).

p.

Cf.

Jung's famous quote on p,28,

6.

14Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy,
Criticism", sections 6-9.

pp.

l5Cassirer,

p.

18Ibid. r

203.

p.

12.

8.

'Schelling,
supra.

^

p.

17Ibid., p. 239
34-36 supra.

26

“Attempt, at Self-

(italics added).

(italics added),,

18Friedrich Jacobi,

Cf.

Jung's comment on

quoted in Cassirer,

p.

254

(italics

added).

and

l9Cf. Ereud, "On Repression", SF 14, p. 152, where affect
idea become the representatives of the forever unconscious

instinct.
20See Erich Neumann's The_0riglns and History of Consciousness, p. 2£, where he describes the necessity of emotional in¬
volvement in order to bring things to consciousness.
See also
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Jung, "Spirit and Life," CW 8, para. 634, where the affective
motivation of an idea is emphasized.
And of course the idea
is implicit in the above-mentioned essay by Freud as well.
The whole problem of feeling is explored further in our dis¬
cussion of Heidegger, pp. 15lff.

21
This is m contradistinction to Freud and Lacan,
place the word in the unconscious.

who

22

Cassirer, p, 78.
Note that Cassirer is heavily indebted
here to Rudolf Otto and his book, Das Heilice (1917).
Also,
it should be pointed out in this context that current thinking
is no longer so anthropomorphically inclined to reserve all
the credit for human beings.
Lower animals, too, are capable
of surprisingly sophisticated behavior that transcends mere
negative stimulus-response modes.
See Edward Wilson's Sociobiology in this regard.
^Ibid. ,

pp.

217-218

(italics added).

24

Heidegger, "A Review of Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Thought",
in The Piety of Thinking, p. 45.
Kant, too, would probably
have classified Cassirer's work as "anthropology."

Heidegger and the New Ontology

^Note the wary suggestion from one prominent ego-psychologist
"The interest of the psychoanalytic psychiatrist is now directed
toward what motivates each patient to keep material in dis¬
sociation and toward the reactions of the patient in response
to repressed material which mounts into awareness, rather than
toward its contents per se. , . . As a result, the attention
of the psychiatrist has recently been focused more upon the
investigation of the ego-defenses. . . . than upon the scrutiny
of the contents ..." From Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles
of Intensive Psychotherapy, p. 73 (italics added).

2

"Em wanig Gift ab und zu: das macht angenehme Trflume,
Und viel Gift zuletzt, zu einem angenehrnen Sterben." From
Friedrich Kietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 284 (trans¬
lation mine).
3

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 98-101,
Heidegger
examines here the Cartesian conception of man.
It will be
recalled that it was in Descartes8 century that the idea of
man as machine took the world by storm.
^"Die Zeit ist abgeflossen, wo nir noch Zufaile begegnen
durftenj und was KOnnte jetzt noch zu mir fallen, was nicht.
schon mein Eigen ware!". Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 403
(translation mine).

5

Heidegger,

Being and Time,

p.

H 133.
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8Ibid.

7Ibid.,

p.

H 227.

8Ibid.
9
Jung,

Memories,

1QIbid.,

p.

Dreams,

Reflections,

p.

326.

279.

11Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 219.
It is interesting
to note that despite initial objections among philosophers to
Heidegger's etymology of aletheia, recent studies tend to con¬
firm his interpretation, at least for the Pre-Socratic use
of the term.
See Paul Friedlander9s Plato, pp. 221-22, in
this regard.
12Kuhn,

p# in.

13

.
Although it would seem that someone as intelligent as
Wittgenstein was nevertheless not so open to this wonder. See
his peculiarly misleading discussion of this same rabbit-duck
figure in Philosophical Investigations, pp, I94ff, in which
the phenomenon gets lost in his account of "seeing-as,"
14
"Heidegger, Being and Time,
of "Mnemosyne''in this regard.
15Ibid.,

p.

H 222.

16Ibid.,

p.

H 226.

17Ibid.,
paragraph)".

p.

H 108.

P.

H 132.

18

Ibid.,

19
~Ibid.
28>Ibid.,

21

p.

H 215.

One thinks again

(and all other quotations

(original

in this

italics).

(italics added).
p.

H 233,

.Ibid,

Ibid,, p. H 373.
connectedness of life"
23Ibid.,

p.

H 374.

Heidegger borrowed the expression "tie
(Die Zusammenhang des Lebens) from Dilthey.
(and all following quotations up to the

next notation.)
2^Ibid.,

p.

H 373.

25hTeidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...",
Language, Thought, pp. 220-221 (italics added).

in Poetry,

£ 9

-

26

187

See Nietzsche's comments about the sky on p.

104 &

106,

supra.
27

Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", pp. 222-225
(and all further quotations in this paragraph; italics added).

28

The quotation originally ran: "...the sole necessity,
by thinking our way soberly into what his poetry says, to
come to learn what is unspoken." "What are Poets for?" in
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 96.
29

Heidegger, "Hblderlin and the Essence of Poetry",
Existence and Being, p. 286 (italics added).
Ibid.,

p.

289.

3lJbid.,

p.

288.

32Ibid.,

p.

287.

33Heidegger,
34
35

Ibid.,

p.

"’What are Poets for?",

p.

in

133.

134.

Ibid.

36Ibid.

See pp.

104-106 supra for Nietzsche's discussion

of masks.
37Heidegger,
38

"HBlderlin and the Essence of Poetry,"

237.

Ibid.
288.

39Ibid.,

P*

49Ibid,,

(italics added).

41

p.

NP,

CW

8»

para,

409.

42
^CP, Cl 3, para. 354. Note that it was in this spirit
that the early psychoanalytic journal Imago was named after
the title on Carl Spitteler's novel,
43Jung had been instrumental in founding an interdisciplinary
curatorium in Zurich for the exchange of ideas on psychotherapy.
He had direct contact therefore with several Swiss existential
psychiatrists.
See Letters, Vol. II, pp. xl-xlv.
44Letters,

Vol.

II,

p.

261.

Jung is clearly referring

to

Heidegger in this passage,
45Letters,

Vol.

I,

p.

33]-2.

4^jung, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally", CW 10, para. 1025.
In another passage, Jung expounded on this theme: "We are still
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far from Nietzsche's view of philosophy and indeed of theology,
as an 'ancilla psychologiae*, for not even the psychologist
is prepared to regard his statements, at least in part, as a
subjectively conditioned confession." in NP, CW 8, para. 344.
Nietzsche's comments in this regard are as follows: "Gradually
I have come to realize what every great philosophy up to now
has been: the personal confession of its originator, a type
of involuntary and unaware memoirs, , . . There is nothing
impersonal whatever in the philosopher.
And particularly his
morality testifies decidedly and decisively as to who he is
— that is, in what order of rank the innermost desires of his
nature occupy." from Beyond Good and Evil, p. 6.
47
48
49

Letters,

Vol.

Heidegger,

II,

Ibid.,

p.

xlii.

"What are Poets for?",

Gaston Bachelard,

50

p,

p.

116,

The Poetics of Reverie,

p*

103,

193.

51

The classic example Being Ernest Jones* comment on
James Putnam's philosophizing, which he assumed was "placed
in the service of some or other unconscious resistance."
See Putnam, p. 464.

52
53
1951,

Bachelard,

p.

Hans Loewald,
32:10-18.

127,
"Ego and Reality",

Int J Psychoanalysis,

5ZL

Bachelard, p, 118.
And perhaps this best explains
Jung's cantankerous put-down of Heidegger, since Jung was
not hostile to philosophy on principle.
JIbid. ,
56
57

Ibid.,
RPP,

p.

127.

p.

182.

CW 16,

para.

564.

5R

Wheelwright, p. 49.
Jung clearly belongs to this
family of empathic thinkers.
For e>ample: "We must never
forget that the world is, in the first place, a subjective
phenomenon.
The impressions we receive from these accidental
happenings are also our own doing." from TP, CW 4, para. 400,
Toriginal italics j.
59
60
61

Ibid.,

p.

Bachelard,

31
p.

196.

Jung, "Commentary on
(1929), CW 13, para. 54.

'The Secret of

the Golden Flower1

189

62

Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness,
This recalls the "little metapsychology" of" Jacobi on p.
supra.

63
Spring
64
para.
65

Jung, "Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga",
1975, p. 3Off.
Jung,
621.

"A Study in the Process of

Heidegger,

"What are Poets

k^Bachelard,
67

Jung,

p,

70
71

See page

for?",

Dreams,

CW 9,i,

127.

p.

248.

"...Poetically Man Dwells...",

120,

p.

228.

supra.

Being and Time,

.
Nietzsche,

The Birth of Tragedy,

p.

p.

Reflections,

Heidegger,

72Ibid.,

Individuation",

177.

Memories,

&8Heidegger,
69

p. 26.
117

p.

H 233,
p.

49.

50

73

.

Note that Jung himself used the word "authentic" m
just this sense cf distinguishing between the collective,
everyday (and super-ego) morality of the they-self, and
the truly individual morality involved in a decision which
transcends the confines of conventional conduct.
See "A
Psychological View of Conscience" (1958), CW 10, para. 838.
74SL,

CW

8,

para.

647.

Conclusion

1F/J Letters,

2

Kant,

287J,

p.

471.

Critigue of Pure Reason,

p.

5,

"3

Paul Ricoeur,

Conflit des

Interpretations,

lation mine).
4 He i d e c:g e r,

What

Is Called Thinking? ,

p.

5
Nietzsche,
6PAMA,

The Birth of Tragedy,

CW 9,i,

para.

p.

18,

p,

34.

150.

7
Nietzsche,

The Birth of Tragedy,

33.

p.

107

(trans¬

190

o

para.

Jung,
179.

"Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life",

CW

16,

9

G.J.Warnock, The Philosophy of Perception, pp. iff.
We
can cite Warnock as someone outside of philosophy if we recall
with Heidegger that philosophy is metaphysics.
And Warnock
does not dc metaphysics. . .
^Jung,
para. 190,
^Ibid. ,

"Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life",

para.

175.

CW

16,
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